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Summary: 
 
Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction of  the metaphysical priority of  the present 
simultaneously validates presence as the absolute form of  meaning. In order to succeed, 
deconstruction is bound to offer the most robust defence of  transcendental 
phenomenology’s systematic articulation of  the very constitution of  experience in its 
absolute and irrecusably present form. 
Edmund Husserl’s late philosophy of  history accounts for the contradiction of  
atemporal truth—how it is created in time, and how it is possible for the historical 
investigation of  this truth to determine its meaning with absolute certainty. Through the 
necessity of  an ideal and phenomenologically reduced history—not only for the work of  
historical investigation in its own right, but as a constituent of  the meaning of  any truth—
Derrida explains why Husserl devotes so much effort to explicating the structure and 
process of  the formation of  ideal objects in the course of  what is ostensively an 
explanation of  the origination of  the geometrical science itself  out of  subjective 
experience. The purpose of  this is only ever implied in Husserl’s own work “The Origin of  
Geometry”, and the implications are subtle. 
The purpose of  this thesis is to detail how the structures of  Husserl’s system serve 
the end clearly elucidated by Derrida. It first explains how objective truth is constituted and 
an ideal history made possible through Husserl’s examination of  their appearance in the 
living present, and following this it examines the problems raised by Derrida’s 
deconstruction itself. 
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Introduction 
 
What is a philosophical treatment of  history? This, together with the intimately related 
question of  the philosophy of  the other, is perhaps the question of  the twentieth century. 
The difficulty of  both of  these questions is aggravated by the conflicting demands of  
critical philosophy on the one hand and of  a difference which must be thought without 
dissimulation on the other. In the space of  a decade—that momentous decade known as 
the sixties—Derrida practices a careful attention to this difficulty, an attention that resists 
dismissing the legitimacy of  the concerns on either side. It is an attention that shapes the 
character of  his own philosophical project of  deconstruction and its most notable 
concepts, such as differance, being developed during this time, and it pushes the concerns 
motivating both principles as far as they will go. 
 A history which is philosophically adequate must be critical in the Kantian sense—
it must account for the conditions of  the knowledge it claims. That is, history that is 
philosophical (or even just not philosophically bankrupt) must be capable of  showing with 
certainty how it is possible for history to be known now. For this reason, it must address 
itself  as much to the present in which historical knowledge is arrived at as it does to the 
past that is its object. It must be capable of  explaining how the present can see and speak 
of  its history. This means avoiding what Foucault called “the surreptitious practices of  
historians, their pretension to examine things furthest from themselves” (NGH 89) without 
also and first examining the closest thing—the knowing subject in their historical present. 
It is to a philosophical history, what he calls ideal history, that Husserl turns, decades after 
banishing the kind of  history later ridiculed by Foucault in terms reminiscent of  Husserl’s 
own attack on the idealist confusions of  Gallilean science. Seeking historical knowledge 
that is sufficiently certain to provide the grounding for the truths of  the ideal sciences, 
Husserl is above all concerned to account for those structures of  ideality such as language, 
community, writing, and repeatability that have endowed the present with the capacity to 
study its past. Having devoted serious study to Husserl for a decade already at the point at 
which he writes his great book on history in Husserl’s transcendental system—an 
introduction to an unpublished fragment called by Eugen Fink the Origin of  Geometry—
Derrida assiduously examines and full-throatedly defends Husserl’s strange and counter-
intuitive philosophy of  history in which timeless structures and teleology rather than 
anecdotes about an exotic yesteryear are rightly emphasised as its true meaning. 
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 Over against this is the need for a true history not to conceal the remove at which 
its subject is found by treating the other time of  the past as mere appearance-to-the-
present. As Derrida notes in his 1964/65 lecture on Heidegger: Heidegger: La Question de 
l’Être et de l’Histoire: “to define the sense of  being as presence is obviously to reduce 
historicity” (HQ 213)1 would be unphilosophical (“n’est pas un geste de philosophe” [213]) 
because it would dissimulate its subject. In treating history as an appearance to the present, 
it would conceal exactly what is essential to history—its difference from the present.  
 This tension drives at the heart of  the difficulty of  treating history, and since we 
can no longer, since Hegel, pretend that there is anything in the world that is not historical, 
begs the attention of  any philosophical effort. Modern philosophy’s assiduous self-
conscious attention to the present or timeless conditions for the possibility of  historical 
experience and thought includes, nay demands, the recognition of  its own limits. It is 
because we have ceased to be confused about how we know about the past, or to fool 
ourselves into thinking that it appears to us in itself, that we can recognise that we have 
failed to do justice to exactly what historicity has demanded we must—a past that precedes 
the conscious constitution thereof  (viz., the present). To put it simply, we have lost the 
past. 
 This is, in a sense, a particular species of  the complaint voiced against critical 
philosophy by Quentin Meillassoux: “For it could be that contemporary philosophers have 
lost the great outdoors, the absolute outside of  pre-critical thinkers: that outside which was not 
relative to us, and which was given as indifferent to its own givenness to be what it is, 
existing in itself  regardless of  whether we are thinking of  it or not; that outside which 
thought could explore with the legitimate feeling of  being on foreign territory - of  being 
entirely elsewhere.” History, like the other, is a problem for philosophy because it confronts 
us with what must not be merely sublimated by thought.2 
 Husserlean phenomenology represents the bleeding edge of  the critical philosophy 
of  history; the point at which its ultimate theoretical articulation pushes it as far as possible 
to the limit of  responsible, self-critical investigation and to the point at which it must 
succeed or break. A limit to the problem of  history was built into Kantian philosophy at 
the point of  its greatest conceptual flaw—the notion of  limit itself  and in particular of  the 
                                                
1 “Définir le sense de l’être comme presence c’est bien évidemment réduire l’historicité” 
2 Though the privilege of historicity makes it anything but a species of a greater problem—the 
historicity of being makes this THE problem of alterity par excellence. If reason is the search for 
origins, as Levinas has it—"All rationality then amounts to the discovery of the origin, the 
principle." (131), and Meillassoux is himself primarily interested in the questions of origin. 
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in itself. Given a presupposition of  a thing-in-itself, if  our experience of  historical being is 
limited by the subjective conditions of  consciousness, it does not follow that we are 
constrained to say that that is all there is of  our origin. The noumenal presupposition keeps 
us from falling into the problem discussed above—of  denying the meaningfulness of  the 
past as anything but an appearance in and to the present. The Kantian, as long as he 
interprets Kant in a certain way rejected by Fichte, can say that what more there is of  our 
coming to be is in an in itself to which reason cannot ascend. 
 Transcendental phenomenology aggravates the problem by denying itself  the 
luxury of  this ‘back door’. By reducing existence—that is by recognising that the things 
themselves are not some imagined pure object essentially inaccessible to experience, but the 
objects of  consciousness that make up the only ‘real’, in the sense of  meaningful and 
undeniable, world; the world of  experience—phenomenology, when it reduces history to 
the experience of  history does so absolutely. There is no meaningful sense in which a 
residuum or phantom of  the absolute and irreducible past can be posited and held in 
reserve. 
 Husserl’s philosophy as a whole makes the way he treats history at last in his final 
project necessary, if  not inevitable. As the only entirely critical—and thus 
phenomenological—philosophy of  history, it is what Husserl would have to produce in 
order to come to terms with and explain historicity. It is a remarkable and unique work, in 
part because of  the peculiarity of  its aim and the single-mindedness with which it is 
pursued. The double-bind Husserl takes aim at is the difficulty of  explaining how it is 
possible for history, historical experience, and objects of  history to be known, in a critical 
way. 
 
In the origin of  geometry, Husserl sets out to account for a miracle. How is it that 
truth invented in time has come to be universal and immune to time’s vicissitudes? Indeed, 
the invention of  truth seems to indicate a contradiction, and the thought of  what has an 
origin coming to be atemporal seems to confirm its contradictoriness. However, if  Husserl 
is to counteract the forgetting of  the meaning of  truth that has led us to a crisis of  the 
sciences and of  philosophy, it can only be by demonstrating the original meaning of  
truth—that is to say, the meaning that made the invention of  the truth possible—with 
absolute certainty, and this means showing how truth can have originated. 
 Only truth with an origin in history can have its meaning grounded in the existing 
world, the world that can be experienced by a perceiving subject. Without having come into 
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being at a particular time, there could not be meaningful truth that relates to existence, only 
empty validities existing in a system of  internal coherence; it is in its origin, if  nowhere 
else, that truth has significance to (without necessarily directly signifying) experience. An 
ideal objective truth of  the sort in mathematics or geometry, the meaning of  which does 
not refer directly to anything in the world of  possible or actual experience, nevertheless 
contains in its existence the necessity of  an origin—an original coming-to-be—and that 
necessity is the trace of  its relation to a meaningful world. This significance, not contained 
within the truth, but in principle determinable with apodeictic certainty on the basis of  its 
existence as universal truth is what has been forgotten by the sciences. If  how it had to 
have come into being and been made universal and necessary can be worked out without 
the possibility of  error, then it may be possible to reverse this forgetting and reactivate the 
originary significance. This is the purpose of  Husserl’s philosophical and palliative efforts, 
and what it is meant to contribute to the project of  the Crisis of  European Sciences and 
Transcendental Phenomenology. 
 While the reactivation of  the originary significance of  truth is the purpose of  
Husserl’s investigation in the Origin of  Geometry, the lion’s share of  work is devoted to 
accounting for the creation of  truth. Much of  Husserl’s arduous explication is not meant 
to explain the details of  the reactivating meaning and the reactivation of  it that would 
ameliorate the crisis, but to explaining how a scientific tradition that preserves and develops 
truth in a condition of  crisis has been possible. At length and in detail, Husserl explains the 
complex of  ideal and cultural conditions and capacities that were necessary in order for an 
idea that came into being to be able to become invulnerable to historical accidents and the 
vicissitudes of  time. On a first reading it may not be obvious how this intricate system of  
truth-creation that Husserl finds in culture relates to the problem of  the originating 
meaning of  truth and its forgetting by the sciences that rely on it. The reason is this—in 
order for the reactivation of  original meaning to be possible, the system which preserves 
the mark of  its existence must be determined with certainty and necessity. That is to say, in 
order to be able to point to the necessity of  an origin and then to be able to draw 
conclusions about its origin it was necessary to prove that the ideal science of  (for 
example) geometry is indeed universally true and not subject to cultural and historical 
contingency and that it can have been created as objective truth in every relevant sense. It is 
only once the possibility of  the invention of  truth as truth had been accounted for that the 
originating meaning of  the truth could be excavated and reactivated. This is what makes 
the short, incomplete text so strange—its deeply original goal of  the basis of  a science of  
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subjectivity can only be attained by going the other way, as it were, by explaining the 
conditions of  possibility for a kind of  historical objective ideality made immune to all 
historical contingency. The result, counterintuitively, is a defense of  objectivity. In his 
Introduction to the Origin of  Geometry, Derrida explains the purpose of  this baroque and to 
begin with non-obvious project. 
 To make the point of  the Origin’s enquiry clear, Derrida offers a remarkably robust 
explication and defence of  what Husserl calls ideal history, carefully explaining how 
Husserl’s renewed interest in the significance of  history coheres with his much earlier but 
sustained dislike for history. Since Logical Investigations Husserl had consistently opposed any 
effort to seek an explanation for truths in contingent historically, psychologically, or 
biologically contingent conditions. Derrida explains that his fresh interest in history is 
actually in complete accord with the earlier dismissal of  history it seems to directly 
contradict. Here history has been reduced to its essence, allowing its meaning to be 
recuperated. The importance of  history is exclusively in the essential structures of  history. 
Derrida clarifies that it is only what can be determined to have been essential to the coming 
to be of  truth as truth (and not as contingent, historically or psychologically peculiar fact) 
that can have any relevance to the truth or offer any explanation for or of  it. A strict, and 
in some ways counterintuitive, distinction between ideal history and factual history is 
maintained. 
 This is the first focus of  Derrida’s constructive and clarificatory engagement with 
Husserl in his Introduction—the elucidation of  the possibility of  an eidetically reduced 
history that would be necessary for the reactivation of  originary meaning the forgetting of  
which constitutes the crisis of  European science. But what does eidetic reduction mean 
when it is applied to something such as history which seems to resist essentialisation? And 
how do the essential structures of  history—the compound of  repetition, communication, 
writing, and others that make history (and truth) possible—correlate with one another? 
What is their meaning? How do they themselves exist? These are highly technical questions 
which can be understood from careful attention to their very scanty appearances in 
Husserl’s short text, but which by and large Derrida does not flesh out or clarify. This 
thesis will start by furnishing the guide to the correct understanding of  the astounding 
account Husserl gives of  how concrete historical structures are capable of  producing truth 
which is invulnerable to the winds of  time. This more technical account of  the function of  
history could only be accomplished under the guidance of  Derrida’s explication of  the 
purpose of  eidetic history. This is what I have attempted in the first three chapters of  this 
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thesis. Despite the potentially dry and schematic nature of  the project, the fact that what is 
being schematised is a carefully negotiated paradox that defies the conventional 
oppositions between truth and history should provide no lack of  interest. 
 
 This account begins where Husserl’s most in-depth engagement with history 
begins, in the critique of  European science, philosophy, and culture in The Crisis of  European 
Sciences and synoptic lectures and fragments, most notably the Vienna Lecture and the Origin 
of  Geometry. The first chapter of  this thesis will investigate the specifically historical 
meaning of  the crisis, explaining why it is a crisis with a historical meaning and a historical 
remedy. At the same time, the importance of  commencing the study of  history with the 
study of  science in its crisis will be discussed—the study of  history requires the study of  
science for the same reason the obverse is true—a grounded critique requires the critical 
examination of  its own foundations, and for history and science the root of  them both ‘is 
necessarily one’, to paraphrase Derrida (see DH 104). This explains Husserl’s defiance of  
the “ruling dogma of  the separation in principle between epistemological elucidation and 
historical… explanation” (UG 172). Something epistemo-historical, historico-epistemic, or 
epistemologico-historical is called for in which science and history remain undifferentiated. 
This absolute necessity in order for there to be grounded sense in either history or science 
motivates the whole course of  this thesis. Derrida’s clarification not only of  the necessity 
of  a unity of  science and history, but the way in which their coherence is conceived will 
guide this study. 
It is the eidetic science and the eidetic approach in general that makes history, 
historiology, historicity, and historical meaning of  any kind possible, and therefore a great 
deal of  this thesis will be devoted to giving an account not just of  eidetic history, but of  
ideality in general. This is indispensable because of  eidetic science’s complexity and 
because of  the diversity of  interpretation thereof. For these reasons it is paramount for me 
to carefully establish the way I will interpret eidetics and the eidetic reduction so as to give 
ideal history a solid foundation. The necessity of  the eidetic does not mean that history is 
dominated by it—on the contrary, the historical, as eidetic, is essential, so to speak, to 
essential being. There is no ideality without the possibility of  being historical. There are 
problems with this account—questions as to the adequacy of  a reduced history—raised by 
Derrida. Although I will develop them more completely in the fourth chapter, they begin to 
emerge at this point. I will indicate where they do so. 
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There are four points of  interpretation of  ideality on which my reading hangs, and 
most of  the second and third chapters of  part one are occupied with explaining and 
demonstrating these and exploring their consequences. The first is that all consciousness is 
eidetic, meaning that any object intended by consciousness is so intended as an essence. 
The second, a corollary to the first, is that there is no sustained distinction between the 
eidetic and the ideal in Husserl’s philosophy, and that even if  such a distinction is intended 
at points it is untenable because of  the teleological structure of  the ideal which is shared, as 
a telos (which is to say, as it is), by any essence whatsoever. There are not two different kinds 
of  things, and although ideas and essences do come from ‘essentially other origins’ and 
have essentially other contents (See Id I 166), they share in the ideal being which belongs to 
all being—they are united in idea. These two interpretations are argued for in chapter two, 
“Philosophical foundations of  history,” and especially in the second section thereof. The 
purpose of  this chapter as a whole is to show why history in general must be ideal history, 
and to explain what ideal history’s methods are. As such, issues will again be raised which 
will present problems in Derrida’s discussion and which will themselves be my subject in 
the fourth chapter. 
The third and fourth points in my interpretation of  ideality concern the coherence 
of  possibilities which Husserl identifies in the Origin of  Geometry as what makes ideal 
objects possible. These comprise an essential structure of  qualities and faculties which 
create the conditions of  possibility for the ideal object; qualities and faculties such as 
repeatability and writing. Together, these form the coherence of  possibilities of  the ideal. 
Their relationship to one-another, and even to ideal objectivity itself, is symmetrical—they 
depend on each other mutually. However, being ideas, it is not their factual existence which 
is a condition of  possibility, but their possibility. Because ideas are not facts, what they 
require in order to be possible are other possibilities. The twin characteristics of  essential 
structure are equiprimordiality and possibility, and it is these which bring together 
reproducibility, community, language, objectivity, and history, (as a non-exhaustive list) 
because without the possibility of  all, not one of  these is possible. The third chapter, “The 
origins of  history,” is mostly concerned with describing the logic of  this equiprimordial 
coherence of  possibilities and in particular the necessity of  it for history and of  history for 
it, including writing as another essential possibility.  
 
 The fourth chapter changes tack slightly: whereas the first three chapters will have 
detailed Husserl’s science of  history directly but under the guidance of  Derrida’s 
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clarification of  its transcendental aims, the fourth will address the most radical 
consequences of  Derrida’s interpretation in his Introduction—the notion of  delay; that the 
origin is delayed, deferred. I will address this interpretation directly in Derrida’s own 
explanation of  it, just as I will address the more serious and insoluble problems Derrida 
raises for Husserl in the following and final three chapters. Nevertheless, my aim will 
remain the same—to understand the problems and possibilities for the thinking of  history. 
 The counter-intuitiveness of  Derrida’s interpretation of  the origin, and specifically 
the origin of  geometry, as delayed can hardly be overstated, and yet it is a profoundly 
careful reading of  the logic of  origin. Far from refuting the notion of  origin, and Husserl’s 
entire effort to ground meaning in experience, the notion of  delay makes sense of  it in a 
radical way that does not avoid its strange logic and convoluted structure. The structure of  
the origin does not belong simply to the past, since what the origin is the origin of is a 
teleological project still on its way, and an origin can’t be an origin until what it is the origin 
of  is, the origin is itself  yet to come. An origin can only be an origin of  something, and so if  
that thing is teleologically suspended, then so is its starting point. The delay of  the origin, 
as contradictory as its sounds, is a faithful working out of  Husserl’s ideal structure of  
history. As the earlier chapters (especially chapters two and three) will have demonstrated, 
as an eidetically reduced structure, history concerns possibilities, rather than facts; it is the 
ideal possibility of  the truth of  geometry that is enabled by the structure of  history, which is 
itself  rigorously reduced to ideal possibilities, including the possibilities of  repetition, 
communication, writing, and so on. The idea, and truth is an idea, is not a simply existing 
thing, completely and adequately given in its present appearance. The idea is teleologically 
projected in the incomplete appearance and consciousness of  it. 
 My explanation of  teleology in the eidetic structure of  consciousness in chapter 
two will have shown why the radical theory of  delay does not refute the possibility of  
determining the origin of  ideal objective truth with certainty. It does not dictate the 
abandonment of  all sense and the possibility of  science, as it is often taken to. This 
confusion probably stems from a misunderstanding of  the eidetic as a fact, and the 
resulting expectation that eidetic history be able to provide certainty in the origin of  truth 
as though it were a fact. But truth is not a fact—it is an idea, and its grounding meaning 
cannot be anything but another idea. What is essential to its potential to be grounded is not 
factual existence, but its relevance to the essential structure of  experience itself. It is an 
error to think that the event that could ground truth in its originary meaning would have 
been something that just existed all at once at a given present. This error is tempting, of  
17 
course, and it seems at times as though this is Husserl’s own way of  talking about it when 
he talks about the concrete historical event of  an origin. After all, the concreteness of  the 
event—the fact that it really happened, had to have happened—is what makes historical 
phenomenology truly historical and not an atemporal unfolding of  a logic. But it is the 
invariance of  eidetic reduction in all of  Husserl’s expressions and theories that makes it 
appear as such, and if  this invariant is forgotten Husserl very quickly begins to appear 
contradictory. That this deferred structure that is always on its way as a teleological 
anticipation is what an origin is—this is what Derrida’s radical interpretation of  its logic 
shows. It is the only sense that an origin has. It’s for this reason that this is among the most 
thorough and interesting interpretations Derrida gives of  Husserl, as well as the most 
courageous and coherent thinking through of  a critical philosophy of  history and what that 
must mean. 
 
But this, of  course, is not the end of  Derrida’s engagement with Husserl, and it is 
not yet the full flowering of  his own philosophical thinking. What pushes Derrida to 
deconstruct transcendental philosophy despite having given it its strongest and most 
unflinching reading, is most explicitly presented in the newly published and as yet 
untranslated (though there is a translation currently in the works by Geoffrey Bennington 
for the Derrida Seminars Translation Project) 1964/65 seminar titled Heidegger: la Question 
de l’Être et de l’Histoire. By ostensively describing the way Heidegger destroys the priority of  
the present in metaphysics, and in particular by describing the strange status of  a destruction, 
an all-out attack that, however, does not refute or criticise, that is, on the contrary also a 
full-throated confirmation of  that which it destroys, Derrida reveals more clearly than in any 
of  his texts of  the following eight or so years, the period which confirmed his status as an 
original thinker, what the relationship of  his own notion of  deconstruction is with the 
metaphysical structures and texts it takes on. Even more specifically relevant to the topic 
of  this thesis—Derrida’s description of  Heidegger’s attack on the critical philosophical 
project of  thinking history on the basis of  the present tracks almost coincidentally with 
Derrida’s own. 
 The seminar presents an excellent starting point for the examination of  the 
problems Derrida explored in published material in the following half-dozen years. I will 
address two of  these—Voice and Phenomenon, published in 1968, and “Signature, Event, 
Context” delivered in 1971. Through the lens of  Derrida’s clarification of  the meaning of  
Heidegger’s project in the 64/65 seminar the aims of  Derrida’s own texts of  the following 
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years, and the relationship of  their deconstructive intervention to his earlier radical but 
non-deconstructive engagements with Husserl, can be understood more clearly. 
 Derrida explains Heidegger’s destruction of  metaphysics as showing the 
impossibility of  thinking history on the basis of  the present; that is as the past of  a present; 
what is known of  the past by the present; and history as an object of  experience given in 
the present. This destruction marks the end of  the project of  critical philosophy that was 
delivered to its zenith by Husserl in his efforts to rigorously mark the conditions for the 
thinking of  history—it is the end of  every reduction of  history, every critical history, and 
every genealogy. The problem, already revealed in Derrida’s elucidation of  the teleological 
structure of  origin, and its consequent marking by delay, is that this notion of  origin—
though it is the only possible meaning of  origin, the only sense it can have, reduces origin 
to its eidetic sense. Reduction is a Faustian bargain that barters the making-sense of  the 
origin with that which cannot be made sense of  because it cannot be dragged into the 
timeless presence of  the idea—it’s historicity. There is an essential belonging-to-a-wholly-
other-time of  the origin, without which after all it makes no sense. 
 
The sixth chapter, “Death and the infinite,” presents a couple ‘commentaries’ by 
Derrida which are more challenging to the structure of  phenomenology of  history, both 
from Voice and Phenomenon. The first, in which differance (différance) is elaborated for 
the first time in relation to Husserlian phenomenology, returns to the difference which 
delay had hinted at in the Introduction, but as deconstructive of  a reading of  
phenomenology as relying upon a ‘pre-expressive core of  sense’. While wholeheartedly 
adopting the interpretation of  the core of  experience as incorporating an originary 
difference, as well as delay (as I will have set up already in the preceding chapter), I will 
reject the commentary on phenomenology which bases itself  on the idea of  sense which is 
independent of  (at least the possibility of) expression and language. It is indeed the 
possibility of  these faculties which is demanded for sense. 
 Derrida’s deconstruction of  the notion of  the sign is one of  his most important 
contributions to the study of  Husserl and to philosophy in general. However, I will try to 
discuss the meaning of  this reading and its complex significance for a transcendental 
history while refraining from engaging rigorously with the substance of  Derrida’s very 
intricate argument about the impossibility of  excluding the indicating function of  the sign. 
In this chapter, I will restrict my discussion to the question of  what the structure of  a 
‘core’ would consist in in Husserl’s eidetic phenomenology, raising some doubts about 
19 
Derrida’s commentary on it, but in so doing I will once again maintain that the most robust 
Husserl is one that accords best with Derrida’s radical interpretations. 
 There is considerable attention paid to Derrida’s deconstruction of  the Husserlean 
sign and the possibility of  an unproductive reduplication of  sense as the basis of  meaning, 
I will briefly review this scholarship and indicate its importance for Derrida’s development. 
The second commentary moves towards the question of  an origin prior to history, 
a question which delay and difference and the infinitude of  the search for origins opened 
up. It is only a question which phenomenology is incapable of  ignoring or leaving 
unanswered, however, in light of  the problem raised in Voice of  the conceivability of  
infinite difference. This is problematic, because an origin prior to history, an origin that 
precedes the meaningful and being itself  is beyond the ken of  phenomenology. For this 
reason we must call upon differance as originary difference and deferral and prior to the 
difference between the positive infinite and infinite difference, and prior to the difference 
between the infinite and the finite, in order to conceive the infinite difference of  
transcendentalism and eidetic phenomenology. 
The final chapter will re-examine the meaning and structure of  origin as an event in 
the essay “Signature, Event, Context”. I will examine the real consequences that Derrida’s 
observation that iterability of  meaning entails the impossibility of  its absolute 
determination by an originary meaning has for the project of  reactivation that is Husserl’s 
remedy for the crisis of  sciences. This chapter will ask what belonging to a tradition means 
when the origin of  it includes the possibility of  its revision with infinite potential iterations, 
a question which will also have been raised by the discussion of  the teleological structure 
of  the origin in chapter four. The essential possibility of  revision of  the signification of  
what is originated in the origin means that the capacity of  an origin to ground truth, and 
thus the possibility of  remedying crisis, is qualified. I will assess the meaning and 
consequences of  this problem. 
 
My desire to understand the way in which I come from a history, a tradition and a 
community motivates this enquiry. I have pursued this line of  study in order to make sense 
of  this indissoluble debt, a debt to which all certainty itself  is owed. I hope to understand 
what it means to owe a debt to history, as well as to community. With that in mind, I would 
like to thank those without whom this project would have been impossible. My supervisor 
is Tanja Staehler, whose support and confidence in my ability to accomplish this work has 
been a great gift, and without whose expertise and guidance I would never have come to 
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have my world-view turned upside-down by transcendental phenomenology. I would also 
like to thank my secondary supervisor, Katerina Deligiorgi, for giving me excellent advice 
on countless occasions, and to thank my examiners, Paul Davies and Leonard Lawlor, for 
their challenging and inspiring criticisms, as well as for their encouragement. 
A group of  my fellow graduate students at the University of  Sussex, who have 
changed what community means to me, contributed to my work in more spiritual and 
practical ways than I can count. I would like to thank Jacob Berkson, Tim Carter, Ezra 
Cohen, Jana Elsen, Christos Hadjioannou, Alex Elliott, Elaine Finbarr O-Connell, Arthur 
Willemse, Gavin Osbourne, Phillip Homburg, Dimitri Kladiskakis, Patrick Levy, Chris 
O’Kane, Yun Pei, Rebecca Raynor, and Richard Weir. 
Finally, my greatest debt is to my Parents, Aviva and Bob Martin, and to my Bubby, 
Doris Brown, for their unwavering support, infinite confidence, and for gifts to which I 
could never do justice here without appearing to flatter myself. Thank you all. 
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1 – Transcendental history and wayward sciences 
 
Husserl proposes, in his phenomenology of  history, a thoroughly and firmly grounded 
theory of  historical knowledge. For Derrida, the preeminence of  the phenomenological 
approach is self-evident and can only be exceeded by decamping not only the bounds of  
history but traversing beyond sense and meaning altogether; “phenomenology alone can 
make infinite historicity appear” (IOG 152). Because sense, as Husserl demonstrates, is 
historical sense—as Derrida argues, “historicity is sense.” (IOG 150)—the dependence of  
phenomenology on the theory of  history is unconditional. The question of  history arises, 
in The Crisis of  European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, from the need to ground 
science in meaning. I will begin by explaining the crisis described in that late text by Husserl 
to show how it is, and can only be, a historical crisis. 
 
In this first chapter, under the heading “Transcendental history and wayward 
sciences”, I will describe the critique of  science and society levied by Husserl, explain why 
the critique must be historical and begin to address the meaning of  that historicity in 
Husserl’s sense of  it, and finally indicate the underlying interdependence of  science and 
history. This chapter consists of  four sections; “Hollow and shaky tower of  Babel;” “Scion 
or ‘boy in the attic;’ the embarrassing promise of  a European reason;” “Geometry and 
idea;” and “Galileo’s ‘revealing and concealing genius’”. 
The first section explains what the crisis mentioned in the title of  Husserl’s book is, 
beginning with what is referred to by the name of  science—that it both pertains to the 
universal human task of  reasoning and the ‘decapitated’ or ‘reduced’ positivist science 
which dominates. It then goes on to explain how the crisis is diagnosed and what treatment 
Doctor Husserl prescribes. 
The following section; “Scion or ‘boy in the attic’; the embarrassing promise of  a 
European reason”, discusses the teleology without which neither history nor science 
exist—a teleology of  universal reason. This begins with a description of  the temporal 
complexity of  history—its origin in the present whose history it is and its receipt of  its 
characterisation and definition by way of  a teleology. Focusing in on the teleology, this 
chapter will detail Husserl’s use of  the Kantian concept of  the idea and in what sense the 
idea as telos is both phenomenologically meaningful and prior to understanding. After this, 
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the particular form of  this teleology as a teleology of  reason will be addressed together 
with an attempt to present the basis for Husserl’s characterisation of  it as simultaneously 
universal and European, as well as to address Husserl’s troubling Eurocentrism 
(foreshadowing Derrida’s own critique of  reason and Eurocentrism in Rogues). 
Section three, called simply “Geometry and idea”, brings us into the heart of  the 
matter of  history and the geometry that is at issue for it—the ideality that characterises 
both sciences. This section will contain the most sustained enquiry into the ideal in this 
chapter with the aim of  determining how it comprises geometry. The section begins by 
going over the three stages of  the development of  science according to Husserl and how 
they prepare the way for the current crisis, but focuses in on the first stage—the transition 
from practical enterprise such as land-surveying to the ideal science of  geometry (the 
subsequent stages will be addressed in the last section of  this chapter)—for a thorough 
investigation of  the meaning of  the quality (that of  ideality) which marks the change. This 
study is necessary in order to explain the meaning of  science and of  history as both ideal. 
But before discussing the first stage in detail, I will present the activity which comes before 
it and which is not a stage of  the development of  science yet is presupposed by the 
whole—the ‘origin’ sought in Husserl’s enquiry as the ground of  meaning of  geometry’s 
truth. 
The final section, “Galileo’s ‘revealing and concealing genius’”, explains the last two 
stages of  the development of  science and its descent into crisis—Galileo’s invention of  an 
ideal and causally-interrelated totality which need only be read with the language of  
geometry in order to understand it, and the way this relegated the subjective world of  
experience to an irrational anomalous realm, and the last stage which is science’s abdication 
of  its ambition and choice to attend only to what can be “objectively established in this 
fashion” (Crisis 7). These two stages are described in one ‘narrative’ in order to explain why 
the correction of  the most serious failings of  science since the Renaissance must be 
addressed by going back to Galileo and the history to which he himself  had turned a blind 
eye. The necessity of  tracing our way back in order to set science back on the right track is 
due to the indispensability of  historical enquiry for the accurate diagnosis of  crisis. 
The critique of  science and European culture may seem like an odd place to start 
for an enquiry into history, and for Husserl the critique is just as much the priority as the 
phenomenology of  history which is called upon to address it, but by the end of  this first 
chapter it should be clear that there is a necessity at work here—that the crisis of  science is 
also the crisis of  what it ignores, the historical half  of  the unity of  the epistemic and 
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historical that the ‘ruling dogma’ of  their ’separation in principle’ has denied (see UG 172). 
The enquiry into history, like the enquiry into science, therefore, is not a disinterested 
enquiry for enquiry’s sake—it has a palliative mission. And because history is in crisis, a 
pure enquiry is impossible without attending to its fever. Neither history nor historicity is 
an isolate, but part of  an interdependent coherence of  ideas, as it appears in Husserl’s 
Origin of  Geometry, and the philosophy of  history is bound to go wrong when it tries to 
consider it as such in total abstraction. Finally, history is taken up alongside and through 
the crisis of  science because the science of  transcendental phenomenology which is the 
remedy for the crisis is also the only means available for discoursing meaningfully about 
history, as Derrida remarks on IOG 150. 
 
 
a. Hollow and Shaky Tower of  Babel 
 
Science is in crisis. And yet, Husserl’s age, like our own (perhaps more than our own), was 
an age of  tremendous empirico-scientific and technological achievement. The preceding 
two decades had seen the publication of  Albert Einstein’s theory of  general relativity, 
Arthur Holmes’ studies of  the geological time-scale which finally solved the long-standing 
mystery of  the Earth’s age, Edwin Hubble’s proof  that the universe is expanding, and 
Erwin Schrödinger and Werner Heisenberg’s discoveries of  matter’s wave-like properties, 
to name just a few examples that come to mind. Husserl was born twenty years before the 
light bulb was invented and he lived to see the dawn of  the automobile and powered flight. 
Scientific progress in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries may have outpaced 
any period before, or since. Even in identifying the crisis, Husserl acknowledges the virtues 
of  the natural sciences, which “we can never cease to admire as models of  rigorous and 
highly successful scientific discipline” (Crisis 3-4). In particular, the discipline of  physics 
“was always and remains an exact science… it remains such even if… an absolutely final 
form of  total theory-construction is never to be expected or striven for.” (Crisis 4) It is 
already evident from these passages that in his critique of  science Husserl remained 
opposed to skepticism, just as he had been since his very early work The Philosophy of  
Arithmetic.3 Far from possessing a Romantic’s disdain for science, his critique was above all 
                                                
3 In The Problem of Genesis in Husserl’s Philosophy, Derrida interprets Husserl’s early psychologism in 
Philosophy of Arithmetic (published 1891) as induced by the same motivation that drove his entire 
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conservative in its striving to defend the possibility of  rigorous science. It was clear then, as 
now, that whatever was meant by “the talk, heard so often these days” (Crisis 3) of  crisis, 
and however profound science’s putrefaction, the vast accomplishments of  science within 
its elected remit were considered tremendous.  
The crisis is not of  science such as those who do it have chosen to define and 
delimit it, but of  science such as it ought to be; such as it would be if  it did not abdicate its 
highest responsibilities in what Husserl describes as “The positivistic reduction of  the idea 
of  science to mere factual science.” (Crisis 5) Science is in crisis because it has neglected to 
investigate the presuppositions upon which its (in themselves) rigorous theoretical and 
experimental determinations are grounded. 
The only ground for science is experience, because only experience can make 
something meaningful. This is where Husserl would have the scientist look for their rigour: 
“the only real world, the one that is actually given through perception” (Crisis 49). But in 
its pursuit of  the exactitude of  ideal determination, modern science has forgotten the 
necessity of  relating these ideal truths to subjective experience. The truth of  an ideal 
proposition, such as the Pythagorean theorem, is a priori secured by the concepts involved, 
and yet if  such true propositions are to have meaning it is only by way of  their pertinence 
to the experience, or to be more precise; possible experiences, upon which they are 
parasitic. Contrary to the presuppositions of  modern scientific practice and to modern 
philosophy (especially contrary to Kant), Husserl implies that the a priori ideal truths of  
geometry and mathematics are dependent upon a posteriori experience not for their truth, 
which is indeed secured a priori, but for the meaningfulness of  that truth. A meaningless 
truth cannot exist. Ideas must be meaningful as well as formally valid in order to be true. 
For example, the pure formal validity of  the Pythagorean theorem, the absolute validity 
with which the postulates relate to one another in the empty formality of  geometrical 
space, is not enough to make it true. Its truth depends on the meaning of  exact spatial 
description, calculation and prediction of  real and possible bodies. Of  course there is no 
need for geometry, which pertains exclusively to ideal space, to refer explicitly to bodies, 
but without the possibility of  making sense of  that part of  experience which concerns 
bodily things it would be an empty formalism. Because bodies, though they can be 
                                                                                                                                          
life’s work—the erection of an absolute foundation of philosophy; “The idea of an absolute 
foundation, which will never leave Husserl, is in his eyes still accessible to a psychological science.” 
(PGH 16f.) When Husserl abandons this project following its criticism by Gottlob Frege, it is only 
because, according to Derrida, “Husserl begins to find his psychologism insufficient” (PGH 17) for 
that task—the mission of an absolute foundation itself sustained Husserl through to his last work. 
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represented in ideal geometrical space, are things given to experience, ideal truth has a 
direct dependence on experience. 
This is not simply a matter of  methodological rigour, or a question of  insisting on 
an empty precondition that has long-since ceased exerting influence. That is to say, there is 
every danger that the achievements of  scientific progress, undeniable within their own self-
determined realm in which the assumptions on which they are constructed cannot be put 
in question, meaningfully determinable in principle, may turn out to have a rotting 
foundation. There is every possibility of  this because the geometrical determination of  the 
world always proceeded by way of  eliminations; it was necessary for much that comprises 
the experience of  a particular sensible line-shape, or group of  like shapes, to be excluded 
from the pure geometrical concept in order to make its exactitude—the heart and soul of  
objectivity—possible. For the ideal objectivity of, for example, geometrical linearity to have 
been determined with ideal exactitude, it was necessary to eliminate the colour, texture, and 
other sensible features without which no such line could ever be perceived. Geometrical 
thinking validated the elimination of  these other characteristics because they are irrelevant 
to its pure spatial character. However, without all of  these various characteristics which 
make up the ‘fullness’ of  the things of  experience, there are no such things as lines. 
To a certain extent this simplification is a requisite of  the demand for exactitude. 
The real danger is the subsequent step in which this ideal reduction of  the line is 
disavowed. Idealisation is followed by “the surreptitious substitution of  idealised nature for 
prescientifically intuited nature” (Crisis 49–50)—that is to say; the concealment of  the 
necessity of  deriving the ideal object from subjective experience to begin with; the 
dogmatic and fallacious insistence that what is determined with geometrical rigour is closer 
to reality than the subjective experience is. Indeed, it is a fallacy endemic to scientific 
thinking that the mathematically exact description of  things in experiment are taken to 
represent the world as it is in itself  more accurately and even more directly than the 
experiences of  the experimenters. Those experiences, no doubt, are considered necessary 
in order for measurement to be collected, but that is merely a disposable methodological 
necessity that in and of  itself  is not reliable or accurate. His own experience is a necessary 
evil in the eyes of  the objectivist scientist, and its evil can be purified with the appropriate 
mathematical rigour. 
The success of  Galileo and his heirs at producing accurate predictions and thereby 
at making astounding technological-scientific progress in the limited sense of  determining 
facts does not indicate commensurate progress in the philosophical-scientific task of  
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discovering what the world is. The certainty derived from predictions confirmed in 
experiment indicates that a measured feature reliably produces the same or similar 
measurements, it does not describe the thing on which the measurements are based. The 
measurements in all their regularity and predictive capacity, ‘describe’ the thing in terms of  
one property it does not have—mathematical exactitude. Take for example the quantum 
realm that Husserl never, to my knowledge, concerned himself  with; that ‘observations’ of  
quantum ‘phenomena’ produce reliable results that can be put to use in technological 
production and instrument–based experimentation that cannot be explained by classical 
physics is above doubt, however it cannot be said that on this basis any knowledge of  the 
existence of  things at the quantum level is acquired. The absolute impossibility of  any 
sensible counterpart or counterbalance to the purely mathematical and metrical meaning of  
quantum phenomena throws into relief  how great a distance there is between 
mathematically precise predictions and objects of  experience which in the macro world are 
supposed to ground them. This distance reveals itself  with respect to the spatial-sensible 
metaphors it requires us to invent in order to understand the quanta. For example, when 
quantum physicists talk about spin as an intrinsic property of  elementary particles, they do 
not mean anything like what we experience in real bodies as spin. Indeed—we can never 
know what the quantum effect called ‘spin’ is like. The same goes for their description as 
particles. ‘Spin’ and ‘particle’ are meaningful ideas because they pertain to sensible 
phenomena with multiform characteristics. However, the behavior of  elementary particles 
that measurement indicates does not even, as the physicist will say, resemble these 
phenomena. It cannot, because the meaning of  what is described as ‘spin’ in quanta is not 
sensible—it is not the case that if  we were shrunk down with a shrink-ray to a small 
enough size we would then be able to feel or see the spin of  particles—what is described 
metaphorically as spin is the postulated correlate of  measurements, and as such it only has 
ideal meaning, strictly speaking. A sensible phenomenon, spin belongs to an entirely other 
order. Of  course, it can be borrowed by the ideal as a metaphor, but the metaphoricity is 
too easily forgotten or dissimulated because the temptation is too strong to imagine that 
the measurements of  physicists’ experiments bring us closer to knowledge of  the 
phenomenal structure of  the quanta, to a knowledge of  what they are ‘like’, a knowledge 
that we not only do not have, but that is impossible. There is no phenomenality of  the 
quanta. The recourse to sensory metaphors to flesh out a picture of  what is never given 
but can only be described in its ideal mathematical coherence is a testament to the paucity 
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and non-phenomenality of  quantum physics (a paucity that does not impinge on its 
technological success). 
Because the ideal is derived through a simplifying process that is subsequently 
concealed, the entire edifice is held aloft by its own assumptions. While the sciences are, at 
least in principle, held to the highest standards of  duplicability of  experiments, they are 
never expected to plumb their own foundations. As a result, scientific rigour consists in 
careful scrutiny of  the measurements and standards of  measurement used in experiments 
to derive their objective data; scrutiny which can only proceed by comparison with yet 
other measurements, actual and predicted. There is neither requirement nor support for the 
enquiry into the relation of  measurement itself  to the world it is meant to describe, but 
which can only ever be described roughly and by way of  exclusions. This confirmationist 
program means that in the infinite aspects of  experience eliminated from scientific 
consideration in its pursuit of  exactness, there lurks worlds which science has not begun to 
explore. Moreover, the one that it does explore—line and number—is nowhere to be 
found in the real world, it is merely an artificial simplification of  myriad other qualities. 
 
 The diagnosis of  the crisis is the destruction of  what Husserl calls “the 
ruling dogma of  the separation in principle between epistemological elucidation and 
historical, even humanistic-psychological explanation” (UG 172). As the crisis of  the 
forgetting of  truth-meaning, the crisis of  science shows that truth’s transcendence of  its 
conditions and of  every determinate context cannot be confused with an absolute 
independence of  ideal truth from subjective experience, even though to a careless or 
dogmatic eye it may appear to be. What that eye misses, of  course, is meaning—the 
necessity for truth of  a meaning beyond its mere formal validity. The motivation for this is 
clear: the necessity for truth to transcend every finite context in order to be infinite and 
unconditioned is mistaken for a need for a radical and absolute absence of  relation. The 
only real possibility for transcendence is not complete absence, however, but is to be found 
in the recognition that transcendence is not absolute otherness, but is itself  a kind of  
relation. The only meaningful transcendence is transcendence through absolute 
universality—transcendence of  the kind dreamed of  in an absolute independence is 
nothing but a logical fantasy. Rigorous determination of  the meaning of  ideal objectivity 
must come from the careful enquiry into this relation. 
 Husserl here as everywhere else is concerned with defending and thinking 
through the ideal universality of  truth, and the ‘reactivation’ of  truth-meaning that would 
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counter its forgetting is no different. The conditions that he points to in history and 
context are not particular but essential and universal. The particularities and idiosyncrasies 
which make each cultural and historical context absolutely unique are not what can ground 
the meaning of  universal truths. The originary meaning of  mathematics or geometry can 
be nothing other than the universally general structure of  subjective experience. Only a 
universal structure of  experience could ground unconditioned truth in meaning. On the 
other hand, a truth the meaning of  which pertained to a culturally and historically specific 
experience could only have particular and culturally contingent validity.  
Universal validity requires a ground of  “apodictically general content, invariant 
throughout all conceivable variation” (UG 179) such as that indicated at the end of  the 
Origin of  Geometry, a fascinating fragmentary text synoptic with the Crisis: “this much is 
certain as an invariant, essential structure; that [the context for the invention of  geometry] 
was a world of  ‘things’… that all things necessarily had to have a bodily character” (UG 
177). That things, things with bodies, must have occupied the lifeworld of  the inventor of  
geometry in order for it to have been possible for them to have come up with an 
idealization of  pure spatiality can be determined with necessity—otherwise their 
idealisations would not have had any meaning for them or their fellows. The meaning of  
something like ideal geometry cannot be found in a historically, geographically, or culturally 
specific experience such as the type of  stretched rope, with its particular color, warp and 
woof, if  it had one, and its tendency to become caked with mud, that the land-surveyors of  
Egypt to whom Herodotus attributes the invention of  geometry used to do their surveying. 
Nor can they be found in the wet, fecund soil of  the Nile flood-plain itself. Instead, 
meaning must be located in the more general and invariable character of  experience of  a 
world of  things with bodies to which shape might be ascribed that made it possible for 
those proto-geometers, as Husserl counts them, to purposefully measure and divide the 
farmland with their ropes, and for their intellectual heirs to later invent a perfection of  
measurement which exceeded any possible sensible determination. We cannot imagine the 
invention of  a science of  shape without a world of  bodies to which shapely characteristics 
can be ascribed, just as, reason dictates, we cannot imagine the invention of  a science of  
number without objects in the world that are capable of  being distinguished and counted. 
This is not to say that the science of  shape pertains to any particular shape or 
shapes, but it is inconceivable without shape in general. It is only ‘apodictically general’ 
preconditions of  this type that could proffer the meaning-ground for a truth which is itself  
universal, otherwise the meaning the truth would have must constrain it to a particular and 
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contingent condition for meaningfulness. The facts and figures described in Herodotus’ 
account are of  this kind; the mythical king Sesostris, the tax he levied on equally divided 
portions of  the land, and the annual flooding of  the Nile that divided the land in its own 
way (see Herodotus, Histories bk. II ¶109). Although they are essential to Herodotus’ brief  
story, and are essential to the meaning of  the particular measurements taken by the land-
surveyors, they have no hold over the meaning of  land surveying in general, nor the 
geometrical science that came out of  it, nor can they offer anything to explain the meaning 
of  the art or the science in general until they have been reduced to their most general and 
essential content. This will be, for starters, something like, the infinitely exact measurement 
of  bodily things. By ignoring these contingent facts and looking only to what is itself  
universal and necessary in the context as that which is to provide meaning, the connection 
of  truth to context can be recognized while still keeping relativism at bay. Thus, Husserl’s 
recourse to the lifeworldly context of  ideal truth’s meaning retains the intent of  ideal 
universality to transcend the finite cultural conditions of  its origin and aspire to 
unconditioned universality. 
 This is why Husserl declares that his recourse to historicity will exclude 
historiology from the get-go: “No one would think of  tracing the epistemological problem 
back to such a supposed Thales. This is quite superfluous.” (UG 172) The personalities are 
irrelevant, but so is the more strictly intellectual-historical question of  the propositional 
content of  the originating idea: 
The question of  the origin of  geometry… shall not be considered here as the 
philological-historical question, i.e., as the search for the first geometers who 
actually uttered pure geometrical propositions, proofs, theories, or for the 
particular propositions they discovered, or the like. Rather than this, our 
interest shall be the inquiry back into the most original sense in which 
geometry once arose, was present as the tradition of  millennia, is still present 
for us, and is still being worked on in a lively forward development; we inquire 
into that sense in which it appeared in history for the first time—in which it 
had to appear, even though we know nothing of  the first creators and are not 
asking after them. 
(UG 158) 
For the history Husserl is determined to plumb, archival, historiographic, or even 
archaeological research is useless—it is insufficiently profound or ancient, provides the 
wrong type of  evidence, is too prone to error, and above all concerns facts which do not 
reach the necessary generality for grounding geometrical meaning. What is remarkable 
about this is that anything which could provide evidence of  peculiarity, of  the influence on 
the origin of  geometry of  a characteristic that is not universal, is excluded from the outset. 
Only introspection to determine the essential general characteristics of  geometry’s 
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originary meaning is capable of  pinpointing what was essential to the origin, and excluding 
anything which could only have been contingently related to its meaning. 
The method for this is a historical twist on Husserl’s already established technique 
of  imaginary variation: 
But we also have, and know that we have, the capacity of  complete freedom to 
transform, in thought and phantasy, our human historical existence and what is 
there exposed as its life-world. And precisely in this activity of  free variation, 
and in running through the conceivable possibilities for the life-world, there 
arises, with apodictic self-evidence, an essentially general set of  elements going 
through all the variants; and of  this we can convince ourselves with apodictic 
certainty. Thereby we have removed every bond to the factually valid historical 
world and have regarded the world itself  [merely] as one of  the conceptual 
possibilities. 
(UG 177) 
The procedure of  imaginary variation should arrive at characteristics which have been 
determined to be invariable because they are requisite for experience itself  or for the 
invention of  something like geometry. For this reason when Husserl finally explicitly 
reveals what he has in mind— characteristics which are along the lines of  ‘things with 
bodies’—the thinness of  his characterisation could be utterly disappointing.4 The 
generalities of  ideal history don’t offer much in the way of  story. 
These invariable generalities may appear so general as to be impotent. We might 
wonder; what meaning could be derived from such a general knowledge, and how could it 
ground anything? However, Husserl might have replied that in this most general of  
generalities there is already meaning which is absent from the geometrical science—
geometry does not concern bodies, but mathematical relations governing objects in ideal 
space. This is important because bodies possess a whole range of  essential properties and 
characteristics beyond the spatial properties with which geometry is exclusively concerned. 
These essential properties are involved in the meaning of  geometry, then, even if  they are 
absent from geometry itself. 
                                                
4 Derrida consoles this disappointment with a stern glance: “And the annoyed letdown of those 
who would expect Husserl to tell them what really happened, to tell them a story [leur raconte une 
histoire], can be sharp and easily imaginable: however, this disappointment is illegitimate.” (IOG 65) 
This chiding tone is there because these readers are foolish to be disappointed that they have not 
been told a story when what they have been given is something more profound—real history. 
Derrida continues to contrast profound philosophical enquiry with this tendency to ‘raconter des 
histoires’ that other forms of explication, including the sciences and theology engage in. In his 
1964/65 lecture course on Heidegger he brings its pejorative weight to bear: “toute explication 
ontique en elle-même revient à raconteur des histoires” (every ontic explication in itself comes back 
to telling stories; see HQ 61) 
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 It will not be immediately apparent how the recourse to only the most essential and 
general characteristics of  the origin can be of  any help in the critical effort to bring 
attention to the limited context of  the origin. It may appear as though Husserl has returned 
to ideal and formal generalities, through what was only a detour of  history. True, what has 
been retained is as universal as geometrical postulates. However the fundamental 
association of  ideal truth to a culture and to a subject, not in such a way that it is merely 
the product of  its context—as in a historicism such as Weltanschaaungsphilosophie or historical 
materialism which by reducing truth to its context would constitute a denial of  truth 
itself—but in a profoundly interdependent sense, changes the whole meaning of  
universality. Certainly, the only characteristics of  that culture and its subject are so universal 
that they can easily be mistaken for being banal. But despite picking out only that about the 
origin which is universal, it still makes the relation to a concrete origin both absolutely 
certain and persistently relevant. Thus, reference to a historical actuality is ineluctable and 
intrinsic to the meaning of  ideal truth. 
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b. Scion or ‘Boy in the Attic’; The Embarrassing Promise of  a 
European Reason 
 
The crisis is historical, but that certainty leads to the question; ‘how historical is history?’. Is 
history ever ‘pure’? There are a couple different axes to this question: for one, there is the 
dichotomy between history as structure—an atemporal law of  unfolding which legislates 
what happens in history yet is itself  presupposed as invulnerable to its vicissitudes—and as 
genesis (which would be that change itself). This dichotomy, of  great concern to Derrida 
throughout his writing on Husserl up to Voice and Phenomenon5, was a problem of  currency 
at the time during which Derrida was writing on Husserl. Derrida presented his essay  
“‘Genesis and Structure’ and Phenomenology”, which borrows its title from Jean 
Hyppolite’s Genesis and Structure of  Hegel's Phenomenology of  Spirit, at a conference on this 
problem in 1959 with Jean Piaget and Maurice de Gandillac, the proceedings of  which were 
later published (in 1965) as Entretiens sur les notions de Genèse et de Structure (see DH 24 and 
YD 115fn). The title of  Derrida’s Mémoire, the rough equivalent of  a Masters thesis, at the 
Ecole Normale Supérieure—The Problem of  Genesis in Husserl’s Philosophy—also alluded to 
this issue, and Edward Baring notes that “the question of  the Mémoire was clearly 
Normalien6” (YD 114). I will therefore leave this question aside for the present, so to 
speak, and focus on the second axis of  the problem of  the historicity of  history. 
The second is what temporal ‘space’ history occupies. History concerns the past, 
but not only the past. It is at first unclear whether its temporal complexity compromises or 
betrays it. “The past is never dead. It's not even past,” wrote William Faulkner (Faulkner, 
Requiem for a Nun). Unlike unreflective factual history (if  such a non-philosophical 
discipline is possible—a claim to history without theory will almost certainly be discovered 
to conceal a naive and dogmatic presupposition of  its theoretical framework), history 
which is to be self-reflexive and ground itself  by establishing or determining the conditions 
and structures of  historicity itself, awkwardly enough, cannot confine itself  to the lone 
dimension of  the past—it requires the retrospective of  a present from which to launch any 
regressing inquiry (Rückfrage). Husserl suggests that historical inquiry would be circular, or a 
                                                
5 Lawlor writes that in Voice and Phenomenon “The problem of the sign has come to replace, for 
Derrida, the problem of genesis.” (Lawlor, Derrida and Husserl 166) 
6 Meaning, of the Ecole Normale Supérieure. 
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“zigzag pattern” (Crisis 58): “The understanding of  the beginnings is to be gained fully 
only by starting with science as given in its present-day form, looking back at its 
development.”  (Crisis 58) The crucial understanding of  the origins as origins can be 
accomplished only on the basis of  an already mature science and understanding of  that 
science. Without this retrospective, the originating character of  the origins is 
incomprehensible. Derrida explains this necessity: “I must start with ready-made geometry, 
such as it is now in circulation and which I can always phenomenologically read, in order to 
go back through it and question the sense of  its origin.” (IOG 51) However, this 
‘retrospective’—and any understanding of  science—requires historical knowledge to begin. 
It is for this reason that Husserl describes a circular or zig-zag pattern: “Relative 
clarification on one side brings some elucidation on the other, which in turn casts light 
back on the former.” (Crisis 58) Derrida calls this “only the pure form of  every historical 
experience” (IOG 51) 
 
Yet the temporality which we might almost be tempted to call ‘Ek-static’ is not 
limited to the present and its ‘zig-zag’ movement. Even stranger, and perhaps more 
important, is the destiny of  history—its teleological meaning. The future is essential to the 
historical criticism Husserl mounts, because it could only be against the idea of  science that 
the present state of  modern science can be judged and found wanting. The retro view 
alone, if  there even is such a thing, is not sufficient to support a critical evaluation. The 
idea of  science, which is its telos—the future possibility of  science’s identity with its idea—
is necessary for the historical appraisal which identifies the current impoverishment of  
science and allows it to be characterised pejoratively as ‘in crisis’. The changes in the 
sciences from the Renaissance to our time can constitute a crisis for no other reason than 
that they are the disappointment of  real progress towards a telos, the disappointment of  the 
progress of  science towards identity with itself  in its own idea. Past, present and future are 
thought together from the start in Husserl’s teleological history; “It [the crisis] concerns 
not the scientific character of  the sciences but rather what they, or what science in general, 
had meant and could mean for human existence.” (Crisis 5) That is, the crisis is 
recognisable as such (and the recognisability or appearance of  crisis is one of  the most 
important and challenging goals of  phenomenology at this stage in Husserl’s development 
of  it, and that most urgently calling for a rigorous thinking of  history) because of  what is 
discernible in its history, taken together with the potentiality which on the one hand may be 
discerned in that history—not as bare facts but as the meaning of  science itself—and on 
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the other makes it possible to detect and understand that history at all. Without an internal 
logic oriented toward the potential to which history’s trajectory may, in the so-called ‘zigzag 
pattern’, be tending in fact, as a comparison, there could not be any evaluative claim derived 
from the historical reflection. Without the idea of  science as a telos what is called crisis 
could never be subject to anything but description as a moment in history, distinct from the 
moment of  a Renaissance ambition (which could no longer be regarded as a pinnacle), but 
lacking any grounds for the comparison between the two necessary in order to claim that 
the modern is a betrayal of  the Renaissance’s potential. It is, after all, only teleologically that 
this potential, the idea of  science, exists; the crisis itself  shows that in fact this potential is 
currently disappointed. Science such as it is in our time is not the pure exercise of  human 
reason, the transcendence of  the human beyond its finitude, but a more complicated and 
compromised thing. This means that the meaning of  science cannot be derived after the 
fact from the observation of  science’s actual function because observation and description 
provide no grounds for preferring the reason inhering in modern science to the irrationality 
it also manifests. 
 But science is precisely this—an idea. Far from a perfect attainment of  wisdom or 
the capacity of  absolute knowledge, science is an infinite task—it is the idea of  an 
undertaking which infinitely exceeds what is attained within it. Science is the manifestation 
of  reason’s transcendence of  the finitude of  the rational subject; or rather, it is the idea of  
this manifestation. As Husserl puts it in the Vienna lecture; “Mathematics—the idea of  the 
infinite, of  infinite tasks—is like a Babylonian tower: although unfinished, it remains a task 
full of  sense, opened onto the infinite. This infinity has for its correlate the new man of  
infinite ends.” (Cited IOG 128)7 It is only because science exists as the idea of  rational 
enquiry before the fact that science is the infinite project that it is and not whatever 
compromised and finite human exercise it happens to be at a particular historical moment. 
This understanding of  the idea as teleological is fundamental to phenomenology, and, 
according to phenomenology, to science in general. 
The inherent teleology in the structures of  phenomena, and in the form of  the idea 
in the Kantian sense in particular, is an important feature of  Husserl’s philosophy which 
Derrida makes paramount, and it will be explored in depth throughout this thesis. It is at 
least demanded by the pervasive logic of  the idea in the Kantian sense, which I will discuss 
                                                
7 Taken by Derrida from Paul Ricoeur’s translation of a different version of the Vienna lecture 
from that published by David Carr, published as “La Crise de l’humanité européenne et la 
philosophie”. See translator’s note IOG 129fn 
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in chapter six. In short, in the absence of  a teleology all evaluation would be nullified, and 
indeed even ‘simply’ descriptive history would fail to appear. 
 
The shape of  history’s teleological progress is sketched out in Crisis section six—
“The history of  modern philosophy as a struggle for the meaning of  man.”—as the telos, 
“inborn in European humanity at the birth of  Greek philosophy” (Crisis 15), of  reason, 
universality and humanity. These principles are the core motivations of  the critique—it is 
the threat to humanity (and these principles which cannot be dissociated from humanity) 
which make the crisis of  the European sciences matter, but they are concerns which belong 
to us (those of  us affected by the crisis) teleologically. The possibility of  teleology is bound 
up with the possibility of  science and humanity. Indeed, it is from the thought of  the 
human that the thought of  teleology springs: “what is essential to humanity as such, its 
entelechy” (Crisis 15) because the essential distinguishing characteristics of  the human, if  any 
such exist at all, are not actual possessions, but possibilities, potentialities, entelechies, and 
teleologies. The human is nothing without its goal of  transcending what it is, a thinking 
which is put most quintessentially by Nietzsche in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, but in a negative 
form: 
Humanity still has no goal. 
But tell me, my brothers: if  humanity still lacks a goal, does it not also still              
lack – humanity itself ? – 
(Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra 44) 
The characteristics of  humanity mentioned by Husserl are old familiar ones—
sociality, rationality—but here it is their potentiality as much as anything else that is 
decisive, especially since it radically modifies the sense of  the old familiar characteristics. 
 Yet, in teleology some of  the doubt of  Zarathustra’s question remains. It is 
philosophy itself  which makes humanity, or at least has the potential to. While the 
essentiality of  the sociality is not denied—“to be human at all is essentially to be a human 
being in a socially and generatively united civilization” (Crisis 15)—and neither is that of  
rationality—“if  man is a rational being (animal rationale), it is only insofar as his whole 
civilization is a rational civilization, that is, one with a latent orientation toward reason” 
(Crisis 15), there remains a question as to ‘man’s rationality’ and possibly as to his sociality 
also; an ‘if ’, thrown into relief  especially at the moment of  crisis. This question remains 
only because there remains a question as to whether humanity, and universalism, means 
anything. Reason and sociality are teleological determinants of  humanity, not naturalistically 
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defined capacities which a predetermined entity ‘man’ is deemed to ‘possess’. Both ‘man’ 
and ‘sociality’ without reason and philosophy are at most incomplete concepts, lacking the 
universality that belongs to them essentially, if  teleologically. The ‘if ’ concerning man’s 
rationality conceals the existential necessity of  reason for humanity in the doubt as to man’s 
factual existence—the uncertainty whether there in fact is such a thing as humanity. This is 
what is meant by Husserl’s strange claim that “the vitality of  [‘the actual and still vital 
philosophies’, which is to say philosophies which have not given in to scepticism] consists 
in the fact that they are struggling for their own true and genuine meaning and thus for the 
meaning of  a genuine humanity.” (Crisis 15) Reason, and specifically ‘philosophical reason’ 
(peculiarly and problematically European in a way I will examine shortly), is that whereby 
the idea of  the human is conceivable: “Philosophy and science would accordingly be the 
historical movement through which universal reason, ‘inborn’ in humanity as such, is 
revealed.” (Crisis 15) 
 
Because it is teleological, the claims that reason is “‘inborn’ in humanity as such” 
(Crisis 16) and essential to “the meaning of  a genuine humanity” (Crisis 15) are finally very 
different from the pseudo-Aristotelian claims they resemble; that man is the animal rationale 
(zoon logon ekhon), a claim Husserl even cites (see Crisis 15); here the rationality belongs to 
the universal essence of  humanity, not to the individual (except insofar as that individual is 
human, i.e. united socially). It is not as an animal or an organism that rationality is part of  
our nature, but as members of  a “socially and generatively united civilization” (Crisis 15). It 
is a telos in a sense not completely unrelated to Heidegger’s use of  ‘existentialia’ in Being and 
Time as contrasted with categories (see Heidegger, Being and Time 70-71)—the intent is to 
examine humanity without determining its character in advance according to an already 
uncritically accepted ‘scientific’ determination. 
This is what makes reason vulnerable to crisis. The existential necessity of  reason is 
not a ‘natural’ attribute of  an animal, more or less active and realised but never altogether 
eliminable, it is contingent upon the ‘vitality’ of  the ‘struggle’ for the “true and genuine 
meaning” (Crisis 15) of  true philosophy. Here again the extraordinary teleologicality of  the 
meaning of  humanity is central; it is not the full possession in actuality of  the “true and 
genuine meaning” of  philosophy which is necessary, it is the struggle for meaning and the 
potentiality of  meaning. If  this struggle is itself  threatened—and in crisis it is—so too is 
humanity itself ! 
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If  there are eyebrows that the title of  the project did not already raise, then those 
eyebrows should be raised by now with all this talk about ‘European humanity’ and the sort 
of  vanguard role it is said to play in the constitution of  humanity itself. It will no doubt be 
necessary to critically examine this restrictive cultural vision, but beforehand it is crucial to 
understand what is meant by European and ‘Europeanness’ and why it is essential to 
humanity in general—indeed, we must explain how such a thing is possible; that a culturally 
specific tradition could be universally essential. What is important in ‘European humanity’ 
is the yet-unrealised manifold: reason-universality-humanity, and universality perhaps 
chiefly and most paradoxically. It is only within the European tradition of  reason (or as 
Derrida more frequently specifies it, the Greek tradition), that the idea of  universality (or at 
least this particular universality—the uniquely and exclusively western-philosophical 
conception of  universality with which the whole scope of  this thesis and the research 
which has gone into it is already wrapped up and enclosed), and therefore the idea of  
humanity as such, presents itself. It is not so much that we must be European as that we 
must be European; only insofar as we are European do we belong to the united civilisation 
of  humanity that is a European idea, and one which even in the western tradition to which 
it belongs has been far from constant.8 It is the ideal of  universal human reason that makes 
it possible to speak of  something like humanity. Only if  we possess the telos of  universal 
reason, which is European in origin,—only insofar as we belong to that particularity do we, 
contradictorily, belong to the universal. Only in universal reason is there humanity as such, 
and therefore only by being European are we a ‘we’. The emphasis on Europeanity is a 
recognition of  the particularly European context of  the origin of  the ideal (or at least of  
this particular form of  the ideal) of  universality itself. In fact, the particularly European 
universality need not be interpreted as an exclusive universality—it is entirely possible that 
there are other universalities,9 as it is entirely possible that there are not, but in any case 
                                                
8 See Bernasconi, Robert "Who Invented the Concept of Race? Kant's Role in the Enlightenment 
Construction of Race," in Bernasconi (ed.), Race (2001): 11–36, and Bernasconi, Robert "Will the 
Real Kant Please Stand Up: The Challenge of Enlightenment Racism to the Study of the History of 
Philosophy," Radical Philosophy 117 (2003): 13–22 for a clear-eyed treatment of Kant’s racist 
views. In the latter of these articles, Bernasconi writes; “He never resolved the problem of how to 
reconcile his belief in cosmopolitanism with his racism, but this left a dangerous legacy, one which 
he occasionally glimpsed.” (Bernasconi 2003 p. 19) 
9 I refrain from undertaking an effort to answer this question because of difficulties regarding the 
method for undertaking any ‘cross-cultural’ study necessary for doing so; difficulties which in fact 
make an answer impossible. Any study attempting to answer the question of what is or is not found 
in other cultural contexts would have to first establish the means for; one, intercultural 
communication; and two, establishing proof. The possibility of satisfying these conditions depends 
on the obliteration in advance of the separation of cultures presupposed by the question, either 
through a universal common-ground or through the imposition of one culture’s language and 
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they are not *our* universality (a distinction that raises further difficulties). The 
disagreeable, even chauvinistic, emphasis on Europe’s particular role in philosophy’s claim 
to the universal is requisite for an otherwise challenging, even progressive, recognition of  
the hidden structure of  particularity and singularity behind any claim to universality (so 
often necessary) within philosophy or discourse at large. The alternative to this discourse is 
only what is for the most part done in philosophy: the concealment of  the cultural 
peculiarity of  reason and universality, the uncritical and unreflective assumption that the 
truth of  reason and universality does not have a culturally specific origin. We are then stuck 
between a rock and a hard place—pretending that there is no ‘outside’ of  universal 
humanity on the one hand or designating humanity itself  as culturally specific on the other. 
Of  course this is an idea of  humanity and ‘Europeanness’ that should at the very 
least make us uncomfortable, but apart from in a few inessential but plainly and simply 
racist moments, such as when, in the Vienna lecture, Husserl specifies what he means by 
‘European’ as a ‘spiritual’ (‘geistige’ [see Krisis 317]) category that includes far-flung present 
and former colonies but excludes ‘Eskimos’ and ‘Gypsies’,10 that discomfort need not 
necessarily be a resistance to Husserl—the contradictions between our philosophical 
notion of  universality and its particular European context is very much a tension that 
Husserl wants to bring to light and make problematic within ideal history. It is a real 
problem which most philosophers and right-thinking, progressive people are content to 
ignore—what underpins the philosophical claim that there is such a thing as humanity—
and how are we to treat the fact that this foundation excludes other traditions and other 
cultures? Even this contradiction arises only in the case that the teleology of  a universal, 
rational, humanity is proven to indeed belong to ‘European humanity’, which thus far is 
uncertain. However, the cost of  giving up this manifold of  ideas, as we will see when I 
                                                                                                                                          
reason over another. Concretely, the proper form for addressing the question in this context—in 
the context of an academic dissertation—would be to either report research undertaken using the 
methods of anthropology, or to undertake original research using these methods. However, to do 
so would be already to limit oneself to what can be assimilated to or accommodated by (to borrow 
from Jean Piaget) the European project of reason to which anthropology absolutely belongs. As 
François-René de Chateaubriand wrote in Voyage en Italie; “Every man carries within himself a 
world made up of all that he has seen and loved; and it is to this world that he returns, incessantly, 
though he may pass through and seem to inhabit a world quite foreign to it.” 
10 “Thus we refer to Europe not as it is understood geographically, as on a map, as if thereby the 
group of people who live together in this territory would define European humanity. In the spiritual 
sense the English Dominions, the United States, etc., clearly belong to Europe, whereas the 
Eskimos or Indians presented as curiosities at fairs, or the Gypsies, who constantly wander about 
Europe, do not.” (Crisis 273) It is conspicuous that Husserl did not also specify Europe’s other 
‘wanderers’, the other group the membership in Europe is perennially in question and especially 
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return to the question of  Europe and universal human reason in the sixth and seventh 
chapters of  this thesis to discuss Derrida’s concerns and criticisms, would be perhaps 
literally inconceivable. The consequences of  ideal history and its limits with respect to 
questions of  cultural relativism and a certain philosophical imperialism are one of  my 
motivations for this study. Four decades after the bulk of  his ‘output’ on Husserl, Derrida 
returns to Husserl by thematising precisely the question of  universality and reason and 
their relationship with European peculiarity and hegemony in Rogues;11 “Whether armed or 
disarmed, the great question of  reason would already begin to unfurl its sails for a 
geopolitical voyage across Europe and its languages, across Europe and the rest of  the 
world.” (Rogues 119)12 
 
Crisis and critique depend on the strange logic of  the telos. As James Dodd explains: 
“The articulation of  crisis is guided by a sensitivity to the difference between the ideal of  
science and its historical manifestation.” ( James Dodd, Crisis and Reflection 41) It is easy to 
imagine the kind of  problem this would present. The question presents itself  whether 
teleology, or the idea—what is not yet—can ever even in principle be posited, and whether in 
particular it can be in the case of  crisis. Without the absolute priority of  the idea, teleology 
itself  would be teleologically suspended. Only the success of  Husserl’s project to 
ameliorate the crisis and restore the teleology of  universal human reason could 
demonstrate the operation of  the teleology which makes critique possible. The hope would 
lie in the telos which is not yet known to exist, and in the ‘as yet unconcluded’-ness of  the 
“as yet unconcluded movement [of  modern philosophy]” (Crisis 16). Only if  the crisis’ 
solution proved successful (and this is far from certain) and this movement were concluded 
in a way that accordingly fulfils the destiny of  humanity would the accusations and claims 
of  Husserl’s critique be shown to have been true. The corollary of  this is that if  the 
solutions failed—due to the severity and irreversibility of  the crisis—then it would have 
been impossible to ascertain the truth of  these criticisms, since the teleology would not be 
fulfilled. If  the crisis went unresolved, we would never have been able to say that we were 
in crisis, just as we are not fully able to say that we are in crisis now. We would remain 
                                                                                                                                          
then at the moment of the delivery of that address, which followed increasingly virulent attacks and 
boycotts of and against Jews and Jewish businesses. 
11 In the second part—“The ‘world’ of the Enlightenment to come (Exception, Calculation, and 
Sovereignty)” 
12 Derrida gives more precise voice to a familiar worry, perhaps best and most plaintively put by 
Claude Lévi-Strauss; “The great civilization of the West has given birth to many marvels; but at 
what cost!” (Lévi-Strauss, Tristes Tropiques 39) 
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incapable of  distinguishing whether criticism of  science or outright skepticism of  science 
were appropriate. This question should be in the background of  the remainder of  the 
discussion, but I will address it head-on in my last chapter. 
If  the crisis is only crisis because there is a potential of  science which is currently 
disappointed, then is the crisis a sort of  hypothesis which cannot be proven while crisis 
continues? Is the crisis conditional upon the remedy of  the crisis? If  crisis is nothing but 
the derailment of  the idea of  science, then where is the evidence for that idea—is not crisis 
exactly the lack of  idea—a certain being out of  ideas? Approached from the perspective of  
a philosophy which did not take the futural orientation of  experience seriously, this would 
appear as the aporia of  critical work in a time of  crisis (and because those are the times 
which warrant critical work, an aporia of  critique in general). Crisis would be exactly what 
proscribes the identification of  crisis, which is to say that crisis would be the proscription 
of  crisis itself.The critical present in which all we can see of  the great project of  universal 
human reason is “the as yet unconcluded movement [of  modern philosophy]” (Crisis 16) 
which of  course has not “proved to be the entelechy, properly started on the way to pure 
realization” (Crisis 16)13 is not evidence of  a telos of  infinite reason. If  there is no sure 
evidence for the idea does it not remain merely hypothetical, deprived of  any evaluative 
force? If  the structure of  teleology is essentially without completely adequate evidence, 
does that suffice for it to defy the evidence of  the present viewed without that teleological 
frame? Or does the impossibility of  evidence of  the idea mean that the regulative idea is, if  
not simply nonsense, at least not phenomenologically justified? 
Conversely, is it possible that the impossibility of  evidence of  the idea is merely 
apparent and the consequence of  misconstruing the meaning of  telos and the way in which 
it is given in teleology? The idea appears, but its appearance must be understood correctly 
and with strict attention to the limits of  that appearance. As teleological, the idea appears 
inadequately because by necessity something we might call its ‘fulfillment’ is not given, 
which is the reason Husserl stipulates it as an infinite idea—it is the idea which is not 
adequate or complete, not capable of  being made definite. The idea appears, first of  all, as 
the non-givenness of  its content. 
As Fichte employs it, the concept of  the idea separates the teleological goal from 
the certainty of  its attainment, yet allows it to continue to orient intention and practical 
reason: “We are speaking, rather, of  an idea of  the self  which must necessarily underlie its 
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infinite practical demand, though it is inaccessible to our consciousness, and so can never 
appear immediately therein (though it may, of  course, mediately, in philosophical 
reflection).” (Johann Gottlieb Fichte, The Science of  Knowledge 244) The discourse of  the 
superman (Übermensch) in Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra is also an effort to describe the 
future-oriented essence of  humanity which teleology is at its most essential and structural. 
For both Husserl and Nietzsche it is impossible to make sense of  the human, as well as 
science and life respectively, if  we take it simply as present or treat the relationship to the 
future as neutral. I will discuss Nietzsche’s theory of  future-orientation as it is presented in 
the related discourses of  the superman and of  overcoming, because the rigour with which 
he determines teleology as indefinite will help understand the very different and more 
specific but still rigorous evidence-based treatment of  the infinite idea in Husserl. 
Earlier in this section I quoted the last lines of  Nietzsche’s “On a Thousand and 
One Goals” from Zarathustra, in which it is implied that there is no humanity without a 
universal goal, but that there nevertheless is no such goal apparent. To go beyond, to 
overcome, to have a goal is fundamental to humanity and to life for Nietzsche. Zarathustra 
presents overcoming, with characteristic gravity and zeal, as a defining characteristic of  life, 
being “that which must overcome itself  again and again.” (Nietzsche, Zarathustra 138) 
However, because Nietzsche has roundly disavowed the hope for transcending human life, 
whether it be in the form of  the Christian thought of  a life to come (he calls Christians and 
all other spiritualists ‘afterworldsmen’) or the Stoic elimination of  certain traits or facts 
from what can be considered essential,14 as forms of  ‘nihilism’, the overcoming of  life 
cannot be by anything other than life itself. This strange logic of  overcoming of  humanity 
itself  by itself  is the reason Zarathustra can say in the same breath: “I teach you the 
Superman” and “do not believe those who speak to you of  superterrestrial hopes!” 
(Nietzsche, Zarathustra 42). In fact, Nietzsche more often describes it from the converse 
perspective—not that the human is overcome, but that the human is still to come. This 
idea—that what is being experienced and described is still on its way—pops up all over 
Zarathustra. Zarathustra’s ‘first discourse’, on the ‘last man’, is simultaneously his prologue: 
“And here ended Zarathustra’s first discourse (Rede), which is also called ‘The Prologue’ 
                                                                                                                                          
13 The sense of this quotation is altered slightly in that it is itself put as a hypothetical in the text, 
but since the entires supposition of crisis depends on this understanding of the present, its 
interrogative phrasing can be seen as somewhat rhetorical. 
14 “your pride wants to dictate and annex your morals and ideals onto nature – yes, nature itself –, 
you demand that it be nature 'according to Stoa' and you want to make all existence exist in your 
own image alone – as a huge glorification and universalization of Stoicism!” 
(Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil 10) 
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(Vorrede)” (Nietzsche, Zarathustra 47); the thing is the thing preceding the thing. The thing 
and what precedes the thing—the very thing it has overcome and is identified in 
contradistinction from—are not other than each other. This paradox is not accidental—
that the superman is immanent and at the same time so far out of  reach is a consequence 
of  an irreducible absurdity in man himself. 
The superman is the mirage of  overcoming—the name for the self-overcoming 
and still-being-to-come without which there is no ‘man’. “Man is something that should be 
overcome” (Nietzsche, Zarathustra 41), an overcoming that is literally over-man (another 
possible translation for Übermensch) —the superman is nothing more than the overcoming 
of  man; that's pretty much the extent of  description of  him in Zarathustra. Mere otherness 
defines him, but then so does sameness. His very name marks his standing-apart from man; 
as the narrator says to Clark Kent in Jonathan Goldstein's "We are not Supermen": "He 
may be super, but he's no man!" (Goldstein, Wiretap) What he is is what has overcome 
man, and this alone distinguishes him from man. But because man himself  is dependent on 
the superman for his definition; because man himself  is not identified except by this 
overcoming of  himself, it also identifies superman as man. How can this paradox be made 
sense of? In “Reading Zarathustra” Kathleen Higgins comments on the strange nature of  
Nietzsche’s driving goal : “The overman [Übermensch] is a kind of  place-holder for the aim 
of  human aspiration towards greatness.” (Higgins, “Reading Zarathustra” 143, my German 
interpolation) What we know about the superman, in other words, is that he is that which 
because it is beyond us we are not. This nullity makes the superman a strange goal, on top 
of  the abiding strangeness of  goals as such. The superman is pure goal—a pure 'being that 
which man strives for'. Such a place-holder goal is not entirely unfamiliar – it has the same 
kind of  structure as art according to Kant—“purposiveness without purpose” (Kant, 
Critique of  Judgment 47). But this pure, place-holder kind of  goal is strange indeed. Consider 
how it could come to be, the potentiality or possibility of  which would seem to be integral 
to what it is to be a goal. It is itself  an end, not accidentally but necessarily—a goal the 
fulfilment of  which is not its goal, but the process it has solicited (as a goal); namely, 
overcoming, which Higgins defends by a kind of  survey: “Zarathustra spends more time 
discussing the details of  this striving than he does explaining what the overman is” 
(Higgins, Reading 143). But it cannot be only an actual thing, since the actuality of  a goal is 
not itself  solely actual. It is only by virtue of  being a goal that it sets the process in motion 
and makes it possible as a process. This also recalls Fichte’s theory of  the self-positing I: 
“The self  is infinite, but merely in respect to its striving; it strives to be infinite. But the 
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very concept of  striving already involves finitude, for that to which there is no counterstriving 
is not a striving at all. If  the self. If  the self  did more than strive, if  it had an infinite 
causality, it would not be a self: it would not posit itself, and would therefore be nothing.” 
(Fichte, Science 238) 
If  he is only identified by his otherness, how are we to make sense of  the sameness 
of  the superman? Man is superman, as much as man is anything at all. Man is his 
overcoming; because man is he who overcomes himself. Life, which as we have seen is 
often a synonym of  man as much as the class to which he belongs, is “that which must 
overcome itself  again and again” (Nietzsche, Zarathustra 138). It is this self-overcoming that 
Zarathustra praises: “What is great in man is that he is a bridge and not a goal; what can be 
loved in man is that he is a going-across and a down-going.” (Nietzsche, Zarathustra 44) 
Man is not a goal, man is a bridge; he is not a being, but a becoming. He is at the same time 
that which is overcome and that which overcomes. But because he is his overcoming he is 
not what he is. As Sartre put it, réalité humaine15 is ‘‘being what it is not and not being what it 
is’’16 (Sartre, Being and Nothingness 33) Like the superman, man is to come. The 
Superman is man, the Rede is the Vorrede. 
As Derrida points out in The Ends of  Man, Husserl had no interest in 
anthropology, philosophical or otherwise. Derrida writes: “It is therefore surprising and 
very significant that at the same time that the authority of  Husserl's thought was 
introduced and becoming established in France after the war, and even became a sort of  
philosophical fashion there, its criticism of  anthropologism went completely unnoticed, or 
in any event was without effect.” (Derrida, “The Ends of  Man” 118) And yet, as I have 
pointed out, it is a human telos of  rationality that is presented as the ultimate justification 
of  philosophy and reason, and hence for a critical investigation of  them: “Philosophy and 
science would accordingly be the historical movement through which universal reason, 
‘inborn’ in humanity as such, is revealed.” (Crisis 15–16) Did Husserl, then, merely give up 
the steadfast opposition to anthropologism’s relativism of  Logical Investigations: “It is best to 
employ the term ‘relativism,’ and to distinguish individual from specific relativism. The 
restriction of  the latter to the human species stamps it as anthropologism.” (LU 78)?  While 
everything about Husserl’s method, and the project in its own right of  grounding science 
absolutely in the essential, non-relative structures of  experience—this plea for the 
importance of  science and its absolute, non-relative grounding can’t seem to proceed 
                                                
15 The phrase chosen by Heidegger's first translator into French, Henry Corbin, to render Dasein, 
‘réalité humaine’ was adopted by Sartre. See Schrift, Twentieth Century French Philosophy p. 34 fn 
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without an anthropocentric motive. The criticism of  anthropologism was necessary to 
oppose the absurdity of  explaining essential laws of  logic by recourse to contingent facts, 
and there is no reason to think he abandoned it late in life—indeed, the whole concern of  
the Crisis seems to confirm his earlier concerns. But where does the motivation for 
epistemic clarity and the avoidance of  absurdity and groundlessness issue from? The fate 
of  science is, like Fichte’s striving subject or (more arguably) Nietzsche’s self-overcoming 
man, tied to a teleology of  man. The question, then, is whether the crisis respects this 
clear-cut distinction between the absolute and essential structure of  experience and the 
anthropologicist teleology. 
 
For Husserl, there is more to the human than the wide-openness of  overcoming—
the essence of  reason belonging to humanity is the idea which constitutes humanity in its 
pursuit of  itself. Without the infinite idea the concept of  the universal is merely an 
abstraction after the fact. The finite individual, without the idea, is incommensurable with 
the infinite totality of  humanity. But then the finite individual is itself  only an abstraction 
because the idea is always already assumed, given to experience, and presented in the 
finitude of  the individual itself. The infinite idea in which reason, humanity and universality 
are all taken together is phenomenologically basic and is the foundation for the claims to 
universality and reason which are not only necessary for philosophy, but for thought itself. 
In order to sanction the ‘idea’, Husserl departs from the empirical neutrality of  Nietzsche’s 
conception of  life and man, returning to the kind of  essentialism for which Nietzsche 
accused schools such as the Stoics of  nihilism. By rejecting parts of  life, or even just by 
holding up in a prescriptive fashion certain parts of  life as preferred, life—conceived by 
Nietzsche as an indivisible whole— is itself  denied; “you want to make all existence exist in 
your own image alone” (Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil 10). Nietzsche is only able to hold 
essences in such disdain, however, because he spared himself  the burden (even if  it seems 
like he does not at times) of  a rigorous determination of  those things he strove to keep 
free of  them—life and man. As soon as we enquire into the meaning of  the human the 
idea of  reason presents itself  as ineluctable condition of  possibility for such enquiry. 
The evidence of  the telos of  universal human reason is abundant if  properly studied 
and understood according to the structure of  the “Kantian concept of  idea” (Id I xxii), as an 
idea which infinitely exceeds its presentation in finite consciousness and evidence. The 
apparent absence of  evidence for the telos of  science just when that telos must be brought to 
                                                                                                                                          
16 “étant ce qu’il n’est pas et n’étant pas ce qu’il est” (Sartre, l’Étre et le Néant lxvii) 
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bear in crisis only appears as such if  the teleological structure of  the idea is misunderstood. 
The infinitude of  the idea can never be given in finite appearance except as infinite. It is 
the idea of  what is incommensurable and infinitely exceeds the idea of  it. Thus, the non-
appearance, a certain inconceivability, of  the idea is exactly what is to be expected. The 
Kantian idea is an essence the content of  which cannot be given, cannot be thought—an 
essence which exceeds its presentation in consciousness—it is in other words an infinite 
idea, an essence which cannot be delimited, such as for example the idea of  infinity itself, 
which is not only the idea of  infinity but infinite in the same way as certain others: “The 
idea of  an infinity motivated in conformity with its essence is not itself  an infinity; seeing 
intellectually that this infinity of  necessity cannot be given does not exclude, but rather 
requires, the intellectually seen givenness of  the idea of  this infinity.” (Id I 343) The idea of  
infinity allows us to see in the essence of  its content, therefore, the way that its content 
essentially, infinitely outstretches the intuition of  it (essentially, the thought which is 
adequate to its object is not the thought of  infinity). As Derrida writes in the Introduction—
“In the Idea of  infinity, there is determined evidence only of  the Idea, but not of  that of  
which it is the Idea.” (IOG 139)17 
It is the idea as it undergirds science and history which would make it possible for 
critique to be put from a position in which no ‘overwhelming evidence’ of  the teleological 
progression is available, that is to say, to be put from a position in which it is relevant. 
‘Overwhelming evidence’ in this context would merely be evidence sufficient to overwhelm 
the evidence to the contrary—the unreason in evidence that we do not want to be, which 
in fact cannot be, the idea of  science. The Kantian concept of  idea is at one point in 
Derrida’s Introduction presented to address a problem of  almost the same structure—the 
asymmetry between the univocity and equivocity in language notwithstanding the necessity 
of  both univocity and equivocity that he established. 
Absolute univocity is inaccessible, but only as an Idea in the Kantian sense can 
be. If  the univocity investigated by Husserl and the equivocation generalized by 
[James] Joyce are in fact relative, they are, therefore, not so symmetrically. For 
                                                
17 The idea of the outstretching of the idea of the infinite by the infinite itself comes through Kant 
from Descartes’s third meditation, in which the idea of God is defined as the “idea of a being that 
is supremely perfect and infinite” (Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy 31). Being infinite, God is 
not ‘comprehended’ by my idea of God, which is finite as ‘I’ am finite; “For the nature of the 
infinite is such that it is not comprehended by a being such as I, who am finite.” (Descartes, 
Meditations 31) Yet it is nonetheless the idea of God, of all ‘my’ ideas “the most true, the most clear 
and distinct.” (Descartes, Meditations 31) The idea of the idea is its transcendentalism—its ability to 
outstretch its own finitude. The concordance is more noticeable if we keep in mind that what 
Descartes refers to with the term ‘idea’ 
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their common telos, the positive value of  univocity, is immediately revealed only 
within the relativity that Husserl defined. 
(IOG 104) 
One of  these is an idea, the other, though essential, is neither a task, nor infinite. 
I will return to the theme of  the idea in the course of  this thesis. I will examine the 
necessity that the idea “never phenomenalizes itself ” (IOG 137) but must be ‘thought’ and 
discuss what to make of  this difference (if  indeed there is a difference between an idea 
being ‘thought’ and ‘appearing’) and the tension Derrida finds in phenomenology between 
the “principle of  principles” (IOG 138) as one of  finitude on the one hand, and “the 
Infinitizing consciousness” (IOG 138) of  the idea on the other. 
If  the idea and its prioritisation overcomes the bad evidence of  the present, it does 
nothing in itself  to counter the other barrier to identification of  the crisis—which is how 
to determine a crisis of  science scientifically at a time when of  necessity science is 
compromised. The concrete articulation of  the coherence of  ideality, however, does. The 
theoretical depth of  Husserl’s ideal history and its conditions strives to explain a situation 
of  crisis that is not one of  annihilation, wherein the partial and not absolute destitution of  
the resources of  science is rigorously determined. It is in the coherence that the complexity 
of  the Kantian concept of  idea is supported and demanded. Having explained the logical 
structure of  critique, I will go on in the rest of  this chapter to describe the content of  the 
critique itself—the concealment of  the subjective through its substitution by mathematical 
ideal objectivity. 
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c. Geometry and idea 
 
The history of  the crisis is the history of  science itself—it is not an infection coming from 
without to plague science, it is “a crisis which developed very early in modern philosophy 
and science and which extends with increasing intensity to our own day” (Crisis 16). The 
crisis goes back to science’s own origins and develops with science, first latently and then 
malignantly, as the corruption of  science’s own most fundamental virtues and strengths. By 
defining the crisis as integral to the development of  science, the critique is conceived of  as 
immanent and does not require the imposition of  foreign values. On the other hand, by 
respecting the value of  the qualities which are corrupted and in fact the author of  their 
own corruption, and especially the value of  the infinite task of  reason, the critique 
demonstrates the possibility of  treatment and remedy. 
The history of  the crisis consists of  three stages: the invention of  the ideal; the 
idealisation of  nature; and the forgetting of  the irreducible activity of  the subject and then 
of  science’s purpose as “the One Philosophy” (Crisis 8). It is the last of  these three that 
Husserl begins with and uses to characterise the crisis as a whole and as it is today, as we’ve 
seen—this is the only stage of  science’s history in which science is thoroughly corrupted 
with respect to the telos of  mankind; the universal reason that the other historical moments 
had created and developed. Up until this stage, the qualities which constitute the crisis are 
at worst ambiguous. The dangers of  the other two stages—the first of  which, occurring in 
the darkest depths of  antiquity (or even in the pre-historic, depending on how we construe 
history), is the origin of  objective science itself  (it is even the origin of  pure objectivity), and 
the second of  which, a characteristic of  the renaissance that Husserl attributes 
emblematically to Galileo,18 attempts to facilitate the extension of  ideal objectivity, and the 
telos of  universal reason that it makes possible, to the world of  experience—derive from the 
same qualities that make them such enormous innovations in the human spirit. 
 
Rather than the first of  these stages, the invention of  the idea and the ideal, it is the 
modern “transformation of  the idea” (Crisis 21, emphasis mine) which Husserl thematises in 
the Crisis. The preceding invention of  ideality is the slippery theme of  the Origin, but 
                                                
18 “Galileo, the discoverer—or, in order to do justice to his pre-cursors, the consummating 
discoverer—of physics…” (Crisis 52) 
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because that text is so overwhelmingly concerned with how an ideal object, of  which 
geometry is merely one example, can originate as such, the origin of  geometry itself  is 
treated in almost as much detail in the few pages of  the Crisis that introduce modernity’s 
‘transformation’ of  it. I will start with this ‘invention’ as it is presented in the Crisis, and I 
will return to the more thorough and problematising treatment of  it in the Origin 
frequently. 
The invention of  the ideal was itself  a transformation within objectivity. In the flood 
planes of  the Nile, where Herodotus claims that geometry was born before being inherited 
by the Greeks, earth measurement was a particularly and, in itself  ineluctably, material 
practice involving the laying out of  ropes on the land by ‘rope-stretchers’ (the Greek term 
‘ὑποτείνουσα’, from which we derive ‘hypotenuse’, literally means ‘stretching under’) to 
survey changes in the field following the year’s flood, all for the purpose of  taxation. 
Herodotus describes the creation of  this system of  land taxation and how it functioned: 
This king [the mythical Sesostris associated with the New Kingdom] moreover 
(so they said) divided the country among all the Egyptians by giving each an 
equal square parcel of  land, and made this his source of  revenue, appointing 
the payment of  a yearly tax. And any man who was robbed by the river of  a 
part of  his land would come to Sesostris and declare what had befallen him; 
then the king would send men to look into it and measure the space by which 
the land was diminished, so that thereafter it should pay in proportion to the 
tax originally imposed. From this, to my thinking, the Greeks learnt the art of  
measuring land; the sunclock and the sundial, and the twelve divisions of  the 
day, came to Hellas not from Egypt but from Babylonia. 
(Herodotus, Histories bk. II ¶109) 
This conjecture is supported to some extent by the antiquity of  extant artefacts, 
including a New Kingdom era [c1350 BC] fresco from the tomb of  the grain accountant 
Nebamun in the collection of  the British Museum, in which a farmer is depicted ratifying a 
boundary marker lying amidst the grain of  his field. While officials in their chariots look on 
from the shade of  nearby trees he swears “As the great god who is in the sky endures, the 
boundary-stone is exact.” The squares and triangles that we cannot today help but 
recognise in this practice were then not yet the pure forms determined by geometrical 
axioms as we know them but shapes that the earth itself  took—as though the concept 
could not then have been abstracted without remaining caked with the mud of  the Nile. 
Although now the meaning of  the shape described by the measurement of  the rope which 
had lain upon the land is understood in advance as defined by the pure mathematical terms 
which express it, before mathematics as such was invented the physical instrument of  
measurement was mired in the dirt of  what it measured. It was that earth that the art 
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pertained to, as difficult as it may be for us to imagine an inconceivability of  the mere 
withdrawal of  its material basis. That purity would be attained only by the ingenuity of  an 
invention. 
 
Before I discuss this invention, however, I would like to discuss in greater depth the 
activity which precedes it—forgetting for a moment what has already been suggested in a 
factual and anecdotal manner about what exactly that precedent is (the use and invention 
of  arts such as surveying and measurement). While this prehistory is of  an event which 
does not number among the stages of  the development of  science enumerated in the Crisis 
itself, it is presupposed by them, as the Origin informs us, since it is ostensively concerned 
with this realm of  human activity. Not only is an origin of  geometry which precedes the 
invention of  ideal exactness which launches the science itself  presupposed, it is to this 
primordial milieu that Husserl’s greatest ambitions are directed in the endeavour to 
reestablish science in its truth-meaning (Wahrheitssinnes [see UG 170/Krisis 377]), and 
soothe the crisis. Therefore it is crucial to determine the character of  this origin with 
necessity, since the meaningfulness of  science today depends on it. It is for this reason that 
the factual history together with all the ample evidence collected from Herodotus and from 
retrieved archeological artefacts are essentially insufficient. Because, as I will discuss in the 
second chapter of  this thesis, essences cannot be derived from facts (see Id I 17f), evidence 
like this must be bracketed and a new science of  history with the apodeicticity of  ideal 
sciences must be founded—this is the ambition of  Husserl’s ideal history. 
Such a historical enquiry, which Husserl calls reactivation19 of  urevidence (ursprüngliche 
Evidenz or Urevidenz),20 is an enquiry into the historical conditions of  possibility for the 
invention of  geometry as a meaningful idea. It has the potential to offer crucial insight into 
certain characteristics of  the lifeworld—the milieu or horizon in which all subjective 
experience occurs, taking in all of  its conditions and possible characteristics—in which he 
must have lived in order for such an invention to have been possible. The actual findings 
of  this enquiry are thus rather modest—we can say that 
                                                
19 I will examine the notion of reactivation in the following chapter. 
20 Husserl uses the terms ursprüngliche Evidenz (translated by David Carr as ‘original self-evidence’) 
and Urevidenz (translated as ‘primal self-evidence’) interchangeably. Due to the lack of any apparent 
meaningful distinction between these terms and the way they come into use, the unnecessary 
confusion and inelegance caused by the yet-customary interpolation of the word ‘self’; and (most 
importantly) the need, more rigidly than Husserl has done in his text, to distinguish this kind of 
evidence from the axiomatic self-evidence arrived at through explication of ideal meaning, I prefer 
to use the English ‘Ur-evidence’ to stand for both jointly and without distinguishing between them. 
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It is now clear that even if  we know almost nothing about the historical 
surrounding world of  the first geometers, this much is certain as an invariant, 
essential structure; that it was a world of  ‘things’… that all things necessarily 
had to have a bodily character 
(UG 177) 
In the “Vienna Lecture” Husserl proposes the same original character, though the 
historical/free variation method of  arriving at it is not treated; “In this way philosophy 
begins as cosmology; it is first—as it were, obviously—directed in its theoretical interest 
toward corporeal nature, since, after all, everything given in space-time has in any case, at 
least at its basis, the existential formula of  corporeity.” (Crisis 292) 
 The geometrical idea is not wholly independent of  the sensible shapes and the 
measurements thereof  that preceded it—they constitute geometry’s ‘truth-meaning’, 
‘originary meaning’, or ‘meaning-fundament’; “a pregeometrical achievement was a 
meaning-fundament for geometry, a fundament for the great invention of  idealization” 
(Crisis 49). The forgetting of  this foundation is the cause of  the crisis. It is not immediately 
obvious exactly what this dependence consists of, or even what it could consist of. It 
cannot constitute a merely causal dependence, a ‘mere’ midwife to truth itself, for this 
meaning remains indispensable to the meaningfulness of  geometry, and the loss of  it is the 
beginning of  the crisis. No one visits her midwife into adulthood. On the other hand, 
geometry’s ideality is so much of  an other world than the empirical one—a different realm 
of  thought—that it is difficult to understand what kind of  dependence on a sensible 
meaning-fundament ideality could have. 
Urevidence is the evidence given to experience which originally called for the 
invention of  geometrical ideas, and which historical enquiry knows to have existed because 
it is such evidence that gives the persisting ideal objects meaning. It is because there was an 
altar to Apollo that the oracle had ordered doubled that the ‘Delian problem’ or ‘doubling 
the cube’ was meaningful (see Merzbach and Boyer, A History of  Mathematics 57f), but this 
is not urevidence, rather, it is the reemergence through applied geometry of  ideal objects 
back into sensible evidence. Urevidence must be presupposed by the invention of  
geometry as a meaningful domain. The geometrical and ideal object of  the line segment 
and plane, for example, will have been meaningful because they adequately described 
objects given to experience, that is, originary evidence. It is in order to mean something 
given originarily in experience (subjectively) that geometry was invented, and we know this 
with certainty because it is only such an original meaning-something-given-in-subjective-
evidence that can bestow meaning on geometry. Without such a meaning it would be 
nothing but a baroque and rule-abiding game. That only this kind of  evidence can secure 
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meaning for geometry follows from Husserl’s ‘principle of  all principles’—“the principle 
of  the grounding of  all cognition of  matters of  fact by experience” (Id I 45). 
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d. Galileo’s ‘revealing and concealing genius’ 
 
The geometry inherited by Galileo is by then already “empty of  meaning” (Crisis 49), 
because it does not refer to or represent “the only real world, the one that is actually given 
through perception” (Crisis 49)—it is a self-contained system of  rules without any 
influence from anything whatever outside. It is, he says a “τέχνη, removed from the sources 
of  truly immediate intuition and originally intuitive thinking, sources from which the so-
called geometrical intuition, i.e., that which operates with idealities, has at first derived its 
meaning.” (Crisis 49) How it derived this meaning is less clear in this text than how the 
meaning was lost, but when Husserl mentions at this point an “original geometry” (Crisis 
49) which may be thought to mean the geometry that originated the discipline, or geometry 
at the moment of  its invention, he may be implying that this original geometry was not yet 
meaningless. I will return to this ambiguity in the next paragraph. Regardless of  how 
geometry may at one time have been meaningful, it had by the time it was taken up by 
Galileo long since become an ideal science which neither could nor needed to allow itself  
to be confirmed or denied by experience—it constituted a system unto itself  which could 
never be a world in Husserl’s sense but was capable of  that peculiarly systematic kind of  
completeness: 
But it is possible—and this was the discovery which created geometry—using 
these elementary shapes, singled out in advance as universally available, and 
according to universal operations which can be carried out with them, to 
construct not only more and more shapes which, because of  the method which 
produces them, are intersubjectively and univocally determined. For in the end 
the possibility emerges of  producing constructively and univocally, through an 
a priori, all-encompassing systematic method, all possibly conceivable ideal 
shapes. 
(Crisis 27) 
Geometry by Galileo’s time (and probably much earlier) was already in the 
beginning stage of  its crisis—geometry is only meaningful insofar as it transcends its self-
completeness; insofar as it is not a game21 which, while self-consistent and coherent 
according to the rules it sets out for itself, is devoid of  any external significance. Geometry 
                                                
21 Similarly with respect to logic, Klaus Held, in “Husserl’s Phenomenological Method” wrote; 
“If we detach these laws from situations, then logic becomes a setting up of systems of rules, rules 
which can no longer be anything more than technical specifications for the setting up of true 
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must and does have meaningful contact with other realms of  meaning, specifically the 
‘lifeworld’ (Lebenswelt) and the empirically intuitable world. It had divested itself  of  “the 
true, the only real meaning of  these theories, as opposed to the meaning of  being a 
method” (Crisis 53) and remained only that; a ‘method’, a ‘technique’. What remains 
unclear is how it could ever, on Husserl’s terms, have had such meaning, since it has always 
been a world apart. Especially in the Origin, Husserl explains in detail what such contact 
entailed, it does not explain how it was possible. 
 
 In Galilean physics the exactness geometry had used to determine ideal shapes was 
brought to the ‘physical world’. Because Galileo and his contemporaries so consistently 
maintained the fallacy of  a ready and direct applicability of  ideal forms to anything and 
everything in the world made up of  ‘things’ with a “bodily character” (UG 177), which is to 
say—the whole physical world (a world into which modern science and its expanding 
disciplines has steadily incorporated everything which, in the materialist thesis that is its 
more or less consciously espoused philosophical framework,22 it considers, indeed can 
consider, real) it was a simple matter of  approximating the measured and surveyed bodies 
to “the geometrical ideal shape which functions as a guiding pole” (Crisis 29) to eliminate 
and “overcome the relativity of  subjective interpretations” (Crisis 29). With the help of  the 
ideal, modern physics created the illusion of  an empiricist realism independent of  the 
empirical and the perceiving subject, despite the clear contradictoriness of  this fallacious 
fantasy. Because the directly empirically intuited world (and remember there is no indirect 
intuition in the sense of  passing through an ideality that constitutes a ‘mere’ detour) is 
inexact and requires taking into account the variable of  the subject of  intuition, the world 
as described by geometry was imagined to be more real than the world of  experience. 
Thus, modern physics accomplished a bold switcheroo: “the surreptitious substitution of  
idealised nature for prescientifically intuited nature” (Crisis 49-50). In the concealed 
idealism of  modern science, ideas are not subject to a demand to be confirmed against raw 
experience or just any experience at all, rather experience must be quantified and redacted 
so as to either conform to the idea or raise problems for it, otherwise they must be 
discarded as scientifically meaningless aberrations with purely subjective origins. Of  course, 
                                                                                                                                          
statements; they would be without any attachment to the content of lived situations in which a 
person can originarily convince herself whether something is true or false.”  (Held, Method 12) 
22 At least, the philosophical thesis in which it operates, whether explicitly or implicitly. The 
pervasiveness of a materialist philosophical position plays a significant role notwithstanding the 
hidden idealism that Husserl’s critique shows underlies science’s materialism. 
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modern science is the empire of  testing and experimentation—but in modern empirical 
method it is the quantifications and data derived from, or even corroborated by, experiment 
and not the experience itself  alone which is necessary for scientific demonstration. 
The point here is not that which Thomas Kuhn makes about a science in which a 
paradigm struggles to incorporate and explain anomalous data, a state of  affairs which is a 
more urgent and internal crisis than Husserl’s crisis (Kuhn uses the same vocabulary). 
Kuhn writes “Though they may begin to lose faith and then to consider alternatives, they 
do not renounce the paradigm that has led them into crisis… once it has achieved the 
status of  paradigm, a scientific theory is declared invalid only if  an alternate candidate is 
available to take its place.” (Kuhn, Structure of  Scientific Revolutions 77) Kuhn’s example 
pertains to the aberrant state of  affairs in which a paradigm backed by quantification 
struggles against quantification, but of  course nowhere in such a confrontation is the right 
and priority of  quantification itself  in question. In Kuhn’s terms, Husserl’s crisis would not 
register as such, but as a state of  good health. In the ‘surreptitious substitution’ he 
describes, Husserl is talking about a much more normal (though of  course still febrile) state 
of  affairs in which the experience which either cannot be quantified or which goes against 
the accepted data is not considered. This is because the dependence of  the univocal and 
objective ideas on subjective intuitions is forgotten, leaving geometry meaningless but still, 
for better or worse, technically powerful, and thus able to conceal the derivative nature of  
the a priori beneath the relentless progress of  its own self-reinforcing ideal creations. 
 
The unlikely priority of  the mathematico-ideal in scientific objectivism comes 
about because of  science’s need not only to posit the material existence of  its object but to 
describe it also. Without this possibility the philosophical objectivism on which it rests 
would not be able to support it. For science to do its work it is never enough for it to 
indicate the materialist dogma of  the prior existence of  physical objects which supervenes 
against their experience—the conditions for scientific description and explanation must 
also be established so that the character of  that reality might be determined. The only 
scientifically accurate description is quantitative description—the exact description of  
physical things in terms of  their quantitative character. Subjective evidence is considered 
unreliable in comparison with geometrico-mathematical quantification, rather than as the 
only possible origin of  that objectivity. This is not to say that modern science would not 
acknowledge, if  pressed, an epistemological debt to subjective evidence—any philosophy 
of  science is constrained to acknowledge that experience is in some way necessitated in 
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order for the descriptive quantification to be acquired—but the materialist metaphysical 
limitation of  its importance to the epistemic is fundamental to science and its objectivism. 
Because the object is hypostatised, the mathematical description of  it is understood to be 
indeed of  it—of  the object itself. The evidence of  the object does not have any 
metaphysical significance—once it has provided evidence for mathesis it can be disposed of, 
and indeed should be, since in mathematics the unreliable particularities of  the evidence 
can be eliminated. The purified ideal object of  applied geometry, to the creation of  which 
experience has played merely a means, is therefore taken to be the description of  an object 
in the metaphysical sense. The existence of  the object is independent not only of  any 
experience of  it, but even of  the possibility of  experience of  it, which is exactly the 
meaning of  the objectivism Husserl resisted, 
It is only with Husserl’s motto ‘back to the things themselves!’ (LU II 168) and its 
simultaneous critique of  materialism and idealism in the position of  the object of  
experience as what there is that the fallacy on which scientific objectivism’s ‘Frankenstein’s 
monster’ of  idealism and materialism is evident—the supposition of  an object independent 
of  experience which the mathematical idea describes is a metaphysical dogma for which 
there neither is nor can be any evidence. Indeed, it is precisely supposed to be beyond 
evidence. In maintaining this dogma, objectivism obscures the continued and ineluctable 
necessity of  evidence. In supposing that mathematical ideas describe an object (which is 
not the object of  a subject) itself, objectivism conceals the things themselves and the only 
legitimate role of  applied geometry—the determination, with a level of  exactitude which is 
always approximate, the objects of  consciousness arrived at in subjective evidence. This 
determination will always be approximate because there is an ineliminable irreducibility of  
the object in evidence to the mathematical object. 
 
Although it is a detail significant only with respect to the chronology of  the 
genealogy of  the crisis, not its general trajectory, it is nevertheless illustrative to clarify the 
role of  Galileanism, and of  Galileo as “consummating discoverer” (Crisis 52), and to explain 
exactly how the employment of  and reliance on geometry in modern physics constitutes 
not merely a paradigm shift in Thomas Kuhn’s sense but a revolution which sets up the 
conditions for any ‘revolutions’ which could be called ‘scientific revolutions’ in the way 
Kuhn means. Without understanding in concrete terms the revolutionary character of  
science’s reliance on mathematics, it is easy to misconstrue its significance. It would then be 
easy for Husserl’s historiographical interpretation to appear very forced. After all, 
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application of  geometry to sensible objects had never ceased to be the basis of  its utility 
since its earliest days, before Thales predicted the 585 BC eclipse, as Husserl himself  points 
out; “geometry had long since become, as ‘applied’ geometry, a means for technology” 
(Crisis 28). So what, exactly, is new in modern physics’ application of  geometry, which is to 
say reduction of  empirical intuition to ideal terms? 
Although in applied geometry its ideal forms had been used to describe objects in 
the empirically intuited world, and the exceeding exactness and rigour of  ideas had 
replaced comparison according to already rigorously standardised, yet sensible units (in the 
arts of  measurement and surveying), it is only with modern physics that the empirical 
world, conceived for the first time as a world and “all-encompassing unity” (Crisis 31), is 
conceived in advance as subject to geometrical laws and only properly understood as 
described in geometry. Prior to this the geometrical rendering of  an object had to be 
understood as an abstraction of  it which left the object itself  within the sensible realm to 
which it still belonged. In Galileo’s ‘mathesis’ the object itself  was understood to be a 
geometrical object. Perhaps we can conceive the role of  applied geometry as the 
comparison of  geometry’s idea with an eidetically reduced sensible object. Even in 
Platonism a dualistic distinction between the ideal and the real maintains the discreteness 
of  an, albeit subsidiary, empirical world. Any such distinction is eliminated in Galileo’s 
mathematisation of  nature, in which, rather than positing ideality as an originary realm or 
as a possible descriptive language for nature or the empirical world: “nature itself  is 
idealized under the guidance of  the new mathematics; nature itself  becomes—to express it 
in a modern way—a mathematical manifold [Mannigfaltigkeit].” (Crisis 23) 
Galileo’s innovation was the Frankenstein’s monster that used a veiled idealism to 
make materialism seem plausible. His rigorous systematisation of  mathematical exactitude 
and experimentation concealed the underlying theory, cobbled together from the corpses 
of  dead ideologies, that was its foundation. Until Galileo rigorously systematised 
experiment by making its whole point the acquisition of  mathematical description, no 
materialism could be put forth which was descriptive without being bound in an immediate 
and obvious way to the experience of  the subject. The way that Galileo’s introduction of  
mathematical idealism fundamentally altered the materialist metaphysical position of  
Galileo’s natural philosophy (more than the astounding practical and predictive success it 
made possible) is that it made it possible for the first time in the history of  ideas for 
materialism to ignore the subject and its role in the world. Ironically, the intimate and 
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pervasive fundamental incorporation of  idealism permitted the systematic denial of  the 
ideal. Or at least, to convince itself  it could. 
What changed with modern physics was the idea of  a “universal causal regulation” 
( Crisis 31) that conjured a world that was “not merely a totality [Allheit] but an all-
encompassing unity [Alleinheit], a whole (even though it is infinite)” (Crisis 31). Causality 
was understood as the unity of  relations that constituted the world, prior to and 
independent of  subjective experience; “the specifically determined world-causality, the 
specifically determined network of  causal interdependencies that makes concrete all real 
events at all times” (Crisis 32), permitting a priori determination of  the world that exceeded 
any experience of  it by a living subject, because the entirety of  the world was conceived in 
advance as determinable throughout, conforming to a universal ‘style’ of  ‘bodily character’, 
being ‘res extensae’, which unites the entire world in “a universal immediate or mediate way of  
belonging together” (Crisis 31) by way of  a discrete and comprehensible “universal causal 
regulation” (Crisis 31). The causality uniting the world conformed to the ideal forms and 
laws of  geometry, and therefore made possible “a completely new kind of  inductive 
prediction” (Crisis 33) capable of  determining with precision and necessity ‘events’ which 
are beyond experience, even beyond the scope of  experience. The rigorous and exact 
mathematical determination of  the world (or at lest of  regions thereof) permits predictions 
which further relegate the role of  experiment to mere confirmation, and what’s more, 
further support the metaphysical presupposition of  a purely objective world independent 
of  subjective intentionality which the ideality of  mathematics is able to determine as if  on 
its own. 
In Galileo’s metaphor, nature is the book in which philosophy is written in the 
language of  geometry, ready to be understood by any who speak it; 
Philosophy is written in this grand book, the universe, which stands continually 
open to our gaze. But the book cannot be understood unless one first learns to 
comprehend the language and read the letters in which it is composed. It is 
written in the language of  mathematics, and its characters are triangles, circles, 
and other geometric figures without which it is humanly impossible to 
understand a single word of  it; without these, one wanders about in a dark 
labyrinth. 
(Galileo, “Assayer” 237-8) 
The rhetorical point to which this world-changing claim is in service is the very revolution 
for which Galileo is so often praised—Galileo is criticising his own major critic Orazio 
Grassi, writing under the pen-name Lotario Sarsi, for relying on and defending the 
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important scholastic method of  appeals to authority. Philosophy is not a matter of  books, 
titles and authors, but that grand book— 
In Sarsi I seem to discern the firm belief  that in philosophizing one must 
support oneself  upon the opinion of  some celebrated author, as if  our minds 
ought to remain completely sterile and barren unless wedded to the reasoning 
of  some other person. Possibly he thinks that philosophy is a book of  fiction 
by some writer, like the Iliad or Orlando Furioso, productions in which the 
least important thing is whether what is written there is true.23 
(Galileo, “Assayer” 237) 
What’s interesting here is that the metaphor of  the book and of  being a speaker of  the 
language of  philosophy seems so much more important than the ‘gaze’ to which it stands 
open. The masterful rhetoric reveals the importance of  the ideal in what has so often been 
understood as the triumphant birth of  scientific empiricism—without the ideal “one 
wanders about in a dark labyrinth” (Galileo, “Assayer” 238). This evidence shows why 
Husserl’s critique of  Galileo rightly contributes counterpoint to his place in the cannon, 
despite his innovative and fundamental use of  mathematics, as the hero of  empiricism. In 
fact, Galileo allows us to forget the empirical. We forget that in science experience is 
idealised, because in science both the experience (despite its rhetoric) and the ideal (despite 
its important function) are misunderstood. Thus, Husserl’s defence of  the experience 
which is empiricism’s heart is an attack on modern science as a whole from two unexpected 
directions—he attacks it for excessive idealism of  a specifically mathematical sort in service 
of  a one-sided and metaphysically dogmatic material objectivism. It is an attack that turns 
the philosophical understanding of  science on its ear. 
 
The historical critique of  Science lays bare its abandonment of  its telos—truth—in 
the pursuit of  an objective exactitude—that is; truth’s simulacrum. While objectivity, and 
even the universal communicability of  objectivity that exactitude and univocity of  terms is 
essential to, itself  has a place in the telos of  humanity, science has pursued a course of  
idealisation that makes a univocal objectivity possible, but at the expense of  abandoning 
the meaning of  such objects without which they can in no way further the goal of  humanity 
and of  a humanity. It is the teleo-historical character of  the crisis which makes it possible 
to meaningfully identify a crisis of  meaning. Because of  the teleological nature of  science, 
its present can be meaningfully criticised on the basis of  the idea which it also consists in, 
                                                
23 Husserl, like so many other philosophers who share a sort of disdain for an excessive 
traditionalism, would no doubt concur. See for example his introduction to the Cartesian Meditations, 
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and because it has disappointed its potential its crisis can be identified as a crisis (as opposed 
to a mere factual change), and the cause of  that crisis identified in its history. 
The invention of  ideality and the mathematisation of  nature are the essential 
philosophical revolutions of  science—the conceptual cornerstones of  science’s rigour and 
discipline, as Husserl said (see Crisis 3-4), and of  what we so often applaud as its 
steamrolling progress. Ideality freed inquiry from the comparison of  the objects of  
determination with themselves-indeterminate objects as in the ancient arts of  measurement 
and surveying—bestowing on us instead ideal limits which were fixed absolutely from their 
inception. It was an unparalleled advancement of  the project of  universal reason since it 
greatly diminished the room for equivocation that belonged to our projects of  object-study, 
and opened up the possibility of  their communication within a community and 
preservation for posterity with certainty and clarity hitherto impossible. For the first time, 
the manipulation of  ideas became possible with confidence in the invariability of  their ideal 
identity. The land-surveyor no longer is limited to the fertile mud of  the banks of  the 
nile—no longer confined to the finite and parochial tradition of  the culture in which his 
particular trade and its tools and concepts (which are all the same—that one stretched and 
sodden rope)—he works with ideas that are universal and true for all land-surveyors in all 
places. And although he is no longer at the bleeding edge of  the science (which 
nevertheless still takes its name from him), having ceded that to the theoretician and 
philosopher, he is part of  a universal community and fills his own little role in an infinite 
task of  determining with absolute certainty and for all time that shape of  things. 
Galileo’s mathematisation of  nature is more problematic in itself; it is not merely 
the invention of  a new kind of  object, but the subordination of  one realm of  objects 
under another—the ideal is no longer a technology for the standardisation of  objects 
which were attained in experience, as was the case in applied geometry; in modern physics, 
experiment is itself  reduced to a technique for the discovery of  ideal relations and laws 
constituting the universe as a unity, relations that are supposed to describe reality’s true 
fabric. Nevertheless, it is only the causally-related unity of  nature that makes it possible for 
Galileo to postulate his law of  the constant rate of  motion in falling bodies (see Galileo, 
The Two New Sciences), and for the postulation of  all such laws as the basis for their 
inductive generalisation; 
                                                                                                                                          
where he almost haughtily proclaims his mission as the pursuit of Descartes’ modus operandi, and not 
of his texts. (see CM 2) 
60 
The indirect mathematization of  the world, which proceeds as a methodical 
objectification of  the intuitively given world, gives rise to general numerical 
formulae which, once they are formed, can serve by way of  application to 
accomplish the factual objectification of  the particular cases to be subsumed 
under them. 
(Crisis 41) 
It is the universality already assumed in advance that validates induction or even makes it 
conceivable, that “guides all induction of  particular causalities” (Crisis 39)—without it, 
experiment is unique and without its apotheosis to the universal; 
From the very beginning, for example, one is not concerned with the free fall 
of  this body; the individual fact is rather an example, embedded from the start 
in the concrete totality of  types belonging to intuitively given nature, in its 
empirically familiar invariance; and this is naturally carried over into the 
Galilean attitude of  idealizing and mathematizing. 
(Crisis 41) 
This would be a genuine achievement for the goal of  universal human reason were it not 
for the continued substitution of  the ideal for the sensible that it is based on, in which that 
substitution is ‘surreptitious’, and the sensible almost entirely ignored. 
 Would it have been possible for Galileo or some other ‘revealing and 
concealing genius’ (see Crisis 52) to achieve this ordering of  the physical world as a whole 
according to geometrical idealities without what Husserl calls his “fateful omission” (Crisis 
49) of  the historical enquiry (Rückfrage), in which Husserl engaged himself,24 into the 
original meaning of  geometrical truths for the empirically intuited world? If  the particular 
dependence of  a given ideal object on intuition (for its sense and meaning) was in each case 
made explicit through inquiry into its particular histories, would ideas still function as ideas 
with their essential universality? And would that in any case suffice for the necessities of  
causal relations invented in the idealisation of  nature of  modern physics to have any 
phenomenological or lifeworldly necessity beyond their cultural significance, in other 
words—for there to be a physics which is phenomenologically meaningful with the 
necessity essential to physics? Husserl seems to suggest that it would’ve been possible, as 
he criticises Galileo for that; 
It did not enter the mind of  a Galileo that it would ever become relevant, 
indeed of  fundamental importance, to geometry, as a branch of  a universal 
knowledge of  what is (philosophy), to make geometrical self-evidence—the 
‘how’ of  its origin—into a problem. 
(Crisis 29) 
                                                
24 Husserl says that we are (meaning ‘I am’) “proceeding beyond Galileo in our historical 
reflections” (Crisis 29) 
61 
These are very difficult questions on which hang the fate of  Husserl’s proposed resolution 
to the crisis—the enigmatic notion of  reactivation of  original sense-evidence, or urevidence. 
It is no accident that the same revolution which Husserl blames for having 
dissimulated the subjective origins of  science, which he so effectively criticises by exposing 
its metaphysical presuppositions, is responsible for modern science as such, with all its 
breathtaking success. The unparalleled success of  Galileo’s philosophy cannot be 
underestimated. Nor can a critique which just explains it away, which does not account for 
its success and its virtues, hold water. Science is immensely successful notwithstanding its 
philosophical hollowness—the fact that it stands on a supposed foundation that it cannot, 
in principle, provide. Crucially, it is successful not merely in superficial ways—it is not merely 
a matter of  technological (in the usual, non-Heideggerean sense) and practical progress and 
invention, but of  understanding (again, in a non-Heideggerean sense). With Galileo, in his 
metaphor of  the world as a book written in numbers, for the first time the world is 
conceived as a totality that is open to systematic rational study—“What is new, 
unprecedented, is the conceiving of  this idea of  a rational infinite totality of  being with a 
rational science systematically mastering it. An infinite world, here a world of  idealities, is 
conceived, not as one whose objects become accessible to our knowledge singly, 
imperfectly, and as it were accidentally, but as one which is attained by a rational, 
systematically coherent method.” (Crisis 22) With the postulation of  the world as 
systematic ideal totality, geometry and the infinite task of  reason is born again, as Derrida 
explains Husserl’s discourse (and I will explain the implication of  such plural—indeed, 
infinite—origins in chapter four). 
Galilean science is crucial for the development of  ideality, which is why Husserl’s 
critique of  it is more nuanced than Heidegger’s criticism of  technology, for example. The 
same cannot be said for science since the Renaissance, however—the period in which the 
third stage of  the crisis unfolds, which Husserl describes with this heading: “The positivistic 
reduction of  the idea of  science to mere factual science.” (Crisis 5) For all the scientific and 
technological progress we have experienced since Galileo’s time there has been nothing to 
push the boundaries of  understanding. This may seem like a bold, even myopic, claim in an 
era which has discovered subatomic particles, pierced the veil of  the mechanisms of  
evolution, and explained the movement of  tectonic plates; and witnessed the invention and 
then overturning of  Newtonian physics but all of  science’s history since Galileo has 
‘merely’ been the exercise of  the domain of  reason and understanding already invented. 
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There have been no revolutions, only bloodless coups. But then, Husserl means to start 
one—a revolution to return the attentions of  reason to the subject. 
The third ‘stage’ of  crisis, then, is merely a disappointment of  science’s promise—
the forgetting and ignoring of  the “specifically human questions” (Crisis 7) which 
positivism is ill-equipped to treat—though one the way for which had been well prepared 
by its earlier accomplishments. What has become of  the land-surveyor now? He has 
become Kafka’s land-surveyor; face-to-face with an infinite, obscure and archaic system 
before he can get to work measuring the land and making its form and dimensions 
conceivable. It is a system which is immense and can never be taken into view. Its origins 
are obscure, and anyway they are unfathomable. He is told he has already carried out work 
when he has not. But it is the system in which he must work—“‘Well, you’re the land 
surveyor,’ he explained, ‘and you belong at the castle. Where do you want to go?’” (Castle 
17) 
The prescribed remedy is not just to roll back our culture’s most recent and most 
egregious mistakes with science—these mistakes have been prepared by a long history that 
led science down a road that became dangerous long before it became a mistake. It is not 
enough just to try to back up and start again from where we went most obviously wrong, 
like Kafka’s land-surveyor, trying to get out of  trouble by trying first this course of  action 
then that, constantly testing to see what might work but without ever throwing out the 
whole project, the whole enterprise which is getting him in such trouble! Husserl’s land-
surveyor is not a Kafkan one, and he would have gone on to the next town or even the 
next country long ago, leaving the castle behind him. I’ll try one more metaphor: science in 
Husserl’s time had brought humanity out of  the woods only to leave it on a dangerous and 
unstable cliff, and Husserl’s solution is not to take a few steps back into the woods, turn 
around and try the next path to see if  it is still a cliff  there—Husserl would guide us back 
through the forest to the point where we first started heading towards the cliff, and take us 
a different way entirely. Such a radical response is necessary—the results of  trying to 
reopen science’s eyes to “the enigma of  subjectivity” (Crisis 5) from within the objectivist 
paradigm launched by Galileo can be seen in modern and contemporary psychology and 
related disciplines which not only treats the subject as an object of  consciousness, as any 
discourse or even the most glancing attempt to bring the subject to mind must, but must 
take subjectivity and ego to belong to the world described by geometry and mathematics, 
just as much as the banks of  the Nile are. Denial may not just be a river in Egypt, but it can 
be measured the same way! The whole philosophical framework of  Galileanism hangs on 
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this reducibility, in the reductive sense, because of  its essential monism; “We have not two 
but only one universal form of  the world: not two but only one geometry” (Crisis 34). 
If  the solution is a radical recommencement of  science, then it is clear that we 
must go back to before we were committed to the irrationality of  Galileo’s disregard for 
the subjective and his ‘fateful omission’ of  historical enquiry, but why is the solution cast in 
terms of  this backwards-looking method (Rückfrage) at all? Why do we not just start from 
scratch, the way scientists and philosophers so often have flattered themselves that they 
were doing things? The answer takes us back in its own right to the question of  the means 
of  diagnosing the crisis to begin with—a crisis which only reveals itself  with the clarity of  
its causes and meanings when examined teleo-historically. This is why the critique must be 
historical, which is to say teleological. It is only in view of  the regulative idea of  universal 
human reason to which science owes its meaning that the sciences can be said in spite of  
their apparent vitality to be in crisis. On their own terms, since they accept, wittingly or no, 
the objectivist metaphysics in which they operate, the confrontation with universal reason 
has no critical hold on them. It is only when reason is reaffirmed that the critique stands 
and the metaphysics of  objectivism appear corrupt. It is when the question of  the meaning 
of  truth, a question that brings together the historical and the epistemological, is raised that 
the emptiness of  truth in itself  becomes evident. At that point we are already in 
phenomenology, which is nothing but the pursuit of  infinite reason. 
Within the limits of  their own assumptions the techniques of  mathematically 
rigorous experiment are fantastically successful, but the meaning of  science cannot be 
found in scientific method or even scientific facts themselves—it depends on its place 
within the idea of  humanity. The invention of  ideal exactitude in mathematics marked 
progress within that idea of  humanity by the creation of  an infinite standard of  objectivity, 
but also introduced a danger in its movement away from experience, the only real basis for 
knowledge. The idealisation of  nature both deepened that progress by making the whole 
universe understandable according to that same objectivity, and heightened the danger by 
raising the ideal above the sensible as more real, or at least more faithful to reality, and 
concealing that subversion as well as the original difference between the ideal and the 
sensible in its “surreptitious substitution” (Crisis 48). The ideal is what must be confirmed 
in the case of  doubt or controversy, while its origin is ignored; “Thus all the occasional 
(even "philosophical") reflections which go from technical [scientific] work back to its true 
meaning always stop at idealised nature” (Crisis 50). Finally, the abandonment by modern 
science of  the Renaissance project of  “the One philosophy” (Crisis 8) oriented towards 
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“‘metaphysical’ questions… (which) surpass the world understood as the universe of  mere 
facts” (Crisis 9), to which Galileo’s ‘consummating’ physics yet remained tethered, tipped 
the mounting dangers of  science’s idealism over into crisis. The current state of  the 
European sciences is the result of  their historical development, and it can be identified as 
crisis because of  the teleological idea of  human history, which both sets up an idea of  
progress against which science’s succumbing to its innate dangers can be identified as a 
crisis and provides the more fundamental framework for conceiving the inaugural and 
shaping events in and around science as its history, and as part of  the history of  humanity. 
The critique of  science is Husserl’s motivation for engaging in philosophy of  history, but it 
is extraordinary to pay so much attention in the Crisis and in the Origin to the basis for 
historical understanding itself. Such a profound inquiry might well have been left aside, the 
capacity for historical thinking taken for granted. Husserl may not have considered this an 
option—as Derrida’s contextualisation in his Introduction of  the Origin within the broader 
concerns of  Husserl’s phenomenological project shows, the concern with the basis of  
historicity reflects the necessity of  determining precisely how the historical is presented as 
historical—for Husserl the account of  history and its conditions themselves is inextricable 
from the account of  a particular historical phenomenon. It is the rigours of  
phenomenology themselves which demand the inquiry into history; it is because of  the 
demands of  phenomenological science that we cannot be content with an account of  crisis 
which does not sufficiently establish the possibility of  the science of  history on which it is 
based. 
There is also a more peculiar suitability in treating the phenomenological critique 
of  science together with the phenomenology of  history because as we will see they are not 
distinct creations, but depend on each other from the outset. History is not a distinct 
concern from that of  science. History is neither possible nor consequential except insofar 
as it is the history of  truth, which is to say the history of  science. This is why history, as 
distinguished from ‘chronicle’, is, like science, for the most part a feature of  the 
Renaissance and the modern era. It is natural that when science comes under scrutiny for 
Husserl it is together with history, not only because the historicity of  science is crucial, but 
because the transcendental phenomenological method is required by both together. Science 
and history will be shown to be inseparable; indeed, meaning and even being itself  is 
inseparable from history. As I have already quoted before and will do again, Derrida 
writes—“historicity is sense.” (IOG 150) The distinctiveness of  Husserl’s philosophy of  
history (or one aspect of  it) is its refusal to treat history on its own or in the abstract, 
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because there is no history without science. For this reason, history becomes the target of  
Husserl’s most interesting enquiry; the meaning of  ideal history. The means for this enquiry 
into history will be set forth in the following chapter, concerning ideal history—the 
historical method of  transcendental phenomenology. 
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2 – Philosophical foundations of  history 
 
This chapter, titled “Philosophical foundations of  history,” will systematically explain the 
meaning of  Husserl’s philosophy of  ideal history, ideal history’s necessity, and begin to 
detail how it works (in addition to giving a necessary interpretation of  the meaning of  
eidetic science and the eidetic reduction, which serves as crucial background). Three 
sections—“From facts to the meaning of  facts,” “The eidetic structure of  consciousness,” 
“Uniting the epistemological and the historical”—comprise this chapter. 
The first section explains why history, in particular, must always be eidetic no 
matter what form it takes or what it is the history of. There is a whole structure of  
meaning which the historical invariably relies on, which is why all history, even so-called 
‘factual history’ is eidetic, and in this section that reliance is explained. First, however, the 
independence of  ideal history from the factual which is dependent on it, which Husserl 
explicitly declares, is spelled out with an example of  what it might look like when the two 
find themselves actually in discord. This independence is important, because it allows 
history to ignore the factual and concern itself  with the kind of  history capable of  
explaining the meaning of  our current truths, which will be the major theme of  the third 
section of  this chapter; but it is in a way what the whole chapter is leading up to and so it is 
introduced here (or rather, reintroduced; I wrote about it briefly in the first section of  
chapter one). Finally, factuality will be let back in from the cold in a consideration of  the 
eidetic meaning of  ‘factualness’ for history. 
Following this demonstration of  the indispensability of  the eidetic in the 
philosophy of  history, it is worth taking some time to understand the theory of  eidetics as 
it was already long established to be a key part of  phenomenology, which I will do in the 
section “The eidetic structure of  consciousness”. This section is a sustained argument that 
the intentional structure of  consciousness and transcendental phenomenology presuppose 
that objects of  consciousness are essentially, so to speak, essential. This argument counters 
the anti-transcendental and object-oriented phenomenology of  the Göttingen circle and 
the scientific-methodological interpretation of  eidetic reduction of  Dagfinn Føllesdal. The 
section ends with an explanation of  how ideality forms the basis of  objectivity in all 
phenomenologically meaningful senses of  the word and a detailed explanation of  the 
diversity that is possible on that basis, in order to explain the difference between the 
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originary truth-meaning of  geometry in the psychical realm and geometry’s mature ideal 
objectivity as a difference within the same realm, being ideal objectivity. This diversity 
comprises ideal objectivity which possesses the ‘unrestricted universality’ of  systems of  
meaning such as geometry as well as in a qualified and more complicated fashion regions 
of  meaning such as the memories of  childhood or the dramatis personae of  works of  
literature. 
This is where the last section, “Uniting the epistemological and the historical”, 
picks up; re-iterating that eidetic history is necessary because it alone can establish the 
origin of  a science with the certainty necessary to secure that science’s meaning, before 
explaining the most basic methodology of  ideal history—imaginary variation. This method 
of  eidetic science is explained in earlier texts by Husserl, but I have taken on the work of  
explaining how it functions as a historical project. Imaginary variation is the reason the 
pure essence can be determined and facts dispensed with, and therefore why history can be 
reunited with science. 
 
a. From facts to the meaning of  facts 
 
Husserl’s utter disinterest in historical facts with respect to his inquiry into ‘ideal history’ is 
the first thing that will give a new reader pause. “No one would think,” he writes, “of  
tracing the epistemological problem back to such a supposed Thales. This is quite 
superfluous.” (IOG 172) The complete lack of  interest in even the most relevant factual 
historical account to what is still meant to be an inquiry into the history of  geometry is 
nothing short of  astounding at first glance. Of  course, a philosopher’s disdain for the 
strictly historical and especially of  the biographical is nothing new or surprising. Indeed, 
Hannah Arendt quotes Heidegger as having said with respect to Aristotle; “Regarding the 
personality of  a philosopher, our only interest is that he was born at a certain time, that he 
worked, and that he died.” (Arendt, Martin Heidegger at 80 297) Nevertheless, two things 
make Husserl’s unique brand of  disdain for the ‘historical’ far harder to understand. First, 
there is Husserl’s express intent to do history, to bring down “The ruling dogma of  the 
separation in principle between epistemological elucidation and historical, even humanistic-
psychological explanation” (IOG 172), to stop at nothing short of  bringing history and the 
historical back into the heart of  philosophy itself. Second, the sort of  thing involved in the 
‘factual history’ disdained by Husserl goes well beyond the sort of  things excluded by 
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Heidegger. Not only is Thales’ birthdate and his real name irrelevant—even his work itself, 
in itself, is devoid of  any philosophical or historical interest. What Husserl calls ‘factual 
history’ is not limited to those contextual and biographical aspects which are obviously of  
only indirect relevance to the matter of  the genesis and development of  an idea and its 
own ‘internal history’—even the idea itself  as it may be supposed by living memory or 
historical record to have actually appeared and originated is excluded from the scope of  a 
history which is nevertheless supposed to be the most thorough-going, rigorous and 
profound: 
The question of  the origin of  geometry shall not be considered here as the 
philological-historical question, i.e., as the search for the first geometers who 
actually uttered pure geometrical propositions, proofs, theories, or for the 
particular propositions they discovered, or the like. 
(IOG 158) 
The factual history of  geometry is excluded not only as to biographical content and 
identifying information, but also the very ideas themselves insofar as their appearance 
therein is contingent, insofar as its necessity within that very history is not demonstrated—
that is, the ideas themselves are only significant to the extent they are integrated into the 
essential history that gives them meaning. The idea in itself  is not historically relevant for 
Husserl—it is only relevant when it is determined with specificity in terms of  its necessity 
within the historical development of  the field. 
 Husserl never really offers examples of  this distinction, yet the case of  the 
heliocentric theory may be illustrative. In fact, history rightly (by its own standards) credits 
Nicolaus Copernicus’ early 16th century theory that the sun is the centre of  the universe, 
around which all the celestial spheres revolve with the genius of  the heliocentric theory. In 
a perhaps quite rare disagreement, Husserl’s history would have to give a somewhat 
different account, and claim that at the period of  Copernicus’ pronouncements the 
heliocentric theory such as it is still had yet to be invented, because the heliocentric theory 
is an objective truth and at the time of  Copernicus’ writing it did not exist as such or in 
that way—if  it was something (and surely it was) it was not something that belonged to the 
history of  science, but something which we might take comfort in calling ’true belief ’. 
Though we were not at the time, we have long since been in a position to observe that this 
theory has the status of  objective universality, and that it required the theory of  inertia—in 
fact Galileo Galilei’s more or less century later refutation of  the Aristotelian laws of  
motion and with them Ptolemy’s arguments against the motion of  the earth—to allow it to 
attain this status of  truth. Ideal history is concerned with the heliocentric theory, and with 
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its dependence on the law of  inertia. That factually heliocentrism was postulated some 
hundred years earlier than the law on which its objectivity depends is inconsequential—
ideal history is concerned with the essential genesis of  ideal objects, and it is only with 
Galileo’s ideas that Copernicus’ attain this status. The facts, even when they are the facts of  
the ideas themselves, are strictly contingent and do not help us understand the necessity that 
belongs to science’s history!25 As long as it does not confine itself  to the ideal necessity of  
ideas in relation to one-another, it is not the internal history of  science. 
 
Through the reduction of  factual history, the ideal history crucial to the invention 
and existence of  science is distinguished and liberated from the kind of  external and 
beside-the-point contingent factualities which had dominated not only history’s writing but 
its philosophy (as for instance in Kant [see IOG 41–42]), as Derrida explains; “factual 
history must be reduced in order to respect and show the normative independence of  the 
ideal object in its own right; then and only then, by thus avoiding all historicist or logicist 
confusion, in order to respect and show the unique historicity of  the ideal object itself.” 
(IOG 44) In distinguishing a history internal to science from history which is external (at 
least to that science—it may be the object of  its own science in the same way that the 
subjectivity excluded from objectivist modern science is made the object of  a subsidiary 
science of  psychology), Husserl avoids Kant’s “indifference to empirical history” (IOG 42) 
and historicism’s dangers simultaneously. 
 
I will have to go into the necessity of  the eidetic reduction in Husserl’s 
phenomenology in greater depth than I did in the preceding chapter and explain the 
dysfunctional hollowness of  so-called ‘factual science’ in some depth, and I will do both of  
these shortly, but there is a more specific reason, proper to the ideal-historical project itself, 
that compels Husserl to dismiss factual history and thus leave himself  open to the 
persistent criticism that he ignores history—his critics will say that even his late historical 
                                                
25 Derrida indicates his affinity with this revolutionary and powerful methodology in the first, non-
numbered section of his Introduction by setting out the logic behind the itinerary of his own study of 
the Origin with attention to its consistency with the rest of Husserl’s oeuvre. His first sentence 
situates the text, which he calls “this meditation” (IOG 25), within the body of Husserl’s work as 
“By its date and themes” (IOG 25) belonging to the philosopher’s last project. At the end of this 
introduction of the Introduction, Derrida writes, apparently without irony—“Though this moment of 
Husserl’s radicalness is ultimate according to the facts, it is perhaps not so de jure.” (IOG 27) ‘Not 
so de jure’, meaning that there is a historical logic of the development of Husserl’s thought which is 
in some sense independent of the facts—perhaps this is not rigorously determinable in the case of 
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turn treats history in an ahistorical fashion, that the eidetic reduction eliminates what is 
most fundamental to history; its contingency. 
In Discovering Existence with Husserl, Levinas writes “In Husserl, the phenomenon of  
meaning has never been determined by history.” (Levinas, Discovering Existence with Husserl 
87) This is the basis for a major distinction between Husserl and Heidegger, about whom 
Levinas writes in the following paragraph; “For Heidegger, on the contrary, meaning is 
conditioned by something that already was. The intimate link between meaning and 
thought results from the accomplishment of  meaning in history, that something extra that 
is one’s existence” (Levinas, Discovering 87) Derrida comments on this point specifically in 
“Violence and Metaphysics” (see VM 87–89), and does a great deal throughout his writing 
on Husserl, most of  which centres on history or related issues, to refute this hasty 
characterisation. 
Derrida also sums this criticism up very clearly and conclusively in Rogues: 
“Whenever a telos or teleology comes to orient, order, and make possible a historicity, it 
annuls that historicity by the same token and neutralizes the unforeseeable and incalculable 
irruption, the singular and exceptional alterity of  what [ce qui] comes, or indeed of  who [qui] 
comes, that without which, or the one without whom, nothing happens or arrives.” 
(Rogues 128) 
 
Probably the most obvious counter to a Husserlean ideal history, however, would 
be Foucault’s genealogy, committed as it is to the discontinuities of  history. Foucault writes: 
“if  [the genealogist] listens to history, he finds that there is ‘something altogether different’ 
behind things: not a timeless and essential secret, but the secret that they have no essence 
or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fash­ ion from alien forms.” (Foucault, 
“Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” 78) Husserl, in thinking about history, tries to bring to its 
depths the same light of  recognition of  the conditions for experience that inaugurated 
phenomenology. He would cease to use the obscurity of  history as an excuse to resign the 
experience of  the past to darkness and mystery. The critical (in the Kantian sense) rigour 
of  Husserl’s approach (by making the claim about the past responsible to the possibility of  
our experience of  it) avoids some of  the excesses of  approaches to history that turn their 
scepticism to a sort of  dogmatism by refusing to make their claims of  change and 
discontinuity responsible to the transtemporal objectivity which alone could allow change 
                                                                                                                                          
Husserl’s philosophical biography, but the language suggests that it could be where ideal truths 
were concerned. 
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to appear. If  Husserl’s pursuit of  origin is exactly of  the type Nietzsche, according to 
Foucault, challenged on the grounds that “this search assumes the existence of  immobile 
forms that precede the external world of  accident and succession” (Foucault, “Nietzsche” 
78), it is because the reduction of  ‘accident and succession’ is necessary in order for them 
to appear. Husserl’s recognition of  the essential ‘immobility’ is an antidote to the naivety 
and dogmatism of  the thought that the external world can be supposed without first 
reducing it to essential and thus immobile forms. The genealogy of  Foucault and of  
Nietzsche, then, consists of  either claims for which the conditions of  their knowledge has 
not been adequately determined, or the night in which all cows are black, as the old Yiddish 
saying goes.  
While in a certain sense true, Foucault’s claim that "What is found at the historical 
beginning of  things is not the inviolable identity of  their origin; it is the dissension of  
other things.” (Foucault, “Nietzsche” 79) is also nonsense. If  there really is no identity 
tying the thing to its origin, then in what sense is that its origin? Why is it not the origin of  
something else entirely? And if  it really is the thing’s origin, then there must be some sense 
in which the thing is contiguous. While it is incontrovertible that, as Fichte asserts; “By 
virtue of  its mere notion, the ground falls outside what it grounds” (Fichte, Science 8), the 
possibility of  determining a ground as ground demands the positing of  a relation between 
them which undermines the discreteness of  the ground’s transcendence. This is the 
paradox of  origin, and I will continue to discuss it throughout this thesis, especially with 
respect to Derrida’s “Signature, Event, Context”. 
A few pages later, Foucault uses twin examples of  the eye and punishment (see 
Foucault, “Nietzsche” 83), pointing out that neither of  them always had the use or value it 
has now, nor is its current value a ‘culmination’, which is to say teleologically determined. The 
eye, he says, was not always the contemplative tool, but was honed for hunting and 
warfare—what a statement! With this pourquoi story, he signs onto a whole unexamined 
system of  certainties of  evolutionary biology. Foucault would liberate us from the 
subordination of  the past’s vicissitudes to the form by which they are now understood, but 
he would do so only by chaining them to an overarching discourse with its own 
assumptions of  dogmatic metaphysical realism. Surely, the discourse of  Darwin is not to be 
doubted, but how much does this utilitarian and practical story of  the eye’s origin confine 
its meaning? Can the eye, when it is understood in those practical terms ever really be freed 
from them in order to have its contemplative value? With what eye, that of  the warrior or 
of  the contemplator, is the practical origin spotted?   
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Either way—whether the origin is really denied, or the thing the genealogy of  
which is studied is denied—taken to the extreme that Foucault wants us to, Nietzsche’s 
dismorphic genealogy would indicate a refusal to take ideas seriously that would fatally 
undercut his own claims. The language with which Foucault expresses the claim belies its 
impossibility—in what sense could the thing’s beginning be its beginning if  it were not 
identical? How can a history or genealogy present itself  without some kind of  essential 
likeness.  
Husserl’s history is not a Genealogie, but a Rückfrage—at no point does it purport to 
be a science of  the origin, the past and emergence and all the other aspects Foucault 
mentions except in terms of  the appearance of  the origin from the present. While Foucault 
says that “the historical sense [of  historians] is mastered by a supra historical perspective” 
(Foucault, “Nietzsche” 87), in fact it is a suprahistorical perspective that his own approach 
assumes. Despite his own talk about “the surreptitious practices of  historians, their 
pretension to examine things furthest from themselves” (Foucault, “Nietzsche” 89) 
the pretension to examine discontinuity without the aid of  an underlying relation can be 
nothing other than that. There are many kinds of  absolutes from which certainty can be 
acquired, and far from refusing them all, Foucault’s genealogy has its own.  
On the other hand, Foucault is attentive to the indispensability and influence of  
perspective that also undergirds Rückfrage. Foucault writes: "The final trait of  effective 
history is its affirmation of  knowledge as perspective." (Foucault, “Nietzsche” 90) But it is 
clearly not enough to acknowledge perspective without also studying what makes it 
possible for the past to appear to it, as Nietzsche has no interest in doing. Is this a 
description of  the historical reduction, in which the appearance of  the concrete historicity 
has a transcendental sense that is dependent on but also prior to the ideal sense of  its 
continuity? 
 
Ideal history is necessary because the factual is simply ill-equipped to provide the 
kind of  epistemologico-historical foundation that the meaning of  geometry needs, or even 
for the identification of  that meaning’s disappearance. Factual history is incapable of  
overcoming the division between ‘epistemological elucidation’ and ‘historical explanation’ 
necessary in order for the historical to play the role Husserl wants it to in the establishment 
of  the epistemic grounding of  geometrical truth in which it is recognised that the 
aforementioned separation “between epistemological and genetic origin, is fundamentally 
mistaken, unless one limits, in the usual way, the concepts of  ‘history,’ ‘historical 
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explanation,’ and ‘genesis.’” (UG 172-3) ‘In the usual way’, that is, as fact in thrall to its own 
contingency. A factual history cannot help to establish the epistemic grounding of  truth, 
and its involvement with the project of  grounding has only served to open truth up to the 
scepsis of  a historicism. This is because it can never be enough that science has happened 
to have had such-and-such a genesis—the epistemologico-historical task requires that it be 
proved that this genesis was essential, and that it could not have had any other, alternate 
development or motivation. Moreover, the genesis must connect the science itself  to 
something other than itself, something the meaning of  which is not contained in the 
science—viz. Subjective experience. Only a genesis of  this kind can provide meaning. By 
rejecting the ‘ruling dogma’ of  separation between history and truth in which the essence 
of  history is ignored in deference to its more apparent vagaries and contingency we are 
able to understand how history makes truth ‘at home’ rather than inviting scepticism in; 
what we know—namely, that the presently vital cultural configuration 
‘geometry’ is a tradition and is still being handed down—is not knowledge 
concerning an external causality which effects the succession of  historical 
configurations, as if  it were knowledge based on induction, the presupposition 
of  which would amount to an absurdity here; rather, to understand geometry 
or any given cultural fact is to be conscious of  its historicity, albeit ‘implicitly.’ 
(UG 173) 
This kind of  essential history could be derived from the dependence of  Copernicus’ 
heliocentric theory as scientific truth on Galileo’s laws of  motion, just as it never could 
from the ‘accident’ that the latter came a century after the former. Truly, Husserl’s complete 
lack of  interest in the factually established chronology of  events in intellectual history is as 
revolutionary as it is necessary. 
 If  history is even capable of  ignoring contingencies and changes because 
they cannot at least to this point be made sense of  in the teleology of  history, then is it still 
historical? This is the objection to any teleological account of  history raised first by 
Nietzsche and then by Foucault. I will not answer it with any finality at this point, indeed it 
is one of  the most serious questions regarding history and will stay with me until the end, 
and perhaps beyond (even beyond all ends). This concerns Derrida from the beginning of  
his studies of  Husserl in his ‘mémoire’ (dissertation) for his diplome d’études supérieures at the 
Ecole Normale Supérieure written when he was 23, published only in 1990 as Le Problème de le 
Gènese dans la Philosophie de Husserl, in which he wrote: 
Now, at the moment when Husserl writes that the history presupposed by the 
passive genesis 'is itself  announced,' he has interrupted this dialectic between 
phenomenology and ontology. Every history announcing itself  is reduced a 
priori to its phenomenological and intentional sense, to a sense which it did not 
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create in its authentic genesis but which preexists it, envelops it, and continually 
informs it. 
(PGH 143) 
Leonard Lawlor offers a concise summary of  this criticism, that Husserl’s whole 
philosophy subsumes genesis under the essential and structural invariability; “The 
reduction, therefore for Derrida, cannot capture, within temporal lived experience, the 
absolute constituting source: genesis.” (DH 81) These concerns never abate; even in his last 
work, in Rogues, Derrida is confronting Husserl with the annulling subjection of  history in 
the teleology which makes it possible (see Rogues 128). And yet, despite his betrayal of  
history, it is Husserl’s history which Derrida returns to over and over. Why is the history 
which dooms history so attractive to Derrida? 
To aggravate the problem a little further, let us look at the example of  the 
heliocentric hypothesis. If  the salient fact is not the strictly factual priority of  the discovery 
of  astronomical evidence of  heliocentrism but the historico-epistemological priority of  the 
discovery of  laws of  motion (which would permit the overturning of  the Aristotelio-
ptolemaic laws of  motion that had continued to provide potent arguments against 
Copernicus’ postulates), then why does Husserl insist on talking about history at all? Why 
does he break down the separation between history and truth, and why is he not content to 
be as resolutely on the side of  ahistorical truth as his critics, Derrida to some extent among 
them, think he ends up after all? Why is the historico-epistemological priority, which is to 
say the priority in terms of  internal history, not a good old-fashioned logical priority?  
 
 
 Ideal history is prior to and independent of  any other form of  history, 
nevertheless it is easiest to understand it insofar as it belongs to historical fact as what 
makes historical facts true. Just as there is no truth or meaning outside of  history, a problem 
I will return to with both Husserl and Derrida, history is meaningless without truth, and 
the truth for history is the essence of  history which comprises a historical fact’s “inner 
structure of  meaning” (UG 174). Eidetic rigour, and especially the eidetic identity between 
substance and (eidetic) circumstance, permit ideal history to concern itself  not with the 
contingent history, the particularity of  certain facts or data regarding any given 
“undiscoverable Thales of  geometry”, but with the “structure of  meaning” (UG 174) not 
only of  any such facts but of  the possibility of  historical factuality in general. The 
historicity of  the idea is indissociable from the idea itself––it is the essential having-been-
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created-in-time or having an essence-of-the-first-time (Erstmaligkeit)26 on the basis of  
essentially prior inventions of  ideas and as itself  the essential foundation for subsequent 
ones that belongs to the content (as opposed to mere context) of  the idea. This is why ideal 
history is also called ‘internal history’ (innere Historie) by Husserl (UG 180/Krisis 386). Ideal 
history is the “essentially general structure” (UG 174) of  any history; it is presupposed by 
factual history as the structurally temporal removal of  its given facts from an always prior 
present in relation to which they are retrospective, as well as the commerce always at the 
same time operating across that distance. That is, it is the structure of  history which makes 
it possible to say of  a given fact that it is both distant and present––not itself  ‘here and 
now’, but apparent to the ‘here and now’. Every ‘historical fact’ depends on this historical 
ontology the same way that any simply present fact depends on its own ideality for “its 
inner structure of  meaning” (UG 174), the very position of  it within a system (whether 
assumed or articulated) that makes it capable of  being given to consciousness. It is the 
eidetic which makes it possible for us to be meaningfully related to anything, and below or 
beyond which we cannot go except by raising what we find there into the ideal and the 
harsh light of  day. Husserl understates the case, writing: 
All [merely] factual history remains incomprehensible because, always merely 
drawing its conclusions naïvely and straightforwardly from facts, it never makes 
thematic the general ground of  meaning on which all such conclusions rest, 
has never investigated the immense structural a priori which is proper to it. 
(UG 174) 
What he is describing is not a pure factual history but a factual history that treats its 
theoretical underpinnings naively, uncritically and acts as if  they were not there. A factual 
history which neither thematises its facticity nor its historicity is the only actual practice 
that ‘purely factual history’ could actually denote, however, because there could never be a 
history which was truly purely factual; it would always have the essential structure of  
historicity27. 
Science is the “tradition of  truth” and “the most profound and purest history” 
(IOG 59), as Derrida reckons, because it is the tradition of  truth which establishes the 
continuity which is the condition of  possibility for historical meaning in the first place. Any 
discourse must take shape according to the ideal of  truth’s continuity and universal validity 
                                                
26 As Derrida has it, following Fink (see IOG 48fn) 
27 “If the usual factual study of history in general, and in particular the history which in most recent 
times has achieved true universal extension over all humanity, is to have any meaning at all, such a 
meaning can only be grounded upon what we here call internal history, and as such upon the 
foundations of the universal historical a priori.” (UG 180) 
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as Derrida again points out; “Indeed, without this [the ‘continuity established by ‘the 
tradition of  truth' or 'the pure unity of  such a tradition's sense'] no authentic history would 
be thought or projected as such; there would only be an empirical aggregate of  finite and 
accidental units." (IOG 59)28 
 
The ideal is the foundation of  meaning for any kind of  historical imagination or 
science (whether of  pure ideas themselves or of  facts). Husserl offers examples of  the 
necessity of  the eidetic early on in Ideas I in his description of  the relationship between 
factual and eidetic sciences: “it is without question that an experiential science… must 
proceed according to the formal principles treated by formal logic… [and since it is 
‘directed to objects’] must be universally bound by the laws that belong to the essence of  
anything objective whatever” (Id I 17–18). It is only because of  the essential structure of  
meaning that the facts treated by ‘experiential’ or factual sciences are scientifically or even 
meaningfully related or even understandable as ‘facts’ and the basis of  experience; there is 
thus no purely factual science or pure empiricism29. Without the a priori of  history would 
not even be “a heap of  broken images, where the sun beats” (Eliot, The Waste Land, line 
22). 
As Husserl writes, again in Ideas I; “There is no science of  matters of  fact which, 
were it fully developed as a science, could be pure of  eidetic cognitions and therefore could 
be independent of  the formal or the material eidetic sciences.” (Id I 17) It is no different in 
the case of  the science of  history—anything meaningfully intended as having played a part 
in history must already possess an eidetic structure according to which it is able to be 
identified above all else as an event or occurrence and as having occurred prior—and it is 
essential to a rigorous science to articulate and examine this structure and how it is that it 
maintains the historical event both in relation to a present and yet at a distance from that 
present. This is the essential structure of  all historical science, but for a purely 
phenomenological science of  history, or to accomplish the historical task of  an enquiry 
(Rückfrage) that would reestablish the foundation of  meaningfulness of  the ideal science of  
geometry, or even just identify the loss of  meaning that calls for it, a more demanding ideal 
                                                
28 I would heap up on this claim by noting that even ‘accidental units’ are never apparent without a 
system which makes sense of them as  accidental. 
29 This position draws from Hegel’s refutation of the naive certainty of the senses in The 
Phenomenology of Spirit as always ‘mediated’ (See Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit 59), although 
for Husserl the picture is already complicated by the idea in a way that it is not yet for Hegel at that 
stage. 
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history is necessary, a purely eidetic history independent of  facts. Before looking into this 
history and its method, I will discuss what is meant by ‘facts’ and by ‘ideas’. 
 
 It is helpful to return again to Ideas I to explain what is meant by facts and 
factuality, and to understand the meaning of  the fundamental division in historical science 
between the kind of  ‘philological-historical’ questions that are extrinsic to the history of  
the meaning of  ideas (or of  certain ideas), and the ‘internal history’ which alone can 
account for them. It is all the more crucial because, as we saw, the substance treated by the 
two types of  history need not be different. We must be clear about how it is that the 
treatment of  ideas as ‘facts’ is insufficient in the way that the treatment of  ideas 
essentially—in other words, as ideas—is not.30 
‘Factualness’ (Tatsächlichkeit), as Husserl calls it in Ideas I, is what contributes the 
contingency that distinguishes individuals. It is that by virtue of  which an individual existence 
is such as it is; “Individual existence of  every sort is, quite universally speaking, ‘contingent’. 
It is thus; in respect of  its essence it could be otherwise.” (Id I 7) Facts, then, do not 
concern distinct entities, nor even distinct qualities—the individual is always at the same 
time factual and related to its essence, and the extent to which it is considered factually 
marks nothing more than the limit of  eidetic enquiry into it reached by us. The individual 
existence is never, insomuch as it can be made sense of  at all, purely factual; 
the sense of  this contingency, which is called factualness, is limited in that it is 
correlative to a necessity which does not signify the mere de facto existence of  an 
obtaining rule of  coordination among spatiotemporal matters of  fact but 
rather has the character of  eidetic necessity and with this a relation to eidetic 
universality. 
(Id I 7) 
This follows from phenomenology itself  as an eidetic science, and the eidetic 
structure of  objectivity, thus of  consciousness, but it is easy to mistake since the ‘ideal’ 
which describes everything that appears, including the factual (Husserl’s distinction in the 
introduction to Ideas I notwithstanding) also refers, as in the case of  mathematics, to 
peculiarly identically exact types of  ideas. The basic structure of  objects of  consciousness 
is ideal, and therefore the factual is not a different ‘type’, an entirely different order of  
                                                
30 The significance of this distinction is that ideas can be rendered insignificant when they are 
treated as facts, rather than in themselves. This can be seen again in the example of the heliocentric 
postulate. 
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being, but a type of  idea—the idea of  factualness.31 I will go into the meaning of  the 
distinctness of  certain exact types of  ideas that are distinguished as ‘ideas proper’ or ‘ideal 
objects’, but these are not different entirely, merely free from various sorts of  modification. 
We must understand ‘ideas proper’ as ideas which do not require bringing in other ideas, 
such as the idea of  factualness and the particular determination of  that factualness, but 
which stand alone. 
Factual science, then, does not pertain to pure facts, but neither is it concerned 
exclusively with what can already at the moment of  the experience of  it be reduced to a 
unique eidos independent of  its particular but contingent associated context. Factual 
sciences include experiential sciences,32 the kind of  sciences which concern “founding 
cognitional acts of  experiencing [that] posit something real individually” (Id I 7), as 
opposed to the eidetic sciences of  mathematics and logic and the kind of  eidetic science of  
phenomena proposed by Husserl in which the subject performs a kind of  ‘eidetic seeing’ 
or imaginary presentation, a “seeing which is presentive of  the essence” (Id I 8) in order to 
determine what the thing is apart from its contingent experiential context. Factual sciences 
concern individuals, but not as objects or things already entirely reduced to their eidos; they 
concern experiences in which the things that constitute them are not yet separated from 
their contingent actuality and in which individuals do not appear as they exist in themselves 
at any point but only insofar as they are experienced in a particular setting. Seized in its 
factuality; 
it [the thing in experience] is posited as something that is at this place, in this 
physical shape (or else is given in union with something organismal having this 
shape), whereas the same real something considered with respect to its own 
essence could just as well be at any other place and have any other shape 
(Id I 7) 
In a factual individual, its context (which when we get down to it is also a web of  ideas) is 
inextricable from its eidos. 
What I am trying to stress here is that there is a phenomenological sense to a 
factual science, distinct from the metaphysical presuppositions naively and unintentionally 
subscribed to by a science which purports to deal in ‘facts’. Certainly even a factual science, 
adequately understood, is eidetic. There can be no such thing as a purely factual science—a 
                                                
31 The distinction Husserl makes in the introduction to Ideas I is not opposed to this, except insofar 
as I have rejected the terminological exclusion of ‘idea’ from “the universal concept of (either 
formal of material) essence” (ID I xxii). Whatever term is preferred, the fact is that the exact idea is 
a kind of idea, and belongs to ideality in general. 
32 “Experiential sciences are sciences of ‘matters of fact.’” (Id I 7) 
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purely factual science would be one that ignores the eidetic foundations of  its meaning, 
which any non-phenomenological science does to the extent that it does not suspend the 
judgments upon which it bases itself. The positivistic sciences dissimulate their eidetic 
foundations by claiming a naive materialism—the essentially unverifiable metaphysical 
assumption that facts concern objects existing absolutely independent of  intention33. A 
fact, then, would have its basis, the foundation for its truth, in a real object or real objects, 
and the factual sciences would derive their rigour from their true representation of  objects 
in nature. A fine system, except that it is based on the essentially unverifiable, which is to 
say on faith.34 Having rid itself  of  the presupposition of  a pure objectivity assumed by the 
natural sciences, the basis for what Bernet, Kern, and Marbach call (phenomenological) 
science’s “intersubjectively verifiable, objectively valid” (IHP 77) aspirations must be more 
rigorously established through a presuppositionless science of  essences. It is as an essence 
among essences, rather than a reference to a piece of  matter and state of  affairs that facts 
exist and can be true.  
A factual history is one that treats the entities it considers, regardless of  whether 
they are biographical or historico-contextual facts or even ideas themselves,35 not as 
isolated in their unique essences and abstracted from their experiential (in this case, 
historical and evidential) context, but as irreducibly contingent. This non-internal history, 
itself  based on internal history, concerns the historical existence of  a truth insofar as it is 
tied up with all kinds of  other historical facts, more or less irrelevant to its essential 
content, and as long as the existence and coming to be of  truth is explained in this way its 
internal history, the way in which it depends not on historico-biographical factors or other 
factors external to the truth of  that truth itself, but on the science and reason that 
preceded it and made it possible, and the way in which it is itself  necessitated by truths 
invented later on. All this remains concealed, and it remains impossible to establish truths 
and the essential history of  which they consist as the way of  being and development of  
                                                
33 Ideas, which are also objective, are themselves independent of any intention, but without the 
added materialist hypostatisation which presumes that its objects are independent of even the 
possibility of intention. 
34 As Derrida will help show, what seems the same can be said of phenomenology, which relies on 
the idea, the form of which itself (he claims) never appears. The damning symmetry is only 
apparent however, since in phenomenology the apodeictic guarantee is not meant to be the idea by 
which the experience is explained, but the experience itself. The idea (in the Kantian sense) and the 
whole eidetic reduction is merely a theory to explain the existence of what is in itself absolutely 
certain—the appearance of what appears. In empirical science, so-called, on the other hand, the 
evidence is only ever meant to be a guide for the existence of an object. In the latter case, much 
more, infinitely more, is expected from what is ultimately a matter of faith. 
35 Derrida mentions “the particular propositions they discovered” (IOG 158) 
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truth, at once epistemic and historical. The ideal history Husserl proposes seeks to free 
history from this contingency and to invent a historical project in which the eidetic 
interrelations between essences are considered irrespective of  their factual context. To 
many, this does not look like a history at all, but I hope to make its strengths apparent, or at 
least to explain why a history of  the usual kind cannot do the work Husserl requires of  a 
history. In order to make this clear, I will go into some more detail with respect to essences, 
their sense in phenomenology, and phenomenology as an eidetic science. 
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b. The eidetic structure of  consciousness 
 
The beginnings of  eidetic science already belong to the very intentional structure of  
consciousness that is fundamental to phenomenology from the beginning (logically and 
chronologically). In the structure of  intuition, the intuited object is already distinct though 
not independent from the intuiting act; the two aspects of  intuition are, as Husserl puts it; 
“essentially interrelated but, as a matter of  essential necessity, are not really inherently and 
essentially one and combined.” (Id I 86) This distinction is the fundamental premise which 
Husserl inherited from his teacher Franz Brentano—that consciousness is always ‘of ’ 
something. The object of  consciousness is constituted by the transcendental subject as an 
object that transcends the consciousness apprehending it as such. Husserl’s distinction 
between ‘transcendental’ and ‘transcendent’ is strange until we understand that 
consciousness is transcendental because it is of  objects that are transcendent—they are 
complimentary aspects of  the phenomenal world. Crucial to its function, the eidetic 
structure of  consciousness is at the foundation of  phenomenology. 
Husserl’s transcendental turn is his turn from the things themselves to the 
investigation of  their origins; the way that the transcendent object is constituted as an 
object in consciousness. The perceptions that make up the flow of  consciousness are 
combined with apperceptions, the interpolations of  what is not ‘actually’ perceived but 
suggested according to the ideal meanings of  the direct perceptions themselves, to 
complete the objectivity and unity of  what is only ever adumbrated (perceived in part, 
insufficient to its objective form) and in flux for perception. Husserl’s demonstration of  
this ineluctable egoic constitution, and the vast difference between ‘pure perception’ and 
the synthesization of  conscious experience in §41 is brilliantly clear; 
I open my eyes; and I have the perception again. The perception? Let us be 
more precise. Returning, it is not, under any circumstances, individually the 
same. Only the table is the same, intended to as the same in the synthetical 
consciousness which connects the new perception with the memory. 
(Id I 86) 
It is because consciousness is attending to the essence of  the table that it is immediately 
taken for ‘the same’ despite the interruption of  direct experience of  it. The table is the 
same, even though the perception is different. As a result, we have no choice but to call this 
‘objectivity’. 
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Essences concern those aspects of  perceptions which do not belong to them alone 
as a unique and non-duplicable ‘element’ of  flux—it is not an individual moment’s 
absolutely unique essence which eidetic science is concerned with, but the essential 
characteristics and aspects which are at least in principle shared by many like and (in other 
respects) unlike individuals (in fact, this is an imprecise way of  speaking, for everything 
which can be denoted as individual already surpasses its own individuality because it already 
has the properties of  objectivity which abstract it from pure flux). But these are not 
inductive distillations of  numerous intuitions a posteriori; the essence already belongs to 
the object in its constitution by the ego. Even though the table synthesised by 
consciousness before and after Husserl closes his eyes is an individual table synthesised as 
having individual inextricable characteristics (themselves also essential and capable of  being 
partaken of  by many other objects) such as for example its dark colour, its being sunlit by 
an adjacent window or having on it papers and a writing instrument, all of  which belong to 
it as ‘this table here’36 (including those characteristics of  it which do not belong to it as a 
table but belong to its context within a world) but are entirely irrelevant to its essence as a 
table. And yet, the synthesising consciousness does not merely constitute the table as an 
object on the basis of  its individual and distinct character, it also does so on the basis of  
the essences of  which it partakes—that it is a table, that it has a flat surface, that it is 
sunlit—and which belong to the constituting ego prior to the perception of  it. The eidetic 
work of  experience and the synthesis of  apperceptions are contemporaneous though 
separable parts of  consciousness, and in experience we continuously switch back and forth 
between ‘this table here’ and ‘that this here is a table’. Each is presupposed by the other. 
When Husserl says that all phenomenology is eidetic, this is what he means.37 
 
 Essences are the basis of  objectivity in both the sense of  the existence of  
constituted objects as well as in the sense of  being available to everyone in like form. By 
the grace of  essences the transcendental subject is liberated from “an eternal Heracleitean 
flux” (Bernet, Kern and Marbach, Introduction 77) in which what cannot even be described 
in such stable terms as ‘perceptions’ appear and then vanish again without any constancy or 
                                                
36 I am describing the table in a late photograph of Husserl in his office in which he is seated at it, a 
wall of books behind him, lit by a large window to his left. He is looking intently at a small piece of 
paper in his left hand. 
37 I have kept my discussion of intuition brief, in part because it has been discussed so thoroughly 
by scholars. See Held; Bernet, Kern, and Marbach; Lewis and Staehler. My purpose in discussing it 
here briefly has been to indicate the synthetic nature of consciousness, in order to explain the role 
of essences within consciousness itself. 
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definition.38 And it is on the basis of  an already eidetic consciousness that 
phenomenological science is able to be intended by consciousness—transcendent and thus 
objective. As David Carr explains, the eidetic object or ‘what is meant’ in consciousness is 
inherently universal and separate from the subject’s meaning of  it; “Transcendence is 
conceived as the nonreducibility of  what is meant to the particular act or acts in which it is 
meant” (Carr, Phenomenology and the Problem of  History 87) by being meant as “always being 
the reference point of  other possible acts implied in any actual one.” (Carr, Problem 87) In 
eidetic consciousness the meant object is separate from the fact of  its being meant, from 
the intending subject, and from the fleeting act of  intention. It is because it is 
transcendent that the object is an object, both in the minimal sense of  being an object of  
consciousness and in the great sense of  being, first; intersubjectively available, and second; 
true for everyone, which Carr expresses in the context of  his explanation of  the peculiar 
aspect of  the problem of  solipsism Husserl undertakes to explain in the fifth Cartesian 
Meditation; 
In a sense the possibility of  different egos has already been taken into account 
by the very eidetic approach of  phenomenology. By taking the particular 
objects of  transcendental reflection as merely exemplary, Husserl seeks to 
describe the structure of  any consciousness at all. 
(Carr, Problem 87) 
This recalls the distinction made by Dorion Cairns between Husserl’s use of  the words 
Objekt and Gegenstand, which Carr disagrees with (see third section in the preceding 
chapter). I concur with Carr for the most part, as I mentioned in the preceding chapter, 
and although a distinction between the two might be illustrative, with Gegenstand used to 
refer to the ‘minimal sense’, while Objekt could be used for the more precise sense, what 
their shared condition of  possibility shows is actually a continuity—one that I will explain 
fully in chapter three. Being capable of  being thought and being true for all are both made 
possible in the same way. Not only that—to be an object of  consciousness is to be an 
objective truth, so long as it is considered appropriately with the necessary conditions and 
not precipitately universalised. 
Reduced to their eidos, the objects of  consciousness are objective, though not 
necessarily freed from their factual dependence on a particular factual subject and her 
factual time and place. This transcendental objectivation is a matter of  degree in that the 
object is only ‘free’ to the extent that it is treated with respect to its essence. So, a psychic 
                                                
38 “The perception itself, however, is what it is in the continuous flux of consciousness and is itself 
a continuous flux” (Id I 87) 
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object that is not purely ideal—a childhood memory for example—can be made ideal by 
being expressed in language and put in context—such expression liberates the object of  my 
memory from its purely intrasubjective origin and presents it as an ideal and objective 
pertinence to the world and the things in it (in which and about which my memory is 
presented as being of) as well as liberating the object that is my memory itself  and 
presenting it for the first time as an intersubjectively shared object—an idea or essence. 
The entire recollection remains bound to my individual psychic factuality; not only is the 
existence of  the whole memory essentially limited to that region, with its objectively 
determinable privacy (see fifth Cartesian Meditation), but the object of  the memory itself  
exists only in that recollection as a transcendental object. This means that it is not merely a 
subjective perspective on a universally available object, but tied to a subjectivity from 
beginning to end. Nevertheless, subjectivity for it is a mode of  ideal objectivity, which is its 
fundamental ontological state. The factual and the psychical are modifications of  essential 
objectivity, which anything possesses from the start by dint of  being always capable of  
being communicated and verified intersubjectively (to a degree limited by the absence of  
obstacles, the privacy of  the psychical, etc.). The partially psychical (partially bound to my 
individual subjective psyche) objectivity of  my memory is eidetic insofar as, being a 
memory, it is an object of  consciousness, but the recollection itself  is nevertheless not 
objective in the strong sense because the object of  consciousness is, in its essence, dependent 
on the consciousness in which it is held, bound to it as that which objectifies it and thus in 
which it exists. It is only objective in the full, intersubjective, sense when the consciousness 
itself—the memory—is itself  made objective in language and communicated to others as 
dependent on my particular psychical context. It can be verified and made objective by my 
communication of  it—when I say something like “…but then the memory, not yet of  the 
place in which I was, but of  various other places where I had lived, and might now very 
possibly be, would come like a rope let down from heaven to draw me up out of  the abyss 
of  not-being, from which I could never have escaped by myself ” (Proust, Swann’s Way 12) 
In that sense, though objective, it is not free, and it is not the type of  object which stands on 
its own independently of  any other objects. The memory itself  is an idea and an object, but 
one whose validity is bound to my individual subjectivity. The meaning and truth of  the 
above sentence depends on the fictional context of  Marcel, and the literary context of  
Swann’s Way, the eide or essences of  those contexts are inextricable from its meaning and 
must remain connected to it, implicitly or explicitly, at all times in order for it to stay 
meaningful. This is how it diverges from the kind of  ‘pure’ ideal objectivity which can 
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belong to things like geometrical postulates alone—these require no contingent context but 
are meaningful whenever the system of  geometry to which they belong essentially is 
meaningful. The divergence is a difference between things which are all nevertheless ideal 
objects—yet it is the origin of  geometry. It is a difference without a difference—it is 
important not to confuse the difference that inaugurates ideal objectivity with the 
difference between the objective and something not objective, or even something that is 
not objective in the ‘full’ sense. Which is to say, the origin of  objectivity is not in the 
difference Cairns indicates between Objekt and Gegenstand.39 In the rest of  this section, I will 
explain the differences that can be between ideal objects, and how the geometry originates 
as a different kind of  idea not through modification or supplementation, but through an 
elimination of  contextual meaning made possible by the universality and exactitude of  
those ideas.  
 
 Objectivity in the fullest sense belongs as a matter of  course to ideal objects, and 
while it only belongs to the kind of  psychic object which Husserl maintains the ideal had 
originated from (must have originated from, since it had to have been invented by a living 
subject; “This process of  projecting and successfully realizing [that is, grasping the truth of  
the geometrical idea] occurs, after all, purely within the subject of  the inventor” [UG 160]) 
in a qualified way, it nevertheless belongs to them, as it does to any kind of  object which 
nevertheless must be ‘qualified’ by the stipulation of  a ‘region’ of  existence. Only ideal 
objects tout court can be objects in the sense of  being intersubjectively available without 
qualification, but any object at all, qualified appropriately and in the absence of  any 
impediments is objective in this way. This is why the difference between the geometrical 
object and its intrasubjective origin is a difference without a difference, not a categorial one 
or an ontological one. The function of  ‘qualification’ is appropriate because it suggests the 
superaddition of  something like an impediment rather than a deficiency in the fundamental 
objectivity that belongs to it as a transcendent object. An object of  this type is one that is 
bound or hobbled. Easy intersubjective availability constitutes the object’s ‘freedom’ from 
an individual psyche in which the psychic object, for example, in its own essence, is ‘bound’ 
(to borrow and transpose, with Derrida, Husserl’s terminology from Experience and 
Judgment). While the object’s deliverance occurs in language and requires its incarnation in a 
“linguistic living body” (UG 161) or in “linguistic flesh” (IOG 76), which Derrida makes a 
                                                
39 In fact, in the Origin, the usage, if it signified anything, would have to signify the contrary of what 
Cairns claims it does. on Krisis 370 (UG 163), Gegenständlichkeit is used to refer to geometrical 
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big deal of, it is not this manifestation which is responsible for the difference—that would 
be too much of  a difference. The possibility of  incarnation in a “linguistic body” 
(Sprachleib) belongs to every object as such. Freedom is spontaneous, and a triumph of  the 
meaning of  the object itself  and its “‘unconditional’ universal validity” (Id I 15). 
 Freedom for an idea is the ‘unrestricted (or, ‘unconditional’) universal validity of  its 
eidos’ (See Id I 15)—the complete independence of  the truth of  its eidos from any 
contingent context. This particular exceptional quality is not ultimately a consequence of  
its linguistic embodiment, which must belong to any idea or object whatsoever, but a 
spontaneous act of  freedom. There is no cause of  the freedom of  the idea from the eidetic 
context of  the subject’s internal life beyond the freedom itself—nothing, that is, which is 
added to the psychical object in order to liberate it. It is in the object’s self-emancipation 
that it comes to exist in the linguistic form it may already have inhabited (like a shell). 
Specifically and emphatically; the putting of  the psychic object into words does not suffice 
for its eidetic content to be freed from the psychical and made ideal in the pure sense, even 
though in places Husserl himself  almost seems to give language this role. This is the way he 
answers the question that orients the enquiry into origins: 
how does geometrical ideality (like that of  all sciences) proceed from its 
primary intrapersonal origin, where it is a structure within the conscious space 
of  the first inventor's soul, to its ideal objectivity? In advance we see that 
occurs by means of  language, through which it receives, so to speak, its 
linguistic living body [Sprachleib]. 
(UG 161) 
Despite appearances, this cannot be interpreted to mean that it is the sudden and 
novel introduction of  language, or rather of  the object into language, that makes for ideal 
objectivity of  the particular kind that geometrical ideality is. In the following pages of  
Husserl’s text, the role of  language in the constitution of  the objective is consistently 
described as the faculty, or one of  the faculties, which makes this kind of  object possible, 
and indeed it is. But only because it makes all objects possible. The language Husserl uses 
here frequently makes it sound like he is laying out a stage-based theory, and yet this is 
impossible because the seeming new acquisitions are indispensable to the ‘stage’ which 
might have come before. In chapter three I will recharacterise Husserl’s account as one of  a 
cohort of  mutually interdependent characteristics which makes eidetic science, and ideal 
objectivity specifically possible, notwithstanding certain expressions of  Husserl which 
indicate, on the contrary, a stage theory. 
                                                                                                                                          
objects, which are necessarily objective in the strongest possible sense. 
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 It is always possible for the object of  psychical intention to be represented in 
language, without thus itself  being freed from its psychical home and coming to exist in 
language in a universal sense, as when an individual uses language to pick out and represent 
an object belonging to his psyche; “To be sure, something psychic which can be 
understood by others [nachverstehbar] and is communicable, as something psychic belonging 
to this man, is eo ipso objective, just as he himself, as concrete man, is experienceable and 
namable by everyone as a real thing in the world of  things in general.” (UG 162–63) 
Therefore, a stage-based interpretation of  the origin of  geometry would come at too great 
a cost for our understanding of  the anexact sciences, the intentional and transcendental 
structure and functioning of  consciousness and language itself. No kind of  object, or any 
kind of  ‘thing’ at all, is possible without the possibility of  being expressed in language, and 
becoming involved with all the other possibilities which belong to the eidetic, a confluence 
of  possibilities and teleologies which connect the object of  consciousness to the absolutely 
objective object incontrovertibly. To make the particularly exact kind of  ideality of  
geometrical objects, that kind which are distinguished as ideas in the Kantian sense, the 
only things capable of  being put in language would be ludicrous, and there is not much 
indication that Husserl thinks this is the case. Quite the opposite is true—linguistic 
embodiment belongs already as a pure possibility, which as I will explain in the following 
chapter is the only relevant way of  being of  ideal qualities, to every object of  
consciousness whatsoever. 
 But in such case, the psychic domain of  the object is ineliminable from its essence 
as its way of  being; there belongs to the object an essential qualification or modification—I 
will shortly explain how the liberation of  the object is accomplished merely through the 
elimination of  all essential modification, which the object is capable of  if  it possesses an 
essence to which belongs the possibility of  being so stripped of  modification. The example 
of  a childhood memory shows how an object can exist as psychical, and yet be able to be 
put in language, and thus also eidetically reduced, without losing its existential dwelling 
within the subjectivity in which it originated. In such a case, the consciousness of  the 
remembered object, in the form of  a memory, is itself  objectified and can be expressed in 
language—but the essence of  that object (the entire recollection) is presented as belonging 
to its psychical existence within myself  and thus is not simply objective in the sense of  
being available in the same way to everyone without qualification, even though it can be 
given in language to everyone, because it must be given in language as mine in order to make 
sense. It is in terms of  this that we must understand the distinction Husserl makes between 
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psychical and ideal objects. When Husserl puts his organising question in terms which 
appear to make a rigid distinction between types of  objects explicit— 
But how does the intrapsychically constituted structure arrive at an 
intersubjective being [eigenen intersubjektiven Sein (Krisis 370)] of  its own as an 
ideal object [ideale Gegenständlichkeit (Krisis 370) which, as 'geometrical,' is 
anything but a real psychic object, even though it has arisen psychically? 
(UG 163) 
—it is not because ideal objects and real psychic objects are entirely different ways of  being 
of  things. The distinction is asymmetrical—an ideal object is “anything but a real psychic 
object” but the converse does not follow—psychic objects are ideal objects. An ideal object 
is anything but psychic because it has liberated itself  from the bounds of  the psychic 
domain through its exactness and universality, not because it is a different kind all together. 
Only such objects as can become fully ideal because they possess the possibility of  being 
held in common by all members of  the given community, that is, eidetically universal 
objects, can free themselves spontaneously of  the necessity of  being related to a subject’s 
interior psychic activity or other such determining context in order to be understood. Only 
under these conditions can they become full and independent ideal objects. To both kinds 
of  objects belongs the possibility of  expression in language which constitutes them as 
objects (or, without which they could not be objects), but it is the objective content which 
constitutes the difference between a psychic object whose form is essentially related to its 
objectifying subject, and the ideal object which is universal. The difference cannot be one 
between different ‘types’ of  objectivity in the sense of  ways of  existing of  objects, but 
concerns their different objective sense.40 The eidetic reduction from which all 
phenomenological inquiry proceeds makes this clear—that the limitation of  the psychic 
object is a special case of  what is, as an object, essentially essential.41 Phenomenology must 
separate the fundamental constituting role of  language from the innate characteristics of  
ideal objects which are objective in an unqualified way, and I will devote the remainder of  
                                                
40 In UG 160-61 Husserl seems to distinguish ideal objects from other types of objects as 
independent of their sensible embodiment and ‘spatiotemporal individuation’; distinguishing ideal 
objects from other cultural products he writes: “It is proper to a whole class of spiritual products 
within the cultural world, to which not only all scientific constructions and the sciences themselves 
belong but also, for example, the constructions of fine literature. Works of this class do not, like 
tools (hammers, pliers) or like architectural and other such products, have a repeatability in many 
like exemplars.” (UG 160) The ‘freedom’ of ideal objects from spatiotemporal instantiation and its 
repetition actually show that sensible (and also psychical) objects are special cases of ideal 
objectivity, as I will explain shortly. 
41 Thus, Husserl explains that ideal objects in the ‘pure’ sense are “quite different ones from those 
coming under the concept of language” (UG 161), even though they are both ideal objects. 
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this section to explaining this difference, as I will devote the entire third chapter to studying 
the role that language and the other essential characteristics of  ideality play. 
 
 The taste of  madeleine dipped in “real or lime-flower tea” (Proust, Way 58), and 
the childhood Sunday morning tableau in which Marcel’s Aunt Léonie gives him the “little 
crumb” (Proust, Way 58), the objects of  the memory of  In Search of  Lost Time’s narrator, are 
both objective (let us suppose for the moment that they are not both fictionalised; let us 
forgive the gulf  separating a petit madeleine and a bit of  stale toast, separating Combray and 
Illiers [now renamed Illiers-Combray, narrowing the gulf  somewhat] or whatever other 
variances and inventions have interceded, even if  they extend to the entire episode)—the 
taste could in principle have been enjoyed by anyone at all, and the quaint Sunday morning 
was not only in fact (or rather, in fiction) experienced by Aunt Léonie in addition to 
Marcel, but essentially could have been experienced by anyone at all, say by M. Swann, who 
though he may not have been invited to Léonie’s room and would not have called at that 
time, nevertheless would if  for some reason he had payed such a remarkable visit have 
been able to hear Marcel enter his great Aunt’s room and to know the two of  them to be 
there together and in such a way experienced the same scene. It matters not, of  course, that 
he did not, only that in principle he or anyone else could have—as objects the little crumb 
of  madeleine and the tea, whatever type it was on that particular occasion, was available to 
anyone whose perspective was free of  obstacles to regard it. The ultimate object of  Marcel’s 
memory—“the little crumb of  madeleine which on Sunday mornings at Combray (because 
on those mornings I did not go out before church-time), when I went to say good day to 
her in her bedroom, my aunt Léonie used to give me, dipping it first in her own cup of  real 
or of  lime-flower tea” (Proust, Way 58)—is objective because it essentially could have been 
experienced by anyone whose perspective allowed her to do so. This essence ties it to the 
material or real context in which it occurred as the basis for its being an object—as such it 
is, insofar as it is a memory of  an experience of  the real world, not tied to the peculiar 
subject—Marcel—from whose perspective it is given to us.42 This is, of  course, bracketing 
the fact that the whole belongs to fiction, a context of  ideal objectivity which deserves its 
own consideration. 
                                                
42 My purpose in this discussion is to explain intrapsychical objects as objects in continuity with 
ideal and intrasubjective objects, and to argue that the ‘intra’ of ‘intrapsychic’ is a modification of an 
object that would not be confined to an individual subject’s psyche were it not essentially so 
modified. 
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 Within the fictional ‘world’, the madeleine dipped in tea is a real object in itself, and 
the taste thereof  is an object of  experience, but it is emphatically not as a real object that 
Proust, his narrator, or his readers are concerned with it—his concern is not with the 
object of  memory abstracted from its existence as memory, which as ‘intellectual memory’ 
“preserve nothing of  the past itself ” (Proust, Way 55), by which he means, I think, that 
they fail to preserve the ‘pastness of  the past’ (to paraphrase an idea that seems to have been 
almost simultaneously invented by T.S. Eliot, in “Tradition and the Individual Talent” in 
1921, and by Thomas Mann, in The Magic Mountain some time between 1912 and 1924), the 
ineluctable and non-reproducible sense of  the memory as a memory. For this reason he 
distinguishes the lone pre-madeleine memory of  the magic lantern and his difficult bedtime 
that stayed with him throughout his life from whatever other memories of  Combray he 
might have been able to conjure up if  he’d made the effort; 
But since the facts which I should then have recalled would have been 
prompted only by an exercise of  the will, by my intellectual memory, and since 
the pictures which that kind of  memory shews us of  the past preserve nothing of  
the past itself, I should never have had any wish to ponder over this residue of  
Combray. 
(Proust, Way 55 italics added). 
The meaning of  the taste is not in its real objectivity, but its psychic objectivity, 
because the object is not the taste or even the originary experience of  tasting, but the 
memory itself of  that experience.43 The object is still a really existing object, but its existence 
is localised in the real sphere of  Marcel’s subjectivity—it is because of  its essential location 
in the psychical region that the object has the meaning it has. To put this another way, its 
eidos is not pure in the sense of  independent from the eide of  its context, because it lacks the 
unconditioned universality which independence comes from. Rather its eidos is inextricably 
linked with other eide from entirely different systems of  meaning, those being the eide that 
comprise Marcel’s psychical realm. 
For an essence to be dependent for its sense on essences belonging to different 
realms, different systems of  meaning, must be regarded as the mark of  a ‘bound ideality’, 
an ideality bound to its context. Indeed, all essences are meaningless alone, as Hegel and 
the structuralists show. If  complete unqualified autonomy were necessary for free ideality, 
the kind of   ‘unrestricted universal validity’ which belongs to ideas such as geometrical 
                                                                                                                                          
 As such, my use of this example is necessarily at odds with Deleuze’s interpretation of the 
role of signs in Proust, in which the ideal content is denied (see Gilles Deleuze, Proust adn Signs 6). 
43 What, in Internal Time Consciousness Husserl calls ‘secondary remembrance [sekundare Erinnerung]’ or 
‘recollection [Wiedererinnerung]’. 
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ones, then no such thing would exist. The meaning of  geometrical ideas make this 
systematicity explicit—the meaning of  the essence triangle not only relies on but is other 
geometrical essences such as angles and line segments. What distinguishes this kind of  
interrelation is that it is itself  essential—the triangle only ever means anything within the 
system of  geometry and on the basis of  the other geometrical essences it incorporates. It is 
not, however, in any case dependent for its meaningfulness upon anything with which it is 
only contingently associated. The contrary is the case for essences of  the kind I have just 
been describing from Swann’s Way. The taste of  madeleine dipped in tea is an essence, but it 
relies on a context in order to exist and be meaningful, which is to say it relies on other 
essences, such as the essence of  Marcel’s psyche, or the essence of  the book Swann’s Way. 
These essences are not ‘essential’ to it, for a number of  different essences could fulfil this 
role, and in each case which particular one does is a contingent matter. Moreover, the 
essence on which that ‘taste’ depends will belong to a different domain—the psychical, for 
instance, or the literary—and therefore the essence of  the taste of  madeleine dipped in tea 
remains bound to it, to a context which it does not control. 
Any object regarded insofar as it is the object of  an intentional act is always a 
psychic object—the intentional act need not, as it does with Marcel’s memory, comprise the 
full extent of  the meaning of  the object. In this case, the meaning of  the memory is not at 
all its own real object, the taste of  madeleine soaked in tea, but the recollection and its 
existence within Marcel’s inner life; that is, the eruption of  additional recollections and 
long-dormant territories within his mind that the one recollection catalyses— 
And just as the Japanese amuse themselves by filling a porcelain bowl with 
water and steeping in it little crumbs of  paper which until then are without 
character or form, but, the moment they become wet, stretch themselves and 
bend, take on colour and distinctive shape, become flowers or houses or 
people, permanent and recognisable, so in that moment all the flowers in our 
garden and in M. Swann's park, and the water-lilies on the Vivonne and the 
good folk of  the village and their little dwellings and the parish church and the 
whole of  Combray and of  its surroundings, taking their proper shapes and 
growing solid, sprang into being, town and gardens alike, from my cup of  tea. 
(Proust, Way 59) 
In spite of  their essential distinctness, however, neither real nor psychic objects are 
actually orders of  objects different from the ideal. The activity of  consciousness is 
determined according to essential laws which shape its constitution of  objects44, as I 
                                                
44 See Held, Method 14-15: “The character of the activities of consciousness is not dependent on 
the empirically given objects that happen to be there, but instead on ‘Essence,’ that is, on the 
universal de- termination of types of objectivities.” 
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discussed in the preceding chapter, and it is in the reduction of  an object to its eidos that it 
is constituted as an object which transcends the act in which it is intended45; thus all objects 
are of  necessity ideal. Only objects can come to consciousness,46 and they do so by first 
being constituted according to essential laws that direct consciousness’ ‘sight’ or activity, 
and therefore being immediately opened up to the possibility of  repetition and all the other 
structures or ‘coherences’ of  ideality. Psychic objects and real objects are objects which 
belong essentially to those regions, which we can tell because of  the expressibility in 
language which belongs to them essentially insofar as they are objects of  consciousness, 
not to mention the expression in fact by dint of  which we learn of  them, and their essential 
being-for-consciousness itself. As a literary object “the little crumb of  madeleine” (Proust, 
Way 58) exists as an ideal object in the way Husserl specifies in the Origin of  Geometry as, 
perhaps problematically, comprising not only the immortal truths of  mathematics but also 
words, literary work, and perhaps other categories; “It is proper to a whole class of  spiritual 
products of  the cultural world, to which not only all scientific constructions and the 
sciences themselves belong but also, for example, the constructions of  fine literature.” (UG 
160). However, that crumb is also a real object (even a physical object), as well as a psychic 
object, and insofar as it is any of  those it is already ideal. The linguistic precondition for 
ideal objectivity, as Derrida discusses at length in Voice and Phenomenon and as I mentioned 
in the preceding section and will go on to discuss in more detail in the sixth chapter of  this 
thesis, is expressibility in language as a possibility, and not actual external expression. 
However, it is clear in the Origin that the ideality belonging to ‘constructions of  fine 
literature’, and even more clearly to the truths of  geometry and mathematics, is of  a special 
kind—especially in the invulnerability of  such ideas to the vicissitudes of  time, its 
‘historicity’—a kind which seems to be distinguished on the basis of  ideality in a way that 
the generally ideal approach of  phenomenology and transcendental study of  consciousness 
would seem to resist. Husserl seems to mean here what Derrida, borrowing the 
terminology of  Experience and Judgment, calls ‘free ideality’, which is to say, in contrast to the 
‘bound idealities’ of  factual and psychical objects bound to their eidetic contexts, ideas to 
which belong “unconditioned, so-called apodictic universality” (Derrida, “Plato’s 
Pharmacy” 52). However, it is in terms of  the difference of  the ideal that Husserl explains 
                                                
45 See Carr; “Transcendence is conceived as the nonreducibility of what is meant to the particular 
act or acts in which it is meant.” (Carr, Problem 87) 
46 “from where?” one might be tempted to ask. Are we supposed to believe that the objects and 
consciousness itself comes from nowhere? In a sense, yes—there is nothing which is apodictic and 
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the existence of  both ideal science and literature. In fact, the whole problematic of  the 
Origin is predicated on the distinctness of  the ideal—that geometry underwent a 
transformation when it became ideal and that it had an origin that was not ideal, at least in 
the same sense. That is, that there is meaning in the transformation Husserl describes in his 
fundamental question; “how does geometrical ideality (like that of  all sciences) proceed 
from its primary intrapersonal origin, where it is a structure within the conscious space of  
the first inventor's soul, to its ideal objectivity?” (UG 161/357-8) Moreover, Husserl would 
have us understand that the transformation occurs through language—“In advance we see 
that it occurs by means of  language, through which it receives, so to speak, its linguistic 
living body [Sprachleib].” (UG 161)—which we have understood since Logical Investigations 
to have belonged to the eidetic in its most general sense. How can language be understood 
as either a late addition or itself  undergoing a transformation, when it is crucial from the 
start to any sense of  phenomenology as concerned with transcendental consciousness? 
 
 The coherent interdependence of  objectivity, reproducibility, community, language 
and history, which I will articulate in its full depth in the third chapter, is meant to account 
for an ideal object’s belonging to our historical world while remaining invulnerable to the 
winds of  change, a concrete capacity the function of  which must be accounted for in order 
to avoid the non-critical presupposition of  a more-or-less ill-defined non-worldly existence, 
but the role of  language and indeed of  objectivity itself  is impossible to understand 
without that which it plays in all conscious activity coming to the fore and casting doubt 
again on any distinction between ideal objects in the pure sense and objects which are 
themselves eidetically reduced but essentially dependent on real and psychical factuality. 
These amount to qualifications of  a universal idealism and denote regions of  being rather 
than existential differences, as Klaus Held states; 
Thus there are areas of  objectivities, ‘regions of  being,’ as Husserl says, that are 
differentiated according to the special characteristics of  their being, their 
‘Eidos,’ that is, the mental view that they offer in a corresponding originary 
intuition. Eidetic objective determination corresponds, according to the a priori 
of  correlation, to a universal, eidetic condition of  the intentional acts that are 
related to the objectivity in question. 
(Held, “Method” 14-15) 
If  there is no existential difference between different kinds of  ideal objects, and if  they are 
explicitly dependent in all cases on the possibility of  expression in language, then what 
                                                                                                                                          
prior to consciousness—any inquiry into where consciousness comes from can only be done on the 
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difference is there left for a Sprachleib to make? If  it is not a difference of  type, what is the 
difference between geometry’s psychical origin and its mature universality, and how does 
language bridge that gap? 
The ‘bound’-ness of  geometry’s originary psychical context, the eidetically 
irreducible co-implications which belongs to the origin of  geometry prior to its idealisation 
and coming-to-be properly geometrical, is crucial to the meaning of  its ideal existence. The 
psychical object consists not only of  its strictly ideal content, but also of  the psychical and 
factual contexts in and by which the idea exists. The coming-to-be strictly and freely ideal 
which geometry is capable of  consists of  the freeing of  the ideal content by shedding the 
additional signification and qualification contributed in a psychical object. This can only 
occur if  the object is meaningful in that kind of  way—if  it is yet meaningful when it is no 
longer qualified—or to the extent that it is meaningful in that way. The little crumb of  
madeleine is not such an ideal object, since the ideal meaningfulness of  this object is 
contingent on its factual objectivity, modification by the psychical objectivity as in Marcel’s 
memory of  the little crumb, or some other explanation of  how and in what region it can 
be found. “The little crumb of  madeleine” (Proust, Way 58), however, is such an ideal 
object, because as a literary object it exists objectively for everyone independently of  
psychical or real context in order to make it meaningful. By citing its source and putting it 
in quotation marks, it is still not ‘freed’ from all modification, rather, the essential 
modifications are thus brought into the essence intended, as part of  what constitutes that 
object. It is not made universal and unconditioned, since for its essence such as it is, that 
would not be possible, but by defining the “‘secret’ and even unnoticed restriction” 
(Derrida, “Pharmacy” 55), even if  it is not possible to reduce it, it is possible to determine 
the whole as ideal and universal in the sense of  not being subject to history’s flux. It is 
eternally an object belonging to the factual literary object Swann’s Way. Perhaps Husserl 
ought to have distinguished the literary object as a special case of  ideal object, which he 
suggested that he was unwilling to do (see UG 160), but the particularity and dependence 
of  the literary object is different from the particularity and dependence of  other factual 
objects in that it shares the kind of  atemporality which belongs to completely free idealities 
(if  such things can be found). On the other hand, the pythagorean theorem—the square of  
the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of  the squares of  the other two sides—requires no 
qualification whatsoever, according to Husserl, to be meaningful. Rather than being 
conditional, its ideal objectivity is unqualified and universal. As I argued in greater detail 
                                                                                                                                          
basis of its objectification and presentation to consciousness. 
95 
earlier in this section, the ‘process’ that Husserl describes (UG 160f) from an intrapersonal 
origin to ideal objectivity by way of  language cannot be taken literally as a transformation 
in the object’s way of  existing—the objectifying potential of  the idea belongs to any object 
from the start, as does the potential for incorporation in a ‘living body’ of  language, but the 
modifications of  the idea required for its meaningfulness as belonging to a particular 
subject’s psyche constrain the language in which it can be put just as it constrains the idea 
itself. Only when these modifications can be eliminated is the pure ideal object’s 
universality able to take full advantage of  language, history and the rest. 
An object is ideal tout court according to its own ideal content—those ideas the 
content of  which allows them to be used in an unqualified sense Husserl calls ideal (tout 
court). As Derrida notes; “science claims an essential privilege: it does not permit itself  to 
be enclosed in any historically determined culture as such, for it has the universal validity 
of  truth.” (IOG 58) ‘Science’ is the name for the totality of  all ideas which permit the 
simple and universal unqualified employment. The ideas of  science are pure and infinite, 
they are uncontaminated and unlimited, unconditioned and universal, as other ideas must 
be, by the auxiliaries we call ‘context’. Because science’s ideas are pure and infinite, science 
is the vanguard of  human culture; “designates culture’s eidos par excellence” (IOG 58), as 
Derrida says, in contrast to the Weltanschauung, the idea of  the finite idea to which, in 
Weltanchauungsphilosophie, an infinite idea was supposed to be reduced and made no different 
from any other idea, all of  which must be delimited and contaminated by qualifications. 
It is necessary to look to the ideas themselves in order to see how it is that the 
meaning of  an idea can loose the bounds of  its psychical context, or what makes the 
difference between an idea that is independent and one which yet requires contextualisation 
for it to be meaningful, because regardless of  whether the object is full and self-sufficient 
or requires conditions that must be explicated it47 always depends on the pure possibility of  
language, just as language depends on objectivity in order for it to be about anything or to 
have anything to express.48 The difference between the psychical and the ideal, which is to 
say qualified and unqualified ideas is not language. Language is not a difference between 
                                                
47 This is not a categorial difference—the fully ideal object has conditions as well, the coherence of 
ideality. So it is not strictly speaking true to say that it is ‘unconditioned’, but it is true to say that it 
is universal, because the pure idea’s conditions are the universal conditions for any idea whatsoever. 
48 See UG 161; “language itself, in all its particularizations (words, sentences, speeches), is, as can 
easily be seen from the grammatical point of view, thoroughly made up of ideal objects”, and UG 
162 “Language, for its part, as function and exercised capacity, is related correlatively to the world, 
the universe of objects which is linguistically expressible in its being and its being-such.” 
96 
ideas but the basic precondition for the eidetic. As an idea (in the Kantian sense), language 
is the function which makes the continuity between the regional and the universal possible. 
In the previous chapter, in my discussion of  the eidetic and the Kantian concept of  
idea, I made the point that there is a continuity between those essences which are 
distinguished in Ideas I as “‘ideal’ concepts” (Id I 166), which exact concepts such as 
geometrical ones describe, and the essences which are involved in all other conscious 
intending, and in particular of  the conscious intending called ‘perception’, insofar as any 
essence of  an object of  experience is not ‘given’, but its givenness is an idea in the sense of  
a ‘goal’. This is why language already belongs to every eidos as an idea or possibility. The 
idea (in the Kantian sense) is only possible because of  language (and the other possibilities 
or faculties of  ideality), therefore that language is anticipated as an idea by the eidetic is by 
§143 of  Ideas I. According to a logic that I will discuss in the chapters of  this thesis 
dedicated to tracing Derrida’s reading of  Husserl and his own philosophy, Derrida 
recognises the always already there-ness of  language as the impossibility of  getting out 
‘ahead’ of  ideality to the origin of  experience itself, the unconstituted originality of  a 
primordial ‘now’; “Since the ideal is always thought by Husserl in the form of  the Idea in 
the kantian sense, this substitution of  ideality for nonideality, of  objectivity for non-
objectivity, is deferred to infinity.” (VP 86) 
Language belongs to psychical objects already as a possibility, and because of  that 
possibility the communication and even the exactitude of  universal objectivity can be 
attained. The whole ‘transformation’ occurs within what already belongs to the object of  
the psyche, and this is crucial for Husserl’s account, because otherwise the origin of  
geometry would not be the origin of  geometry, but something that happened prior to 
geometry, requiring the addition of  still more radically ‘other’ elements in order for the 
origin to occur. Husserl’s central question—“how does geometrical ideality (like that of  all 
sciences) proceed from its primary intrapersonal origin, where it is a structure within the 
conscious space of  the first inventor's soul, to its ideal objectivity?" (UG 161)—is not a 
question chasing after transformation, but after continuity. The one can originate from the 
other because the possibility for it is already there. Once more, the story of  history is one 
of  continuity, not its opposite. 
 
c. Uniting the epistemological and the historical 
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So far in this chapter concerned with demonstrating the necessity of  an ideal study of  
history I have shown why any historical discourse relies on an implicit, explicit or 
dissimulated foundation of  ideality. After that I explained the ideal structure of  
consciousness insofar as it is intentional, which of  course dictates that objects of  a 
historical consciousness must be eidetically reduced. With these I have tried to show the 
necessity, first, of  an ideal study of  history and the poverty of  a historiology which would 
ignore it, and, second, that the ideal science necessary for the understanding of  history is 
not something that needs to be invented ad hoc, but already belongs to the structure of  
consciousness. But Husserl enters into the study of  history not merely as a cloistered 
discipline, but because historical thinking, as I established in the previous chapter, is 
necessary for science itself; the infinite task of  reason is always a historical enquiry. This is 
the reason peculiar to the phenomenology of  history, and in particular to Husserl’s 
ambition of  ‘reactivation’, that eidetic science alone is suitable for the highest purposes of  
a history. Factual history is unsuitable for the grounding of  geometrical truth-meaning 
because the integrity of  geometry as an eidetic science would not be protected by a merely 
possibly originary meaning—the historical relation to the origin must also have the 
character of  necessity in order for the originary meaning to be able to explain the sense of  
geometry in a way that would not be arbitrary and ad hoc. It is not just because geometry is 
an eidetic science that the sense it makes is necessarily eidetic—the sense of  any science is 
properly eidetic—but the demand for apodeictic certainty in geometry and similar sciences 
imbues it with a kind of  purity that will not broach the introduction of  or reliance on 
contingent facts, because “the sense of  eidetic science necessarily precludes any incorporation of  
cognitional results yielded by empirical sciences.” (Id I 17) 
It is not immediately obvious that the strictures applied to the eidetic science itself  
must also be applied to that whereby we derive its meaning, but a brief  consideration of  
the kind of  meaning needed to undo the crisis (briefer than I will have, and already have 
had, space for elsewhere) will show that this is imperative. Although I’ve mentioned that 
the priority of  a solution is dubious in the Origin of  Geometry, as an ostensive aim it can still 
help us understand the orientation to an eidetic science of  history, and thus the entire 
eidetic complex in which it plays an ineluctable part. The meaning at issue would be the 
relation of  geometry to the world (or to be specific, the lifeworld). This relation would 
constitute the structure of  geometry’s meaning, while the meaning itself  would be 
contingent on what that relationship is, as well as what the world is and what parts or 
aspects of  it are meaningfully so related. In order for this to have any bearing on geometry 
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in the way that meanings have bearing on the meaningful—that is, to determine their sense 
and the ways they are usable—it must be singular and univocal, and this part cannot be 
played by a fact which is a merely possible (however certain by virtue of  being fortified by 
various factual evidence), and thus open to competing ‘meaning-fundaments’. Only the 
‘reactivation’ of  an essential, a priori meaning could have the determining and grounding 
effect on geometry that can make it truly meaningful and therefore resolve the crisis. 
 
This actually makes the role of  ideality different in the case of  the history of  
geometry than it must be as the foundation of  a factual history, as described in the first 
section of  this chapter. Because history must be accounted for as a transcendental science, 
it is not enough for ideality to be merely the meaning-giving structure of  historical facts 
that is the least necessary involvement with ideality for any discourse aspiring to be a 
science. A phenomenological history cannot be merely eidetic in the way that every science 
including factual or empirical sciences must be—it will have to be an entirely eidetic 
science, and as such free from factuality in the way that Husserl describes eidetic science—
“every eidetic science is necessarily independent of  every science of  matters of  fact” (Id I 
17)—otherwise it would remain beholden to the contingencies and extrinsic effects that 
‘factuality’ stands for. The peculiar meaning-giving project of  the ideal history of  geometry 
is inconceivable without the apodeictic certainty that can be derived from concerning 
oneself  only with the pure possibilities of  the science’s genesis; “Thereby [by way of  
imaginary variation] we have removed every bond to the factually valid historical world and 
have regarded the world itself  [merely] as one of  the conceptual possibilities.”49 (UG 177) 
Ideal history must undertake the inquiry into the essence of  geometry’s origin and 
development—“Starting from what we know, from our geometry, or rather from the older 
handed-down forms (such as Euclidean geometry), there is an inquiry back into the 
submerged original beginnings of  geometry as they necessarily must have been in their 
‘primally establishing’ function.” (UG 158)—rather than concern itself  with historical 
figures, extant texts, the relative reliability of  the archive, palimpsests, or mere 
happenstance of  archeological discovery. Ideal history is not dependent on facts and 
evidence because it appeals instead to “essential structures that can be revealed through 
methodical inquiry” (UG 172) which I will explain in the next paragraphs. This eidetic 
inquiry is essentially historical or backwards-looking because unlike a so-called factual history 
which relies on facts that were in principle already facts at the moment inquired about, 
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ideal history concerns essential structures that are only essential retrospectively—it is only 
the existence of  those ‘handed-down forms’ of  geometry which allow us to posit the 
existence of  their ‘primal establishing’ with absolute certainty or any conceivability at all. 
This retrospection comprises the “zigzag pattern” (Crisis 58) of  history’s essential 
structure50, in which the incomplete understanding of  the past and the present to which it 
appears are called upon in turns to bring each other out of  darkness, like the blind leading 
the blind—“Thus we have no other choice than to proceed forward and backward in a 
zigzag pattern; the one must help the other in an interplay.” (Crisis 58) It is as though more 
light shed on the past allows it to help tug the present a little further out of  shadow and 
vice-versa in an infinite process. This necessity marks the enquiry as fundamentally a 
Rückfrage or return-enquiry that is not conceivable as a mere atemporal transcendental 
enquiry. 
 
In order to understand how this necessity is determined, let us look back at the 
methods of  eidetic science in Husserl’s earlier work. In Ideas I Husserl writes; “From 
matters of  fact nothing ever follows but matters of  fact.” (Id I 17) In particular, essences, 
to which belong the eidetic universality; “the not-able-to-be-otherwise of  a matter of  
universal insight” (Bernet, Kern and Marbach, Introduction 80), incommensurable with 
factuality’s ‘It is thus; in respect of  its essence it could be otherwise’(-ness), do not derive 
their necessity from facts, the mere accumulation of  facts, or even from a systematic 
process of  induction. Essences require a bringing to mind of  essences themselves through 
the method called ‘imaginative variation’ or ‘free variation’ in which the essential limits of  
the idea are explored and tested in ‘imagination’ or ‘phantasy’ in order to determine the 
“eidetic predicatively formed affair-complex” (Id I 14) that constitutes a given essence; 
We do this by making the essence of  the material thing something given 
originarily (perhaps on the basis of  a free phantasying [Insertion in Copy A: and 
variation.] of  a material thing) in order, then, in this presentive consciousness, 
to perform the steps of  thinking which the ‘insight,’ the originary givenness of  
the predicatively formed eidetic affair-complex explicitly set down by that 
proposition, requires. 
(Id I 15) 
                                                                                                                                          
49 This implies a kind of historical imaginary variation. 
50 As Derrida claims—“the ‘zigzag’ way of proceeding—a procedure that the Crisis proposes as a 
sort of necessary ‘circle’ and which is only the pure form of every historical experience” (IOG 51) 
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In other words, ‘mere’ facts or even generalisation from facts do not produce essences—
these need to be derived through the contemplation of  the limits and necessities of  
whatever essence is described thereby; 
Every attempted transition to an a priori in this determinate sense (of  an 
unconditioned universality obtained by looking and seeing) demands liberation 
from the fact. The fact in our case is the world actually and factually 
experienced by us, with these factual things. Let us drop this fact. 
(PP 52) 
Moreover, facts pertain only to individuals, by virtue of  their essential contingency.  
The eidetic is a realm of  objectivity apart from and independent of  the factual; it 
can even be acquired independently of  sensory acquisition, through imagination.51 The 
objects intended in this way are not facts but ideas; “The essence (Eidos) is a new sort of  object. 
Just as the datum of  individual or experiencing intuition is an individual object, so the datum of  eidetic 
intuition is a pure essence.” (Id I 9) It is crucial to distinguish these types and not to mistake 
ideas as derivative of  facts (though they may, but not necessarily, originate in sensory 
experience as abstractions from it), or to confuse a truly existing ideal object for any 
matter-of-fact; “Positing of and, to begin with, intuitive seizing upon, essences implies not the 
slightest positing of  any individual factual existence; pure eidetic truths contain not the slightest assertion 
about matters of  fact.” (Id I 11) 
 
Apart from the abstraction from sensory experience, eidetic experience is possible 
on the basis of  ideas alone, and this is how ideal history proceeds. The method ideal 
history employs and the instrument of  its unfettering is the aforementioned ‘imaginary 
variation’. Although I’ve already briefly described this method of  determining an object’s 
eidetic universality through the transformation in pure phantasy thereof  in order to determine 
its ideal necessities and limits, and I will go on to explain, partly through Husserl’s limited 
treatment thereof  in the Origin and partly in an interpretive extrapolation, how this works 
in the case of  history specifically. First, however, I will explain the general process of  
‘variation’ in more depth, and support its independence from facts even in the capacity of  
stepping stones by drawing again on Ideas I, and also on Phenomenological Psychology, in order 
to explain its relationship with intentional consciousness. It is through an eidetic reduction 
                                                
51 “Accordingly, to seize upon an essence itself, and to seize upon it originarily, we can start from 
corresponding experiencing intuitions, but equally well 
from intuitions which are non-experiencing, which do not seize upon factual existence but which 
are instead ‘merely imaginative’. (Id I 10) 
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and the employment of  this tool of  imagination that ideal history acquires its eidetic 
universality and independence from facts, as Husserl writes in the Origin; 
And precisely in this free variation, and in running through the conceivable 
possibilities for the life-world, there arises, with apodictic self-evidence, an 
essentially general set of  elements going through all the variants; and of  this we 
can convince ourselves with truly apodictic certainty. Thereby we have removed 
every bond to the factually valid historical world and have regarded this world 
itself  [merely] as one of  the conceptual possibilities. 
(UG 177) 
 
Eidetic variation refers to the operation in which imaginary variation is employed to 
reduce an intentional object to its essence by establishing its limits or “pure, ideal 
possibilities” by way of  a “variation performed in pure phantasy” (Bernet, Kern and Marbach, 
Introduction 79) in order to determine the eidetic universality belonging to it. ‘Eidetic seeing’ or 
‘intuition of  essences’, which Husserl discusses in Ideas I §4, is the originary apprehension 
in pure thought of  ideas which may or may not have “ever been given in actual experience” 
(Id I 11). In this way ideas are objects of  consciousness in much the same way that 
experienced individual objects are objects of  consciousness. Unconditional universality, 
Husserl claims in Ideas I, belongs to judgments which are not about individual essences, but 
judgments which are true for any essence subsumed under it, without it being ‘about’ any 
particular one, an entire ‘class’ taken as a whole, or even the type of  essence that may be 
subsumed under it ‘as such’; “Thus in pure geometry we do not judge, as a rule, about the 
Eidos straight line, angle, triangle, conic section, or the like, but rather about any straight 
line whatever, any angle whatever” (Id I 12-13). It belongs to the essence of  a judgment of  
universality that it is, unlike any other type of  judgment, not of  a given essence as object, 
but also that an essential possibility of  subsuming a genus and particulars belongs to it: “It 
is, however, of  the essence of  the situation which we are at all times free to shift to the 
corresponding Objectivating attitude, that this shifting is precisely an essential possibility.” 
(Id I 13)52 This kind of  subsumption would be the singularisation of  a judgment based in 
eidetic universality and its application to a particular individual according to the eidetic 
necessity that issues from the essence’s proper universality; “the judgment itself, the asserted 
proposition, is called an apodictic (also an apodictically “necessary”) consequence of  the 
universal judgment with which it is connected.” (Id I 14) 
                                                
52 The claim that such judgments are not ‘of’ an essence as object may appear to violate the basic 
claim of transcendental idealism—that consciousness is always of an object—but this is of course 
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Although eidetic universality and necessity are key logical instruments in Ideas I, the 
method of  deriving them, of  determining what is truly “unconditioned, so-called apodictic 
universality” (PP 52), and distinguishing that from what is ‘merely’ an empirical probability, 
such as a law derived in induction (“Showing [that something is indeed a ‘felt necessity’] is 
the test whether the felt necessity is a genuinely apodictic one, and not a confusion with a 
merely empirical indication” [PP 52]), that is; imaginary or free variation, is not described in 
methodological fulness until the lectures on Phenomenological Psychology in 1925. Imaginary 
variation is just that, the variation of  the object in imagination, but in order to determine 
what is shared by all. This mental operation begins with the freeing of  the imagination 
from its subordination to an originary fact, its relegation to “a nullity in connection with 
[the fact’s] existence and in conflict with its empirical nexus” (PP 53). Husserl is very clear 
in this writing that a reduction is necessary here in order to intuit pure essences—this is his 
eidetic reduction. It is necessary, Husserl says, to expose the “‘secret’ and even unnoticed 
restriction” (PP 55) of  essences derived in advance of  this reduction to relation with “our 
factually actual world” (PP 55), in order to determine essences which smuggle in these 
relations as hidden characteristics; “Only if  we become aware of  this restriction and 
consciously put it out of  play and thereby also free the most extensive surrounding horizon 
of  the variants from all restrictions, from all experiential acceptance, do we create perfect 
purity.” (PP 55) Only given this purity of  essence is what he calls, in Ideas I, unconditioned or 
unrestricted universal validity, meaning that its universality and essentiality is not predicated on 
an unexamined and hidden restriction to factual existence (see Ideas 15), possible. Because 
only in the purity of  the eidetic reduction is it possible to distinguish whether the essence 
of  contingency is ‘essentially’ there. Explained in terms of  this restriction, the eidetic 
reduction seems to require its own epoché; the reduction of  factuality, the ‘factual world’, 
even a sort of  ‘factual attitude’. 
The special meaning of  the fact (in the sense of  the ‘factually actual’) is eliminated, 
and with it the relegation of  “every instance of  imagining it other than it is” (PP 53) to 
mere contra-indication is at an end. Instead all imaginable variations are essentially 
equivalent, regardless of  whether or not one of  them happens to be or to have been 
empirically established in fact; “I can instead let every fictional transformation stand as 
equal to it and let it itself  stand only as one possibility next to these other possibilities.” (PP 
                                                                                                                                          
not the case; in such cases as in the case of all judgments, it is the judgment that is the object of 
consciousness. 
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53) There is thus, of  course, no need to start with a factual variant as a basis for a set of  
varied and invariable qualities; “We stand then so to speak in a pure fantasy-world, a world 
of  absolutely pure possibilities; every such possibility can then become the central member 
for possible pure variations in the mode of  optionalness, and from each there results then 
an absolutely pure eidos” (PP 55). All of  this is perfectly valid because on the basis of  the 
eide no existential claim is made; “essences implies not the slightest positing of  any individual factual 
existence” (Id I 11) 
In the ‘systematic’ and ‘arbitrary’ variation of  objects “in every possible manner” 
(PP 53), “what differs in the variation is of  no concern to us” (PP 54); rather, “we can at 
any time direct our regard toward the fact that an invariant necessarily pervades it or 
pervades all the variants” (PP 54). The invariants expose universal qualities possessed in 
common by all of  the varied ‘images’, and makes possible a determination of  fundamental 
essences underpinning them; “Then a unity pervades this multiplicity of  copy-fashionings, 
namely, that of  the essence which grounds the similarity.” (PP 54) 
 
History as an eidetic science works by way of  imaginary variation as well, only as a 
Rückfrage it is a retrospective variation; an inquiry into what must have been the case given 
the current state of  affairs. History is this temporal removal within the eidetic reduction. 
This is a significant difference, because whereas eidetic variation as it is described in Ideas I 
and Phenomenological Psychology works because the object which the imagination begins with, 
whether it exists purely in phantasy to begin with or not, cannot be distinguished from the 
other objects which are ‘derived’ from it in phantasy, or from the essence which is the end 
result, in any essential sense—indeed, the whole point of  the method is to derive essences 
which are identically shared by all, and that would be impossible if  there were some 
essential difference which it were necessary to keep in reserve. Yet this is exactly what is 
needed for ideal history, in which it is not the essence at hand that is sought, but the origin 
of  the essence. History must show both what the origin of  geometry is, and that it is 
essentially thus. Therefore, a transtemporal sort of  eidetic variation is required by a Rückfrage. 
Though not explicitly set out, the itinerary should not be so complicated after all, 
and it does not properly demand any method not already introduced in eidetic variation. It 
is merely a matter of  adding an extra step. We should imagine the historical phantasy to 
work like this; a possible origin (and originary meaning-fundament) of  existing geometrical 
science is imagined, and on the basis of  that possible origin imaginary variation is used to 
derive its essence. Since it is not necessary for the ‘original’ object of  the varying exercise to 
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derive from experience, it is perfectly legitimate to do so. The essence of  the origin (the 
essential origin), if  it is properly derived, will be exactly the necessary and sufficient 
conditions of  the origin of  geometry—the ground conditions without which no such thing 
could have come into being, and which themselves constitute the complete and adequate 
conditions of  possibility for that coming into being, which is to say, for a geometry to be 
invented which is meaningful. Of  course, there are other conditions, which are lost to the 
contingency of  the event (the name of  that mythical ‘Thales of  geometry’, for example, 
but these are not the relevant ones. Talking about ideal history in terms of  conditions is to 
make appropriate use of  the discourse of  causation. This is indeed appropriate, since ideal 
history concerns the essential origins. But we must remember the epistemic purpose of  the 
enquiry of  the search for origins—Husserl does not undertake his Rückfrage and the 
elaboration of  an entirely new type of  historical science in order to determine what the 
cause of  the ideal sciences are. The essential origin is important because if  it is possible to 
determine what was needed and adequate for the invention of  geometry, then it is possible 
to determine the meaning, the originary evidence or urevidence that could alone ground it 
in meaning. 
The necessity with which the essential origin is thus derived already means that this 
origin is internal to the meaning of  the current science which supplied the only evidence 
for it. It is only because the eidetics of  the origin are essential to the truth of  science as it is 
that the essential history has been able to discover them. The historical enquiry is therefore 
always at the same time an enquiry into the essence of  truth, the truth that this Rückfrage 
started out with. It is always an enquiry which brings together the historical and the 
epistemological in defiance of  their accustomed separation. History is capable of  
informing us of  the meanings of  our sciences in a way that goes far beyond the merely 
anecdotal and speculative gobbets of  factual history. That is to say, as long as history itself  
is possible. And it is to the possibility of  history—the way that historical essences are able 
to appear to a subject, and the complex structure of  ideal existence which sustains 
historical essence—that Husserl devotes even more attention to than he does the methods 
of  essential history in The Origin of  Geometry, and to which I will turn in the forthcoming 
chapter. 
If  the idea of  a history which because of  an eidetic reduction frees itself  from the 
factual seems to be, if  not incapable of  contributing to the resolution of  the crisis, at least 
not a history, not retaining anything of  what must be meant by a history (which must possess 
the essence of  factuality, what Derrida calls by Fink’s term ‘Erstmaligkeit’ and will define as 
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“one for which we should not be able to substitute another fact as an example in order to 
decipher its essence.” [IOG 47]), then it is either because, as Derrida explains, there is a 
‘historical reduction’ (See IOG 47f) which is not simply subject to the eidetic reduction, or 
because a confusion persists between the external history which is concerned with such 
matters of  fact, and internal history, for which the essence of  the fact of  the invention of  
geometry is beside the point. Husserl seems clear on this point at the moment when he 
excludes the factuality of  history’s ‘Thales of  geometry’ from consideration; the only 
essence demanded for ideal history is the essence of  the invention, which can be separated 
from the essence of  its factuality. Husserl seems to be maintaining that we can say of  the 
invention that it is essential to the idea, without yet saying that its occurrence at a particular 
place and time has any importance—but is this not precisely the ‘essence-of-the-first-time’ 
which is factuality? According to Derrida, however, the essence of  factuality, the ‘essence-
of-the-first-time’ (Erstmaligkeit), is indissociable from the essence of  the invention. Is it 
possible that this invention occurred more than once, as so often seems in fact to be the 
case, or would only one be an invention while the rest are (mere) rediscoveries? What is 
necessary for ideal history is nothing more than the essence of  the inauguration and its 
conditions. This factuality is given to us in a historical reduction, in which “a primordial act 
which created the object whose eidos is determined by the iterative reduction” (IOG 48) is 
reawakened, and not just that objective idea itself. This kind of  historical reduction, which 
Derrida avers is not simply secondary to the eidetic reduction, comes into his account in 
his Introduction with respect to the very tricky concept of  reactivation in the Origin. Two things 
are clear about factuality that may seem in tension: the only way a fact can have meaning in 
history or anywhere is as reduced, and on the other hand as a historical enquiry and not 
merely a logico-epistemic one, ideal history unearths the singularity of  something like facts 
from which ideas originated, but only insofar as these singular events were essential, as in the 
‘essence-of-the-first-time’. However, this conceals a profound consistency within eidetic 
reduction. As eidetic themselves it is possible to raise the factual context out of  the 
oblivion of  contingency which is lost forever from historical certainty, and to treat the 
‘facts’ insofar as they are essential, which is to say, not really facts at all since ‘fact’ implies 
contingency, as I wrote in the first section of  this chapter. As Derrida writes “This ‘must’ 
(have appeared) marks the necessity now recognized and timelessly assigned to a past fact 
of  an eidetic pre-scription and of  an a priori norm. I can state this value of  necessity 
independently of  all factual cognition.” (IOG 49)  This may sound like, at worst; nonsense, 
and at best; waffling, but what it means is just that the retrospect of  history is able to drag 
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facts out of  contingency into necessity, and to transpose what was once external into 
internal history (innere Historie)—although it is true that necessity cannot be derived from 
fact through a process of  induction or any other kind of  reasoning, there is all the potential 
in the world for rigorous eidetic method to establish clear-cut necessities in our 
retrospective view which did not appear before. And there is no reason why a fact cannot 
provide the impetus for this eidetic seeing (Wesenschau). If  these two statements can be 
reconciled it is because the eidetic reduction does indeed have a simple priority, and the 
historical reduction works through it—the retrospective clarifies and limits imaginary 
variation. I will return to these questions in chapter four when I evaluate Derrida’s reading 
of  Husserl in his Introduction to the Origin of  Geometry. 
 
 
In the first chapter I explained the crisis in terms of  science’s development of  the 
idea and the eventual dominance of  ideas and substitution thereof  for subjective evidence. 
In the second chapter thus far I have explained the role(s) of  the idea in science and 
history as well as indicating that an essential history can retrieve (even reactivate) the 
evidence that the ideal itself  had ‘forgotten’. This ‘reactivation’ (Reaktivierung) is the 
bringing to ideal objectivity what had been abandoned by scientific idealism in the first 
place—the subjective side of  experience. When geometry was invented it realised the 
purpose of  objects of  consciousness which preceded it of  the adequate definition of  those 
objects, but the method it employed—an exact ideal objectivity in geometry—was 
incapable of  preserving the subjective side of  the experience of  objects. Reactivation, a 
history of  essences intended not only to preserve ideal objects but to retrieve, as objects, 
experiences which had never existed as objects before and thus had never realised their 
potential for being shared and preserved in language, would proceed by way of  essential 
history. I have presented the scientificity of  ideal history, and described the imaginary 
variation which is really its ultimate step, but in the next chapter I will explain the structure 
of  history which makes it possible and indispensable to ideality itself—the coherence of  
interdependent ideal structures. This is the common support both of  reactivation and 
geometry itself. The explanation of  the coherence of  ideality is also necessary in order to 
understand what is meant by the ‘reactivation’ of  subjective originary evidence and how 
science has been able to function, albeit in its critical state, without it. 
But before this I will explain what is in need of  reactivation, and how it is that 
science functions in its absence (which must be known in order to understand how it is 
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needed). Reactivation is the retrospective realisation of  evidence, or ‘self-evidence’. Self-
evidence, Husserl explains, is, in concrete terms, “the successful realization of  an intention 
[Vorhabe]” (UG 160). In other words, it is the “grasping an entity with the consciousness of  
its original being-itself-there [Selbst-da]” (UG 160) which, phenomenologically, comprises 
the experience of  a constituted object (see UG 162). The kind of  evidence which a 
reactivation would seek would be the urevidence I wrote about briefly in the previous 
chapter, which in Leavey’s translation is rendered ‘original self-evidence’. In order to clarify 
its meaning, it is necessary to consider original self-evidence in contrast to the axiomatic 
self-evidence which is not dependent on historical disclosure but is also insufficient to 
ground its meaning in experience/the lifeworld. It is original self-evidence alone that is 
capable of  providing geometrical meaning with its link to phenomenological sense and to 
the lifeworld. As Husserl notes, “Original self-evidence must not be confused with the self-
evidence of  ‘axioms’; for axioms are in principle already the results of  original meaning-
construction and always have this behind them.” (UG 168)  Axiomatic self-evidence is a 
logical and linguistic, non-historical yet active understanding of  “geometrical idealities 
which have been explicated but not brought to original self-evidence” (UG 168), and which 
is therefore acheivable within the meaningful and linguistic capacities of  geometry itself. 
Peculiar is the word that Husserl, with nearly rhythmic consistency, uses to describe 
language, its functions and effects. Language is capable of  a “peculiar [eigenartige] logical 
activity” (UG 167), namely the “peculiar [eigentümliche] sort of  activity best described by the 
word ‘explication’” (UG 167)––the activation of  what is in the first place passively received 
as “a straightforwardly valid meaning, taken up as a unitary and undifferentiated” (UG 
167)––which produces (or rather, Husserl says, is) “a peculiar [eigenartige] sort of  self-
evidence”, the kind of  understanding made possible by articulating “what has been read (or 
an interesting sentence from it), extracting one by one, in separation from what has been 
vaguely, passively received as a unity, the elements of  meaning, thus bringing the total 
validity to active performance in a new way on the basis of  the individual validities” (IOG 
167). 
There is indeed much that is peculiar about axiomatic self-evidence, but it only 
makes sense that language alone, and its explication, would not be able to provide a fully 
adequate original self-evidence, which would have to comprise that not caught up by the 
objective idealities essential to the function of  language. It makes sense because geometry, 
even when it has been reactivated as a whole and explicated in each of  its meanings and 
components, is capable only of  “purely logical self-evidences” (IOG 168); meaning that 
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explication is able to bring out of  indifferent concealment in matter-of-factness merely the 
particular logical necessity of  what are nevertheless part of  the system and derive that 
meaning only from that membership. Explication does not require historical investigation, 
since the logical meaning of  axioms is systematic (derived from their role and place in a 
system) and not contingent on the phenomenological evidence for their meaning, of  which 
original self-evidence consists. However, without the extrinsic, outside-reference of  
urevidence, of  original self-evidence––that is, self-evidence in which the ‘entity’ ‘grasped’ is 
grasped originally in experience—the entire science remains arbitrary; “a tradition empty of  
meaning” (IOG 169).  
This is the difference of  original self-evidence; the particular way that primal self-
evidence realises an intention is capable of  grounding the truth of  geometry in its 
“historical original meaning” (UG 179). Just like the axiomatic self-evidence, original self-
evidence presents ideal objects that belong to geometry in their individual validity, but 
whereas in the case of  the former the presentation occurred through a separate and 
systematic consideration of  its linguistic and logical meaning; in the case of  the latter the 
presentation is achieved by considering the necessary history of  its creation as an ideal 
object on the basis of  ideal objectivities themselves requiring ‘realisation’ in turn. The 
process of  reactivation must proceed until the ideal objects which belong to geometry yet 
in their realisation can be seen to depend historically upon “the prescientific cultural world” 
(UG 172), or rather upon subsequent ideal objects of  which that world is comprised.53 At 
this point, which is not a final point of  historical investigation and yet suffices to ground 
the meaning of  geometry in meaning which is beyond it and not specific to it ("Of  course, 
this cultural world has in turn its own questions of  origin, which at first remain unasked." 
[UG 172]), the resources of  linguistic and axiomatic meaning, which are confined to 
geometry itself  are exhausted.  
                                                
53 Roman Ingarden clarifies the aims of the investigation into subjectivity, and the meaning of 
subjectivity as such: “phenomenology is supposed to grasp the ultimate, the absolute of pure 
subjectivity in its own character of subjectivity. Hence it is to pursue 'objective' knowledge of 
'subjectivity'. Thus, what is to be condemned is not 'objectivism' as such (in the sense here 
supposed), but only the objectivism of the positive natural sciences since, as Husserl asserts, they 
are not capable of reaching the being-in-itself of nature.” (Roman Ingarden, “What is New in 
Husserl’s ‘Crisis’?” 45-46) 
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3 – The origins of  history 
 
In chapter one I explained how Husserl’s critical project introduces the necessity of  history 
in the creation and existential support of  objective truth. After that, I embarked on an 
explanation of  what ideal history is, first by explaining ‘ideal history’, in part contrasting it 
with ‘factual history’, and explaining how the eidetic science of  phenomenology functions 
in relation specifically to history in order to bring to it scientific rigour.  In this third 
chapter, I will explain the phenomenological structure of  ideal history as a node in a web 
of  discrete but interdependent possibilities of  ideal phenomena on which the possibility of  
any ideality depends equally, and from which it is therefore inseparable (Husserl refers to 
this edifice as a Zusammenhang—a coherence). It is this coherence which accounts for the 
possibility of  history. This dependence of  ideal history on the entire ideal edifice and the 
particular form of  lifeworld it makes possible explains how history, including any historical 
object, such as a geometrical truth, exists on the basis of  the phenomenologically given, 
and in so doing avoids the necessity of  subscribing to the metaphysics of  a platonic 
idealism in order to account for it. If  there is to be a study of  history and historical things 
it must start with the essence of  history, and only on that basis treat historical variation or 
the historicity of  facts, if  at all. Without accounting for the essence of  history, history itself  
as well as all knowledge would be resigned to a historical relativism unable even to support 
the idea of  history on which its critique is based. The vagaries of  history themselves would 
be unable even to maintain their own resignation to ignorance and mystery without the 
support of  an idea of  history and the rest of  the ideal coherence. Even the assertion that flux 
and change keep the ghosts of  the past hidden requires a logic to make sense of  the idea 
of  change. As a breed of  scepticism, the unwillingness to seek the stable foundations of  
history’s flow (in nowhere but history itself, of  course) call to mind Hegel’s damning 
indictment; “Should we not be concerned as to whether this fear of  error is not just the 
error itself ?” (Hegel, Spirit 47) 
Husserl’s ideal science of  history walks the narrow road between dogmatism and 
scepticism by way of  its eidetic reduction. As ideal, history and its partners in the ideal 
coherence are possibilities—it is always as possibilities that language, repetition, writing, 
etc. are essential to ideal objectivity. 
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This is supposed to be the foundation of  any other historical phenomenology; 
whether Husserl’s or someone else’s, whether acknowledged or dissimulated; because this 
explanation of  the phenomenological interdependence of  history and objectivity in the 
edifice of  ideality offers an attenuation of  that traditional and metaphysically-rooted 
dichotomy and allows us to understand, in a way not confused by overweening ideas of  
absolutely pure concepts of  history or objectivity, how it is that, through each other, they 
can appear to us and the (objective and historical) phenomena can appear to us as historical 
and objective. The aim is to build a full model of  the architecture of  ideal objectivity which 
Husserl devotes a lot of  attention to sketching out, and which is not only the condition of  
possibility for geometry, but the inherent possibilities in experience and thought which 
makes that ideal perfection of  it possible. I’ll approach this project of  elucidation in three 
sections— “Word made flesh”, “Coherent and possible ideality”, and “Writing across 
time”. 
The first section is concerned with the description of  objectivity in the strongest 
phenomenological sense as first of  all intersubjectivity, and starts with how for ideal objects 
which are freely invented in the imagination a community, specifically a linguistic 
community, is essential in order for intersubjective demonstration to be achieved. This 
dependence, and with it all of  the interdependencies of  the ideal, is clarified in its sense as 
not a factual dependence, but an ideal one, which is to say; dependence on the possibility of. 
And therefore the dependence of  objectivity on its ‘linguistic body’ is always a dependence 
on the possibility of  its incarnation, which explains why language belongs as a possibility to 
consciousness no matter what. 
After this, the whole of  ideality is discussed as a structure of  interdependent 
possibilities, all of  which must be possible in order for any one in particular to be possible, 
in the section “Coherent and possible ideality”. This starts with the assertion that for 
objectivity mere language and community do not suffice without history, which raises once 
more the question of  what kind of  history is needed. Because as I have shown already it is 
neither the pure essence of  history in the abstract, nor mere factual history, but the a priori 
of  history—which as an idea is a possibility—which objectivity requires, it is possible to 
make sense of  history in geometry and such as the development of  a primordial possibility. 
I follow Derrida’s argument that history, as well as the other essential coherence of  
repeatability, is already anticipated in the basic structure of  intentionality to show that 
history is always part of  the eidetic consciousness in the way it needs to be—as possibility. 
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Finally, in “Writing across time”, writing as the concrete condition of  history as the 
persistence of  the idea is explained as Husserl describes it and in terms of  its possibility. 
Like community, even though writing is something concrete and factual in every instance, it 
is only in terms of  its pure possibility that it is necessary in order for objectivity to be 
‘achieved’. And this brings us to objectivity itself, because just as the other possibilities of  
ideality are necessary for objectivity, objectivity is in each case necessary for them. But just 
as with the rest, it is necessary as an idea—as possible. It is the idea of  objectivity which is 
required for science. It is because objectivity is itself  always an idea that the idea of  the rest 
of  the coherence is sufficient to attain it. 
 This explanation will conclude my elucidation in three chapters of  the function 
and character of  ideal history and establish the grounds for the subsequent ‘commentary 
and interpretation’ (see VP 75) on the phenomenology of  history and its role in 
phenomenology at large through Derrida’s treatment thereof, first with a light touch in the 
Introduction to the Origin of  Geometry and then somewhat more forcefully in Voice and 
Phenomenon, though in both cases undertaken with the utmost care and fidelity (which we 
know from his other writing Derrida never considered a straightforward comportment—in 
“Plato’s Pharmacy” Derrida concludes that the obedience to the father demands parricide). 
 
An ideal history is expounded by Husserl which is meant not only to open up 
history to a phenomenological investigation independent of  factual history, its uncertainties 
and limitations, but to explain the structure according to which facticity is possible. 
Contrary to the pure metaphysical concept of  historicity as absolute flux, history as it is 
presented in experience is the objectified historical—and as a phenomenological science, 
the historical is exhausted by the experience of  it, therefore ideal history does not 
distinguish between the historical science and the unfolding of  events and historical 
moments itself; it is ideal in fundamentally the same way mathematics is, as Derrida puts it: 
“Its being is thoroughly transparent and exhausted by its phenomenality” (IOG 27), 
although it is the same way anything is as treated by phenomenology54 This essence of  
history is necessary for history to be able to present itself  to intuition, and thus to the 
science of  phenomenology, but it offers advantages even from without the Husserlian 
orthodoxy, because of  its rich resources for accounting for the way of  existing of  objective 
truths within history, without either abandoning truth to relativism or relying on an extra-
                                                
54 Husserl writes in the introduction to Ideas I that “phenomenology will become established here as 
a science of essence — as an “a priori” or, as we also say, an eidetic science” (Id I xxii) 
112 
historical and extra-worldly realm of  truth. It is my conviction that in doing so Husserl 
presents the most ambitious possible account of  historicity while respecting its limits. 
At the same time Husserl avoids a further danger (or actually just a reappearance of  
the same danger), historical phenomenology is not merely a treatment of  the historical, 
ahistorically, in terms of  their present objectivity—history is not regarded merely insofar as 
it is stripped of  its particularity and transformations and denatured as a static object. While 
historical phenomenology is irreducibly objective, it reveals for all objects the essentially 
historical way that they exist, and it is only on the basis of  the essential historicity of  
objects that the transformations of  historical variation in their (eidetic) core55 can be 
thought. The adequate understanding of  the entire inseparable edifice of  ideality makes it 
necessary to understand history in its objectivity and objectivity in its historicity, and it also 
makes this possible. 
 
The existence of  the science of  geometry as objective truth, just as the existence of  
any ideal object, is due to the support structures of  reproducibility, language, history and 
community. It is by virtue of  all of  these existent structures—its infinite reproducibility in 
acts of  consciousness, its “linguistic embodiment” (UG 161); its historical extension 
through time and across generations by being “capable of  being passed on” (UG 167) and 
received; its belonging to the community, as understandable to all therein (see UG 162), not 
to mention transcendence—that ideal objects exist, and this lifeworldly coherence or 
Zusammenhang explains the existence of  ideas without reducing them to their psychological 
presentation, inventing an otherworldly support for them or relying on any other kind of  
metaphysical substructure, in order to answer the Origin’s central question; “how does 
geometrical ideality (like that of  all sciences) proceed from its primary intrapersonal origin, 
where it is a structure within the conscious space of  the first inventor's soul, to its ideal 
objectivity?" (UG 161). The answer is: by being repeated, expressed in language, preserved 
in history, and available to the community for any one of  whom it constitutes an object. 
                                                
55 According to Carr, “the necessity of a historical introduction to philosophy” (Carr, Problem 56) 
derives from the historicity of consciousness—it is the historicity of consciousness, and not of 
objects, or even the objectified ego, that requires what he calls Husserl’s ‘historical reduction’ or 
‘historical reflections’ (see Carr, Problem 112–13) in order to bring to account the historical 
particularity of the consciousness in which objects appear. This is no doubt true, but it is uncertain 
whether ideal history, which is inseparable from objectivity, can help with a pre-objective historical 
reflection. 
In any case, historical reflection, contrary to Carr’s argument, is essential not primarily because of 
the historicity of consciousness, but because there is no fundamental understanding of the existence 
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These conditions suffice to create an object in the only sense that the term has meaning for 
Husserl—as intersubjectively available and the same for everyone—, just as an object or 
objective realm is necessary for those conditions to be possible themselves. Thus, the 
articulation of  essential structures is easy to misunderstand—the structures are not 
articulated in order to distinguish one or more of  them as independent, or to roll out a 
genealogy, but in order to explain their place within an interdependent network outside of  
which no one of  them, least of  all objectivity, the basis of  meaning itself, could exist or 
have any meaning. The interdependence in the coherence of  ideality is not unlike the 
interdependence of  mental states, mental experiences and all mentalities in psychology, for 
which Husserl uses the same term in Phenomenological Psychology—‘Zusammenhang’, there 
translated as ‘nexus’—; “But psychology and consequently all socio-cultural sciences refer 
to the one mental nexus [Zusammenhang] universally given by internal experience [innere Erfahrung]. 
Internal experience gives no mere mutual externality; it knows no separation of  parts 
consisting of  self-sufficient elements.” (Husserl, Phenomenological Psychology 4–5; first German 
interpolation mine) Just as in the case of  ideality, its ‘parts’ can be spoken of  and identified, 
but not given independently and apart from one another. 
 
a. Word made flesh 
 
The intimate relation between objectivity and the possibility of  other subjects is natural to 
phenomenology as an eidetic science, as David Carr notes; it is “[in a sense] taken into 
account by the very eidetic approach of  phenomenology” (Carr, Problem 87). This is due to 
transcendental phenomenology’s respect for the appearance as fully ‘objective’—that is, as 
available to others—of  intentional objects in principle, notwithstanding factual obstacles 
which may preclude their convenience in certain circumstances. In book five of  the 
Cartesian Meditations, the interdependence of  objectivity and community is established 
explicitly, and community is the ideal means of  circumventing such obstacles. Community, 
in the sense of  the possibility of  intersubjectivity itself, establishes objectivity in the 
strongest sense in which the term is phenomenologically meaningful—“transcendental 
intersubjectivity has an intersubjective sphere of  ownness, in which it constitutes the objective 
                                                                                                                                          
of ideas, on which the whole of phenomenology rests, without understanding the historicity of 
those ideas as ideal objects. 
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world” (CM 107)—it is a phenomenological object’s appearance as available to the 
perception of  others that constitutes it as objective; “there occurs a universal super-addition of  
sense to my primordial world, whereby the latter becomes the appearance ‘of ’ a determinate 
‘Objective’ world, as the identical world for everyone, myself  included.” (CM 107). 
Objectivity is the terra firma of  experience, and philosophy and science rightly 
pursue it, but overshoot the target when they seek a higher standard than universal 
availability to all subjects—truly it is just such intersubjective recognition, no more and no 
less, that we seek in order to confirm the fleeting, the out of  the ordinary, the dubious, or 
the illusory. A more profound metaphysical certainty is not only unattainable, but 
superfluous to our understanding of  the world. Consider the burning need for just such 
objective determination that descends upon reading a fantastical story in which something 
incredible has happened to the protagonist. The reader is unsettled not so much by the 
extraordinariness of  whatever occurred as by the uncertainty of  whether the others will 
confirm it and its strangeness. She reads on feverishly to determine what kind of  
experience she has been presented with, because, more than whatever abominable 
snowman or anthropomorphic nose has appeared, or what kind of  time travel miracle has 
occurred, the ambiguity between an objective fact and something which is an exception 
from the objective is unsettling in the most fundamental way. Is she presented with the 
unverified private experience of  Harvey the friendly six-foot tall rabbit pooka, or the 
objectively verified but extraordinary nose/civil servant of  Nikolai Gogol’s story? Next to 
the undecidedness between objectivity and the lapses thereof  which is only the province of  
dreams, fiction and madness, whatever concrete form the suspension or possible 
suspension of  objectivity has taken is utterly banal, no matter how many tentacles it has. It 
is a privileged moment in a narrative and one which can never last long; the tension begs to 
be resolved. Either objectivity or illusion must reign. The reason the film Harvey is so 
exciting and fun is that it manages to sustain this undecidedness—that no one other than 
Jimmy Stewart’s Elwood P. Dowd can see or hear Harvey isn’t enough for us to confirm his 
non-existence. 
The agreement of  only one other subject is enough to provide the satisfaction of  
obtaining objectivity, which can be intense even in quotidian and even petty circumstances. 
Today, at a coffee ‘cupping’ or tasting my friend mentioned notes of  chocolate and 
blueberry and right away I seemed to taste the same flavours. But such flavours are so 
evanescent—disappearing as soon as they appear like the notes of  a melody as Husserl 
describes in The Phenomenology of  Internal Time Consciousness—they are impossible to detect 
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and to interrogate or inspect at the same time. And then, the power of  suggestion is so 
strong in comparison to a city-dweller’s underdeveloped sense of  smell. These are the 
reasons we’re content to call wine or coffee tasting—indeed, taste in general—subjective in 
the common, non-phenomenological sense of  the term as something which has a 
subjective part only. But of  course it is not! The coffee is an object that I and anyone else 
can experience, and the taste belongs to that object as part of  its essence. The difficulty is 
determining that taste, which is subtle and protean. But to call it subjective as though that 
were all there was of  it is to give up precipitately. Connoisseurs are those who refuse to give 
up the quest for objectivity, indeed, for communication. 
I continued to ‘cup’ my coffee and continued to taste notes of  blueberry and 
chocolate (more so than any of  the notes others in the group mentioned), but also started 
to notice a very distinctive combination of  those flavours that reminded me of  something 
specific. As protean as flavours and odours can be, they yet insist themselves with such 
clarity. Proust explored this, and its relation to memory, with the taste of  madeleines 
dipped in tea. Proteus could eventually be made to return to his own form by being held 
onto tight, but the impressions of  taste and smell seem to be changed by the effort of  
holding onto them, the same way Proteus did at first. Melodies too can have this effect. 
Suddenly, I recognised it and alluded out loud to the Lindt blueberry chocolate bar that it 
reminded me of  so distinctly, and because my friend knew the chocolate he immediately 
and enthusiastically agreed. The satisfaction I felt in sharing this experience was immense, 
because it was the satisfaction of  confirming in communication the objectivity which 
always belonged to my experience as a possibility, but which belonged to it in the form of  a 
possibility, as a tension. It did not make it any more objective, because the objectivity was 
already there in the possibility of  my friend’s or some other person’s experience of  it, but 
allowed me to satisfy my own psychological doubts. Similarly, it is no impediment to the 
objectivity of  that ‘note’ of  blueberry and chocolate that none of  the other members of  
the community seemed to recognise it, just as it would not have made it any less objective 
if  not even one other person agreed with me. Perhaps they had never had the fortune to 
taste Lindt’s  blueberry chocolate bar, which would provide a sufficient obstacle to their 
experience of  that flavour; or perhaps different flavours, also objectively belonging to the 
coffee, resonated and were experienced more forcefully by the others. ‘Bergamot’, ‘citrus’, 
and so on they announced, but for me it was Lindt blueberry chocolate all the way. 
It is in the Origin that Husserl explains how objectivity is attained concretely not 
due to an indeterminate universality of  ‘everyone’, but on the basis of  linguistic 
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community—though never on the basis of  ‘a’ particular community; as Derrida points out, 
it is merely the pure possibility of  any given linguistic community that is presupposed. 
Even though this is an indeterminate necessity of  community as such and is never tied to a 
community in particular, it is nevertheless not reducible to intersubjectivity in general—
what is crucial is that the intersubjective relation have this form of  a shared community. 
Only community can make the sharing of  an object in common possible; 
In this sense civilization is, for every man whose we-horizon it is, a community 
of  those who can reciprocally express themselves, normally, in a fully 
understandable fashion; and within this community everyone can talk about 
what is within the surrounding world of  his civilization as objectively existing. 
(UG 162) 
Objectivity lights up our world, runs Husserl’s account, ‘as soon as’ we find 
ourselves participating in “a community of  empathy and language” (UG 163), or in fact 
merely enjoy the possibility of  such a community, in which abides a certain possibility of  
‘coaccomplishment’ of  shared objects themselves in addition to the simultaneous 
understanding that they are shared; that they can (at least in principle) be given to the 
consciousness of  all ‘members’ of  the community; 
In this full understanding of  what is produced by the other, as in the case of  
recollection, a present coaccomplishment on one's own part of  the presentified activity 
necessarily takes place; but at the same time there is also the self-evident consciousness of  
the identity of  the mental structure in the productions of  both the receiver of  the 
communication and the communicator; and this occurs reciprocally. (UG 163) 
This is the case for the ‘properly’ ideal object insofar as it is an identical mental 
structure which must be understood as belonging identically to the other, just as it is for ‘real’ 
objects in the case of  which the other’s ‘accomplishment’ will vary on the basis of  her own 
perspective.56 In fact, a community with common language is necessary in order to share 
ideal objectivity, whereas the gaze of  a foreigner or stranger is sufficient to accomplish the 
objectivity of  objects in the material world, along the empathic (Einfühlung) lines already 
presented in the fifth meditation, and it is only objects which are exact ideas that are 
capable of  producing the consciousness of  an identical structure in the psyche of  the other 
                                                
56 Derrida describes this difference perfectly; “An ideal object is an object whose monstration can 
be indefinitely repeated, whose presence in the Zeigen is indefinitely reiterable precisely because, 
freed from all mundane spatiality, it is a pure noema which I can express without having, at least in 
appearance, to pass through the world.” (VP 64) 
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(indeed of  any other in the community).57 This is why the exact idea is so important, and 
how it opens up a new potential for civilisation, as Husserl passionately albeit worryingly 
declaimed in the Vienna Lecture. The importance of  the idea, philosophy and civilisation is 
the anxious plea at the heart of  all of  the writings surrounding the Crisis, and in part 
because, whatever criticisms can and should be held against it, it makes an empathic 
communication possible that is not there otherwise. That is because the dependence 
between community and objectivity is mutual. This is so for real objects; it is as a subject 
who intends objects and an objective world that she shares or can share with me that other 
subjects and the community of  subjects are, as subjects, given to me. This is why even for 
material objects the possibility of  language is necessary—without the possibility of  
communicating about it in a language there is no objectivity. 
In its turn, the shared objective world is essential for the intersubjective sphere 
which constitutes it, because it is in their having a world that other subjects are themselves 
constituted as subjects: as Carr emphasises “he is thus constituted as having ‘his own’ world 
just as I do” (Carr, Problem 96) And it is even more the case for the deeper kind of  empathy 
made possible on the basis of  an ideal object which can and must be shared by involving 
identical subjective acts; “what is self-evident turns up as the same in the consciousness of  
the other.” (UG 163) 
 
Since we can imagine real objects which are given to us in a fully intersubjective way 
without any factual involvement of  language, and on the basis of  an intersubjective 
‘meeting’ which occurs among individuals who do not seem to belong to a shared linguistic 
community, it would seem that there is a kind of  objectivity based on a common world of  
experience that is prior to all of  the other parts of  the edifice of  ideality, and that they are 
therefore not equiprimordial. Does the possibility of  meeting a stranger’s gaze not, as 
Sartre explains, indicate a fully intersubjective objectivity which precedes language, but also 
history and ideality itself ? Does it not presuppose that we are able to attain some kind of  
fundamental objectivity that is therefore the basis of  subjectivity and the prior and 
necessary condition of  all ideal content? This would perhaps indeed be the case if  eidetic 
                                                
57 However, this factual difference is beside the point as far as the existence of the ideal object 
goes—whether it is an object the essence of which has the identity of a geometrical theorem or one 
which has the equally identical indeterminateness of an area of Nile floodplain, the object exists 
only insofar as there belongs to it the possibility of ‘coaccomplishment’ by others and by a whole 
community, just as for both the mere possibility of such is sufficient so long as all the other ideal 
possibilities are also ’there’. The identity of the so-called ‘ideal object proper’ consists in the 
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objectification were not necessary for any object to be given to consciousness in the first 
place; were it not only as ideal that consciousness is able to constitute any object; and 
therefore were it not the case that the possibility of  being communicated in language 
already essentially belongs to the object as such. But without eidetic reduction, the 
objectivity of  the object could only be made sense of  in metaphysical realist terms. 
The equiprimordiality of  ideal possibilities that I presume lends a different slant to 
Husserl’s ostensive question in the Origin: “how does geometrical ideality (like that of  all 
sciences) proceed from its primary intrapersonal origin, where it is a structure within the 
conscious space of  the first inventor's soul, to its ideal objectivity?" (UG 161) The question 
re-presents itself  as retrospective; it is the same question, but now enquiring after the way 
in which an intrasubjective origin can be conceived, rather than enquiring after the way in 
which the passage from intrasubjectivity to intersubjectivity could have been blazed. How 
can the object ever come to be constituted within the psychic life of  the individual when its 
coming to be depends on a coherence of  intersubjective relations? If  the object is 
originarily intrasubjective—as both the particular theory of  geometry’s invention and the 
intrasubjective origin and destination of  all indubitable evidence in general demand—then 
it must get started before and independently of  these intersubjective faculties. At least, this 
is the ‘story’ we would have to expect from an account of  objectivity on the basis of  
factually existing psychical and social faculties. Speaking as Husserl is of  ideal possibilities, 
no such linear progression is necessary. The intrasubjective origin of  geometrical objects is 
entirely consistent with the already possible intersubjectivity on which it indeed depends. 
 
The object is constituted within consciousness at the ‘moment’ in which it becomes 
an idea, and only ever becomes so according to the essences which determine both the 
activity of  consciousness and the essence of  the objects which it can intend; “In the 
essence of  the mental process itself  lies not only that it is consciousness but also whereof  
it is consciousness, and in which determinate or indeterminate sense it is that.” (Id I 74). 
The synthesising activity of  consciousness is responsible for any presentation or intuition; 
“If  consciousness were not a referring consciousness, possessing the capacity, the ‘ability’ 
(Vermögen) to bring the empty, indirect, indefinite ‘intended’ to fulfillment, then it would not 
have any intentionally given object.” (Held, “Method” 14) That is, the raw perceptions 
available to consciousness are never sufficient for the derivation of  an object; it is not 
                                                                                                                                          
absolute adequacy of any experience of it by dint of its exactly determined identity. It is not due to 
any existential difference. 
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enough for perceptions, in Held’s metaphor, to wash ashore like flotsam (or jetsam). 
Consciousness is not like a beach waiting to receive whatever washes up on it, it must seek 
out and acquire objects according to their essences; this, again, is why Held emphasises the 
description of  consciousness as ‘intentional’ (see Held, “Method” 14). The essential 
structures determine consciousness’ activity from the start, notwithstanding the “vivid self-
evidence” (UG 163) of  originary immediacy which fades away without offering any lasting 
construction, and which looks like something which is present to consciousness but prior 
to the stability of  an eidos—the repeatability of  an idea already belongs to such originary 
formations even as they fade away, which is Husserl’s whole point in mentioning them as 
the passivity of  what has faded away and finally disappeared but remains the basis for a 
possible ‘reawakening’ (see UG 163). At the moment of  a first consciousness of  an object 
the possibility of  being re-presented in consciousness and expressed in language already 
belongs to it, without which there can be no idea and no consciousness. Originary 
intrasubjective constitution of  an ideal object is possible because it is only the pure 
possibility of  language, a community of  empathy, history, even of  repetition, that is 
necessary, not their effective, factual coming-to-bear or into play. The ideality of  the object 
is nothing but the possibility of  this coherence of  various ideal structures.58 
 
Repeatability makes the objectifying structure of  consciousness possible by 
ensuring the self-identity of  the idea it intends. Repeatability is already necessary in order 
for the object, the thing which can be repeated, to exist at all. The possibility of  linguistic 
expression is necessary in order to explain the possibility of  the object’s mutual recognition 
in an intersubjective community (a possibility which particular objects, according to their 
type and circumstance may or may not possess due to the presence of  obstacles or their 
insufficient exactitude, but which belongs to objects in general as such),59 and not because 
of  the empirical effectiveness which constitutes its outward function, an effectiveness 
                                                
58 James C. Morrison points out, the questions of the intrasubjective origin of the idea of geometry 
is twinned with the question of its coming-to-be objective: “As Husserl's argument unfolds, 
however it becomes clear that it is not merely the first evidence that was actively produced but the 
idealities or objectivities themselves” (Morrison “Husserl's ‘Crisis’: Reflections on the Relationship 
of Philosophy and History” 327) 
59 This connection between originary evidence, essence and language may not be explicitly made by 
Husserl, but it should be—without eidetic cognition, there is no evidence, and while language is not 
materially necessary for ideal objectivity it is necessary for ideal objectivity as a possibility already 
belonging to it. Language is necessary, therefore, in the full eidetic sense of Husserl’s entire 
reflection on objectivity—as a possibility. 
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which is merely ancillary with regards to its pure essence—this is one of  Derrida most 
incisive findings in Voice and Phenomenon; 
“Thus all of  what constitutes the actuality of  what is uttered, the physical 
incarnation of  the Bedeutung, the body of  speech, which in its ideality belongs to an 
empirically determinate language, is, if  not outside discourse, at least foreign to expressivity 
as such, to this pure intention without which no discourse would be possible.” (VP 28–29) 
The essential interiority of  language is a central preoccupation for Derrida in Voice 
and Phenomenon, and a principal target of  his criticism. It should be obvious from the most 
fundamentally transcendental priorities of  phenomenology that it is the object of  
consciousness (Bewußtseinsobjekte), ideally existing and therefore not contingent on either 
material or psychological factual being, which is the basis for any ideality, thus for 
repeatability and language but also for community and finally for history. In all of  his 
enquiries it is impossible to understand the coherence of  Husserl’s project without 
following his attention to the priority of  intentionality as the basis of  the 
phenomenological approach. 
 
Communication is essential in this edifice from the start as the activity which can 
constitute a “community of  monads” (CM 107), but the mechanism of  communication—
language—is only thematised in this capacity in the Origin.60 Language is what makes 
community as such and in whatever form possible; “One is conscious of  civilization from 
the start as an immediate and mediate linguistic community.” (UG 162) Husserl is able to 
assume the role language plays in communication without analysing it up until the writing 
of  the Origin perhaps because it is only there, with the critique, that it becomes necessary to 
thematise the particular sphere of  reality that language, and history, constitute, just as it 
became necessary to thematise intersubjectivity only in the fifth cartesian meditation, even 
though it was already assumed by the account of  objectivity offered as early as Ideas I. The 
reality given to us in language and history is not a derivative one, as Carr attests; “the 
‘sedimented prominences’ that form the background of  my encounter with the world are 
in large measure the ‘deposits’ not of  original experiences but of  communication” (Carr, 
Problem 109)—and in the Origin of  Geometry it at long last gets its due. 
 
                                                
60 I mean to draw a distinction here between the role of language in communication and the 
construction of objectivity as it is described in the Origin and the abstract discourse on “Expression 
and meaning” in the first investigation (See LU 181-233). 
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Language is the ‘living body’ (Leib) of  the ideal object in which it is constituted as 
an object, freed from its confinement to the psychic interiority of  its inventor’s originary 
thought—“the conscious space of  the first inventor's soul” (UG 161)—and made into an 
objective idea, available to anyone, as is the case for instance with geometry; “geometrical 
existence is not psychic existence; it does not exist as something personal within the 
personal sphere of  consciousness; it is the existence of  what is objectively there for 
‘everyone’ (for actual and possible geometers, or those who understand geometry)” (UG 
160).61 Geometry, from its origin, is objective—and anything which is ideal is objective only 
because it is (or rather, can be) made available to all in language. 
Language is thus brought into the originary moment of  ideality and objectivity 
themselves—it is not a form into which the idea is transformed once it has already been 
constituted, but is equiprimordial with the idea and its objectivity and constitutive of  it, as 
Derrida emphasises; 
Whether geometry can be spoken about is not, then, the extrinsic and 
accidental possibility of  a fall into the body of  speech or of  a slip into a 
historical movement. Speech is no longer the expression (Äusserung) of  what, 
without it, would already be an object: caught again in its primordial purity, 
speech constitutes the object and is a concrete juridical condition of  truth. 
(IOG 77)62 
The objectivity of  the idea means just the same thing that objectivity means for 
anything else—that it is, first of  all, and that its existence is not, at least in principle, private, 
but the possibility belongs to it of  being experienced by any other subject. The difference 
in the objectivity of  the idea is that it does not present itself  to the subject with its own 
materiality, but borrows the materiality of  language, taking on a “linguistic living body 
[Sprachleib]” (UG 161). Derrida makes a very odd translation choice when he adopts this 
term, calling it “linguistic flesh” (IOG 76), in French “sa chair linguistique” (l’Origine 69).  In 
other places, Derrida emphasises Husserl’s distinction between the terms Leib and Körper 
(see IOG 97 and others), but here Derrida not only uses a term, “chair”, to translate “Leib” 
which is emphatically closer to the sense of  Körper, he does so in a context in which 
Husserl’s distinction is implicitly at issue. Nevertheless, his observation is, as ever, acute; 
                                                
61 See also UG 161: “objective structure which, e.g., as geometrical concept or state of affairs, is in 
fact present as understandable by all 
and is valid, already in its linguistic expression as geometrical speech, as geometrical proposition, 
for all the future in its geometrical sense” 
62 It is puzzling that Derrida calls this liberation through language and ‘historical incarnation’ 
‘paradoxical’. If it is a paradox, it is exceedingly easy to resolve once we have taken into account the 
eidetics of history and language and the reduction of factuality. 
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this Sprachleib, Derrida writes, “would be absolutely bound to the psychological life of  a factual 
individual, to that of  a factual community, indeed to a particular moment of  that life” (IOG 
77). Derrida describes what he calls the paradoxical emancipation of  the idea through its 
incarnation with the most transparent delight, remarking on ‘our’ possible “surprise” 
(surprendre and étonner) repeatedly, at its ingenuity. This liberation is the difference between 
the ‘psychic object’ the existence of  which is in the intrasubjective, and is thus ‘bound’ in 
the way Derrida describes (see IOG fn71), and the (relative) ‘freedom’ of  an ideal object 
which has come to be through a kind of  incarnation in language. However, the meaning of  
this ‘liberation’ is easily misunderstood in a couple of  ways—first, language is, as we have 
seen, not a late addition which transforms a ‘psychic object’ into an ideal one, nor is there 
any ontological distinction between two ‘types’ of  objects; rather, all objects are already 
objective, in part by virtue of  being capable, in the absence of  any obstacles or vague 
indeterminacies, of  acquiring such a Sprachleib, and the freedom of  the ideal object from its 
bondage to an intrapsychical existence is just that; not the addition of  a body but the 
elimination of  its qualification, of  a hitherto necessary qualification which had determined 
its sense as essentially peculiar to that individual subjectivity. Second, an object liberated in 
this way, by being capable of  being expressed in language, can yet be a ‘bound ideality’ and 
not a free one, as I explained at length in chapter two, since it is of  course possible to give 
expression to objects the meaning of  which are bound to a particular ideal context. 
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b. Coherent ideal possibilities 
 
As important as language is in providing the ideal object with its ‘linguistic body’ it is not 
the only possibility essential to the idea’s constitution. In this section I will explain the 
function of  history within the coherence of  ideality. The place of  history therein is the 
reason for this treatment of  Husserl’s Origin of  Geometry and to a great extent the point of  
that text as well. I began this thesis with a preparation of  the reason crisis is essentially 
historical—why the devastation of  science must be understood in terms of  its own 
historical development and the teleology which orients it. This explained the way that the 
problem of  history emerged for Husserl, and how the critique of  science shaped his efforts 
to provide a phenomenological account of  history. Next I set out the way in which a 
history that is ideal is demanded and prepared by the eidetic orientation of  
phenomenological science, why it is eidetic history alone which can ground science, and 
what ideal history can mean as distinct from ‘factual history’. All of  this makes evident that 
history is not an independent phenomenon and cannot profitably be understood purely 
with regards to its own essence. History, far from denoting the pure flux of  historical 
change, has shown itself  to be for the most part concerned with change’s conditions of  
possibility. It is rather what makes it possible for certain historical things to stand outside 
of  time and pure flux. It is history as an ekstasis in perhaps the converse of  Heidegger’s use 
of  the word; a standing outside of  time that makes it possible to serve as the basis of  any 
change, as the standing outside of  change which is the only way any discourse or 
identification of  change is possible. Lawlor captures this “‘paradoxical historicity’ (LOG 
48/59)” (Lawlor, Derrida and Husserl; The Basic Problem of  Phenomenology 110) of  truth 
concisely; “it seems to have broken with all empirical content of  real history and yet it 
seems to be irreducibly connected to history since it is the only means by which real history 
has continuity.” (Lawlor, Derrida and Husserl 110) 
Historicity belongs to all essences and must be understood in terms of  the whole 
coherence that make any ideality, hence any consciousness, possible. That history depends 
upon the other parts of  this coherence is what Husserl is concerned with showing in the 
Origin, perhaps more so than the character of  history itself, even as one of  these parts. 
History is just as much dependent upon language, objectivity and community as they are on 
each other—but this interdependence is in a sense uncharacteristic for history since it is these 
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other idealities which necessitate an accommodation of  the atemporal within history—at the 
very heart of  history, since there can be no history without them. The existence of  history 
requires other idealities whose stability makes possible the pure essence of  history. In this 
section I will explain how history is only possible on the basis of  the other idealities, and 
also how history is essential to ideal objectivity. 
 
There are two shapes that the considerations of  history take in the Origin—there is 
the ultimate Rückfrage and the discussion of  reactivation on the one hand and, what may 
appear to be a separate consideration, the much more detailed and technically advanced 
treatment of  the conditions for the persistence and invulnerability of  ideas. However, it is 
only on the basis of  the historical structure of  ideas that any historical enquiry is possible. 
Ideal history as a project encompasses the whole—the structure of  history that makes 
inquiry possible and the historical inquiry which not only illuminates the structure, but 
brings it into being as a retrospectively determined essential condition of  any present 
experience. 
Perhaps it is in part for this reason that Husserl employs the more vague term 
’Tradition’ (Tradition) when first presenting the importance of  the science as a protection 
against perdure,63 and that which has been saved from perdurance itself, eschewing for a 
moment the clarity of  the distinction his language makes possible between ‘Geschichte’, 
which concerns actually past historical factuality, and ‘Historie’, which concerns its 
recounting or study, as if  he would’ve preferred the equivocity of  French’s ‘histoire’ or 
English’s ‘history’ celebrated by Jacques Ranciere in The Names of  History. It’s a distinction 
he never really seems to make much of, anyway.64 For the most part, however, Husserl’s 
                                                
63 See UG 158 
64 Derrida mentions this, too. See IOG 27fn. Heidegger had likewise insisted on the ontological 
contiguity between the historical narration or study and its historical object, accusing ‘Historie’ of 
having neglected ‘Geschichte’ in its preoccupation with the method and certainty of its own 
procedures: “Thus the basic phenomenon of history [Geschichte], which is prior to any possible 
thematizing by historiology [Historie] and underlies it, has been irretrievably put aside.” (Heidegger, 
Being and Time 427; German interpolations from Hiedegger, Sein und Zeit 375) Heidegger demanded 
a renewed investigation of the structures of historicity (Geschichtlichkeit) themselves and its 
rootedness in temporality; Geschichtlichkeit is a turn from the critical study of history as a secondary 
account (like factual history) to the investigation of the existential historicity of modes of being 
themselves––“the existential-ontological constitution of historicality” (Heidegger, Being 428; 
Heidegger, Sein 376)––which makes such secondary accounts and inquiries possible. Their 
common-ground is itself no historical contingency––both ideal history and ontological 
Geschichtlichkeit denote the historicity of existence (at least of certain kinds of existence) and the 
existence of any given history without which no history is possible. They show that the limits of 
history are contiguous with its existence, and also that no investigation which traverses those limits 
is properly historical or relevant to history. In other words, they deny the distinction between 
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concern with history permeates the text, encompasses its problem and yet remains 
unnamed—the entire question of  the origin of  the ideal object is a question as to the 
structure of  history. Repeatability for the individual and intersubjective availability to the 
entire community (and hence its communicability between them) are both necessary for 
ideal objectivity, but it is its persistence and invulnerability to change—its fundamental 
historicity—which finally, and most problematically, makes it objective in every sense that is 
phenomenologically—one might even say ‘logically’—meaningful, and without it there can 
be no sense to mathematical truth or to any ideality at all. 
The core of  Husserl’s explanation of  how the ideal object comes into being, and 
particularly how it comes to enjoy the peculiar power of  historical endurance is laid out in a 
few brief  pages (UG 162–164), although the explanation of  this development concerns 
most of  the rest of  the text. The basis of  history is virtually already in place once the 
individual, using his own capacity for recollection, has extended the idea beyond the instant 
of  its invention (“the original being-itself-there, in the immediacy [Aktualität] of  its first 
production” [UG 163]) in which that event occurs. Essentially, it is in place even earlier 
with the potential for repetition which belongs to the idea in that first production. As 
Derrida will point out, there is already for Husserl an essential primordial intersubjectivity 
in the “going out from self-to-self ” (IOG 150) of  intentionality, which is “the root of  
historicity” (IOG 150) With this capacity, the idea is already endowed with the 
‘repeatability’ which in principle frees it from an absolutely unique and isolated moment 
and extends it through time—“the capacity for repetition at will with the self-evidence of  
the identity (coincidence of  identity) of  the structure throughout the chain of  repetitions” 
(UG 163)—but in essence brings it into existence in the first place. The persistence which 
history makes possible through community, language and finally writing seems almost a 
technicality. However, these modifications are all crucial, since their possibility is already 
essential to any internal, egoic recollection or reactivation65, and hence to any egoic 
originary production whatsoever. It is the possibility of  these preserving and disseminating 
idealities which makes intentionality their root. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
epistemic access to the historical and historical existence that warrants the emphasis on the 
epistemic problem that has preoccupied most so-called theoretical thinking about history (de 
Certeau, Ranciere, Foucault) and enables the postulation of an epistemic relation to an existentially 
absent past; a contradictory temporality that masquerades as complex systemic clarity. 
65 Derrida discusses the dependence of repetition on the sign in Voice and Phenomenon. 
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The ‘next’ things after objectivity in the limited (and, indeed, dependent and 
deficient) sense of  ‘identity’ is established in repeatability are “the function of  empathy and 
fellow mankind as a community of  empathy and of  language” (UG 163) in which the ‘full’ 
sense of  objectivity is ‘realised’—objectivity as the availability in principle to everyone. 
Husserl is writing here about the function of  empathy, etcetera, indicating that it is no 
particular empathetic act or relation which makes this full(er) sense of  objectivity 
possible—it is the possibility of  empathy as such which is at issue here. As soon as there is 
the possibility of  a community of  empathy and language, the object is already attained in 
its full, intersubjective sense (though only because as soon as there is community and 
language there is history itself). Although Husserl sometimes employs the language of  
development and progression, as though there were a chronological series from original 
evidence to repetition to communication to preservation (See UG 162–63)—a genesis of  
the development of  ideal objectivity—there is never anything, no phenomenological object 
or act, without all the resources of  ideality already there. This spontaneous and all-at-once 
flourishing is possible because phenomenality requires only the possibility of  the whole 
coherence. What is essential is not for communication to actually occur in order for the 
idea to be preserved. Though that may indeed be necessary for factual persistence of  the 
given idea, such factual persistence is not what constitutes the idea as an ideal object, or its 
permanence. The existence of  the ideal object, a possibility itself, is determined only and 
sufficiently by the pure possibility of  repeatability, community and the rest. Because all of  
the conditions for ideality are possibilities, there neither can nor need be a linear acquisition 
of  each of  them one at a time. Ideality exists as an interdependent structure which comes 
into being spontaneously—not one of  these is already there as a possibility, but all of  them 
are.  
The impossibility of  different stages of  objectivity is the reason there are not 
actually more and less objective objects or ‘full’ objects and somehow not quite full 
objects—the intersubjectively available object is not ‘full’ in comparison to a limited or 
partial object which belongs merely to the individual, rather, as I explained in the previous 
section—ideal objectivity is the way of  being of  all objects whatever. It is only on the basis 
of  an already inherent potential for being communicated and preserved that the most 
factually basic trait of  objectivity—original evidence—can exist. The object which is not 
communicable or permanent is distinguished not because it is an intermediate ‘stage’ in a 
development, but because of  a modification to its own ideal objectivity—a modification in 
its essence which is necessary for its sense, as I explained previously with the example of  
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Proust’s Madeleines. The special state of  the simply-put ‘ideal object’ which belongs to 
ideal science such as mathematics and geometry, the ‘free ideality’, is special not because it 
alone is permanent, but because it alone is permanent in an unqualified sense. 
 
The difficulty of  understanding the interrelation and complexity of  ideality with its 
various ‘parts’ is what dictates Husserl’s periodic description of  the coherence as though it 
were a progressive stage-by-stage development. If  we speak of  the capacity for 
communication as an acquisition it is possible to understand how by way of  it “The 
productions can reproduce their likenesses from person to person, and in the chain of  the 
understanding of  these repetitions what is self-evident turns up as the same in the 
consciousness of  the other.” (UG 163) This can be understood as something made 
possible in the coherence by ‘communication’ which is not possible by way of  
‘repeatability’ alone, even though there is no repeatability alone. If  there were repeatability 
alone, as in a developmental stage-based model, then it would not have the capacities 
required by full objectivity which are provided by communication. The object is available 
(without qualification) in its full, intersubjective sense, to anyone to whom it can be 
communicated. Nevertheless, in order to understand the function of  these different non-
separable parts, it is helpful to talk about them as though their factual effect were what is at 
hand. 
 This is where history as an ideal function comes in—the basis for the property of  
unqualified (in, of  course, any meaningful, phenomenological sense) permanence—without 
which the ideal object is not realised in its full essence. Communication establishes the 
intersubjective availability of  the object, but only among the particular ‘community of  
empathy and of  language’ in which it is launched. This is the case even though it is the pure 
possibility of  language as such that is necessary, and not any particular language, because 
the possibility of  language is essentially the possibility of  some particular language (and the 
same stands for the possibility of  community). That is to say that, considered in itself, 
abstracted from the a priori of  history with which it is essentially always united anyway, 
communication is localised—it depends on the survival of  a given community, or 
reasonably non-disruptive modifications thereof, capable of  maintaining the object through 
internal communication. In Husserl’s words; “What is lacking is the persisting existence of  
the "ideal objects" even during periods in which the inventor and his fellows are no longer 
wakefully so related or even are no longer alive.” (UG 164) We must remember that this 
abstraction of  community without history is a fiction—the possibility of  such a thing is 
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not apparent. There are thus no examples we could give of  such a state, no consequences 
to be drawn with relevance to factual circumstances. Historicism is not due to an existential 
difference of  this sort—historically specific meanings are simply the result of  the historical 
specificity of  those meanings, not to a different way of  existing. It is not because of  the 
regional particularity of  the very means of  its objectification that an object at this stage 
lacks the sense of  unqualified permanence and universality which is essential to objectivity, 
leaving it vulnerable to the kind of  loss and change that introduces the possibility of  a 
community for which it does not appear as an objective idea, thus leaving it open to the 
possibility of  relativism. 
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c. Writing across time 
 
It is as what contributes this permanence that Husserl introduces writing; the possibility of  
writing is what makes something historical, in the sense of  standing outside of  a particular 
time.66 The material possibility of  the a priori of  history; writing effects a ‘sedimentation’ of  
the sensibly experienceable sign on which the ideal signification depends. The sign which, 
as a verbal sign, had been the condition for the liberation from its origin within the 
individual psyche, its expansion to the intersubjective realm, here once again, now as a 
written sign, is the condition for its expansion beyond the community to which the 
originating genius can address himself, simply because in being written down the sign is 
preserved and made independent of  the temporal limitations of  the viva voce; “The 
important function of  written, documenting linguistic expression is that it makes 
communications possible without immediate or mediate personal address; it is, so to speak, 
communication become virtual.” (UG 164) Made virtual, Husserl claims, because 
communication can be effected, in a virtual sense, even during periods in which no 
signifying or attention is occurring, that is, even while no writer is actively writing and no 
reader is actively reading, the sign still contains within its ‘corporeality’ the potential for 
such reactivation. The function of  writing is really quite straightforward, though the ideals of  
permanence and objectivity can obscure it; the object sedimented in writing lies dormant, 
preserved by the solidity of  its material expression, able to be reactivated at any time, by 
anyone. This is permanence and universality in contrast to the dependence on ‘immediate 
or mediate personal address’ necessary in order for verbal language to make its objects 
intersubjectively valid. Through ‘personal address’, verbal communication must maintain an 
uninterrupted chain of  signification from subject to subject, and onwards. Writing, on the 
other hand, allows the object to persist “even during periods in which the inventor and his 
fellows are no longer wakefully so related or even are no longer alive” (UG 164); it frees 
the object from the temporal and regional limitations of  verbal signification by putting the 
signification into a form which can traverse continents (allowing communication between 
those who are far too distant to speak to one-another); and ages (allowing preservation in 
                                                
66 This theme is of immense importance for Derrida in his treatment of Husserl, as well as in the 
development of his own mature philosophy. The theme of writing has been the focus of extensive 
scholarly attention, notably Rodolphe Gasché, The Tain of the Mirror; and Geoffrey Bennington and 
Jacques Derrida, Jacques Derrida. 
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archives without the intercession of  the sensible experience and reception thereof  by any 
living subject), practically freeing it from any qualification of  its universality as would be 
necessary if  it were only available to certain temporally or geographically specific 
communities. As Derrida remarks; "By absolutely virtualizing dialogue, writing creates a 
kind of  autonomous transcendental field from which every present subject can be absent." 
(IOG 88) This ‘autonomous transcendental field’, far from referring to an impossible kind 
of  anomaly is (as a ‘subjectless transcendental field’) invoked by Jean Hyppolite as the 
condition of  possibility of  transcendental subjectivity as such, to paraphrase Derrida (see 
IOG 88). By freeing its object from the necessity of  intersubjective continuity of  
transmission in speech and the collective identity ineluctable in the “community of  
speaking subjects” (IOG 88) without which there can be no speech, writing bestows on its 
object the independence from every particular subject. 
Even enduring oral traditions, for the very reason that they are ‘traditions’, do not 
possess this power. Oral preservation requires exactly that continuity of  “immediate or 
mediate personal address” (UG 164) and maintenance as an uninterrupted tradition. There 
is no possibility of  the tradition passing beyond the ‘community’, because in any 
meaningful sense of  the word the only people to whom the tradition could be passed 
would belong to a community already. And yet, writing also requires some kind of  
communality insofar as the legibility of  its marks must be maintained. 
But is writing really necessary for this achievement? Is this anonymity not already a 
feature of  the object in its intersubjective availability? Is Hyppolite not right in making the 
subjectless transcendental field the condition of  any transcendental phenomenology? 
Certainly, but this does not mean that writing, or to remain exact; the pure possibility of  
writing, is an extrinsic and secondary technology. On the contrary, it indicates that writing 
is already essential to the most fundamental transcendental subjectivity, to the formation of  
any ideal object, and to “absolute Objectivity” (IOG 88). As Derrida maintains: “a 
subjectless transcendental field is one of  the ‘conditions’ of  transcendental subjectivity” 
(IOG 88), and writing is “the sine qua non condition of  Objectivity’s internal completion” 
(IOG 89). 
This temporal freedom granted in writing, so to speak, is not absolute freedom 
from any temporal particularity or other condition whatsoever. If  the ideal object was free 
in such an absolute way (which would only be possible, as Derrida remarks, by positing 
either “a ‘scarcely altered’ conventional platonism” (IOG 42) or a ‘hidden history’ of  the 
type implied in an idealism which removes the origin and existence of  such ideas to a world 
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beyond or a history before)67 they would in no way be historical. I have exhaustively shown 
that history in the phenomenological sense is predicated on various continuities, not least 
of  which is the continuity of  community. We have already seen that community is 
necessary for objectivity of  the ideal type which is the only one of  concern to Husserl, and 
community is just as much a necessity for writing as it is for verbal communication. At the 
very least, a linguistic community is necessary in order to maintain the legibility of  written 
signs, but Husserl also specifies a univocity in the case of  pure or unqualified ideal objects 
which denotes a community free of  ambiguation. Thus, even if  writing frees the object 
from continuity of  linguistic expression, it does not free it from the necessity of  a 
continuity of  linguistic community. To put it simply, the ideal object’s persistence in writing 
depends on the persistence of  a community for whom the writing remains legible. Is a 
sense of  permanence which is dependent on community strong enough to account for 
objectivity in any and all phenomenologically meaningful senses? 
The sense of  permanence demanded by objectivity understood in the full 
phenomenological sense does not, like all of  the other essential characteristics of  
objectivity, make any reference positive or otherwise to being which transcends the 
possibility of  any experience thereof. Or to put it in positive terms—the phenomenological 
object will be one which may be intuited by anyone at all, given the opportunity. There is 
never any expectation—nonsensical in phenomenological terms—that the object also exist 
independently of  the possibility of  any intuition thereof. So, the demands for full eternality 
put on the object are satisfied so long as for anyone at any time the object can be intended. 
There is of  course nothing about objectivity which requires that anyone can intuit the 
object in fact—rather, the possibility of  obstacles to its intuition belong to an object as 
such. There is always the possibility that no lion will be intuited by me as a “flesh and 
blood lion” (IOG 71), as Derrida puts it, or even that I or some other actual subject had 
never been made familiar with the sense of  ‘lion’ due to the contingency of  the language I 
know or the community to which I belong (or even a particularly remarkable lapse in my 
education within a language which nevertheless includes the idea of  the lion), if  I just 
happen never to have the opportunity to see or hear or in any other way obtain an 
impression of  any lion, or on the other hand if  I just happened never to have intended the 
object expressed by the word ‘lion’—but in no sense does it thereby cease to be an object. 
                                                
67 The presupposition of a world or domain from which ideas come or in which they dwell, but 
which is itself hidden from view and out into which our enquiries cannot trespass is the important 
difference between Husserl and a Kantian ‘intraworldly’ history which Derrida discussed in detail 
(see IOG 38-42) 
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Its objectivity only means that given the opportunity and the absence of  all obstacles 
anyone is able to intuit it. Even more so—the pure ideal object of  mathematics can readily 
be concealed from me if  I do not have the training—that is, if  I have not learned “the 
language of  mathematics” (Galileo, “Assayer” 237–38), in Galileo’s words,—necessary in 
order to conceive it. But it is not any less an object and fully objective for that—in fact, its 
objectivity presupposes that it is not in fact given to everyone—and in just the same way 
entire cultures or epochs can come and go without any factual intention of  particular 
objects, especially if  they do not possess the particular language necessary in order to 
intend such an object, without it ceasing to exist. Something like this happened to the 
Egyptian hieroglyphs, which had been forgotten until the discovery of  the Rosetta stone in 
1799 (see Merzbach and Boyer, Mathematics 9). The existence of  the ideal object depends 
not on a factual intention of  the object but on the possibility of  the consciousness of  the 
object, which is in turn dependent on language, community and the rest of  the parts of  the 
edifice of  ideality, but in like fashion it is not dependent on their particular factuality but on 
their pure possibility. Thus, the eternality of  the ideal object depends not on the continuity 
of  any particular language in which it has been preserved or translated, but on the pure 
possibility of  language as such—it is only if  the pure possibility of  language (and 
community) itself  is devastated that the object has ceased to be, no longer has the 
possibility of  being brought to consciousness, and has ceased to exist in any meaningful 
sense whatsoever. But in such an apocalyptic circumstance there is no world and no 
existence either. As long as there is the possibility of  language (and thus of  its whole 
essential network, including objectivity itself), the ideal object persists as the basis for the 
possibility of  its rediscovery. 
If  it seems incredible that ‘mere’ possibilities of  things like language and 
community can issue in actually existent things, objects, which depend on them, that is 
because it is, or would be were that the situation which of  the object. Until now I have 
been describing the coherence of  ideal possibilities in terms of  their necessity for the ideal 
object, which could give the impression that the object is the product of  this structure and 
that objectivity is in an asymmetrical relationship to the rest. It is easier to describe the 
coherence when we have an idea of  an ‘outcome’, and the ideal object is the reason for the 
elucidation of  the others in the historical enquiry into the origin of  geometry of  Husserl. 
But in terms of  the interrelationship of  the ideal possibilities themselves, which is crucial 
for the adequate understanding of  the conditions of  geometry’s birth, as well as in order to 
understand the meaning of  history, there is no such priority. The ideal possibilities as a 
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cohering whole would just as well be necessary in order to account for any one of  them. I 
explained in the first section of  this chapter how we can see this plainly in the fifth 
Cartesian Meditation, in which objectivity and community mutually constitute one another. 
Dependence is mutual between community and objectivity, because it is as a subject who 
intends objects and an objective world that she shares or can share with me that other 
subjects and the community of  subjects are, as subjects, given to me. The shared objective 
world is essential for the intersubjective sphere which constitutes it, because it is in their 
having-a-world that other subjects are themselves constituted as subjects: “he is thus 
constituted as having ‘his own’ world just as I do” (Carr, Problem 96). Without the 
possibility of  objectivity, the possibility of  community which constitutes the possibility of  
objectivity could never be constituted. 
The same goes for even the most apparently ‘primordial’ of  the possibilities—
repeatability. There could not be repeatability without an object to be brought to 
consciousness again. The reason that the symmetry of  this structure is so important is that 
it shows that the apparent ‘goal’ of  an object is not a goal, but just an essential part of  the 
whole process—its appearance as goal-like is merely a consequence of  Husserl’s starting 
place, the point at which he enters the hermeneutic circle. What this means is that the 
ostensive ‘product’—the ideal object, is not meant to be something of  a different kind than 
what went into it. The object sought does not need to be some sort of  absolute object; it is 
not an object in anything more or less than the phenomenological sense. The possible ideas 
of  language, history, and so on are sufficient in their modality, because it is only the 
possibility of  an object which is needed in order to explain the existence of  a geometrical 
object in the most robust sense which is still meaningful. 
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4 – History delayed 
 
Not only does Derrida’s Introduction to the Origin of  Geometry carefully bring Husserl’s subtle 
navigations of  the meaning of  history across the entire development of  his thought to 
light in its exquisite consistency, careful at every step to avoid the Scylla and Charybdis of  
historicism and platonism, but he finds in the improbable locus of  Husserl’s reflections 
on—and defence of  the phenomenological meaningfulness of—the origin and its essence a 
meaning somehow consistent with the notion of  their infinite elusiveness, which was to 
become most characteristic of  his work and the basis for the thought of  deconstruction; 
that which united difference and delay. It is a notion which seems to be nothing if  not the 
fundamental denial of  the sense of  origin. This is no hasty conclusion—the idea that the 
origin that phenomenology can and must investigate is one that is somehow consistent with 
its deferral is carefully anticipated and prepared through the entirety of  Derrida’s study, 
which weaves together the short text of  the Origin with a carefully studied reading of  
Husserl’s entire project reaching back before the origin of  transcendental phenomenology 
all the way to Logical Investigations and even The Philosophy of  Arithmetic in order to 
demonstrate the necessity of  a historical phenomenology anticipated in all of  Husserl’s 
most important philosophical positions, from the refutation of  psychologism to the 
proposal of  ideal history. Even Husserl’s reduction of  history in Ideas I is explained by 
Derrida as anticipating a history of  a different kind (see IOG 43–44). And the kind of  
history and historical meaning which phenomenology can and must offer is essentially one 
in which the thought of  delay is irreducible (see IOG 153). 
At the end of  his Introduction Derrida asks the question that launched his 
philosophical career: is there a philosophy that respects the primordial consciousness of  
delay? The idea of  delay as primordial maintains philosophy within its historical moment—
the thinking of  philosophy is bound up with its historicity and the two can never become 
disentangled. Reduction, Derrida says, is such a consciousness “in the lackluster guise of  a 
technique” (IOG 153)—it is “pure thought investigating the sense of  itself  as delay within 
philosophy” (IOG 153), which is to say, the fundamental and contradictory self-critique 
that thought is the deferral of  itself. Here Derrida launches the basic notions of  difference 
and delay, or as he will later bring them together (while not reducing the tension that this 
must involve) according to his own coinage—‘differance’ (différance)—the irreducible play 
of  differing and deferral which ‘precedes’ any identity or presence (see PP 165-66), which 
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is already hinted at here: “the Absolute is present only in being deferred-delayed [différant]” 
(IOG 153). The constancy of  delay in philosophy and thought is due on the one hand to 
the truism that its origin or originary principle is always preceded by a prior origin; “Here 
delay is the philosophical absolute, because the beginning of  methodic reflection can only 
consist in the consciousness of  the implication of  another previous, possible, and absolute 
origin in general.” (IOG 152) This thought echoes George Eliot’s at the beginning of  
Daniel Deronda—“No retrospect will take us to the true beginning; and whether our 
prologue be in heaven or on earth, it is but a fraction of  that all-presupposing fact with 
which our story sets out.” (Eliot, Daniel Deronda 3) But although it is a truism that every 
origin is itself  only the issue of  a prior origin (save, perhaps, one), with the idea of  delay 
Derrida explains both reduction and transcendental enquiry as the critique of  deferral in 
thought itself—that it is not merely the object of  consciousness that is ‘in medias res’, as Eliot 
shows, but the thought which affords a starting point of  any kind at all whether mediate or 
absolute. To bring this to Eliot’s claim—we cannot say that the story alone is in medias res, 
the telling of  it too is always catching up with itself. The delay is already doubled because it 
is not only the delay of  the origin of  the object, but the delay of  the origin of  the 
consciousness which intends the object, also, which deprives thought of  any stable ‘starting 
point’—specifically of  the absolute originality of  the now, the ‘living present’. Later in this 
chapter, I will explain the odd and essentially dual nature of  delay in which the historicity 
of  the search for origins extends us and our meanings infinitely into the past but also 
forwards into a future because the origin is still to come, the way a caterpillar is still to 
come. 
Derrida’s startling and clear insight into Husserl’s phenomenology culminating in 
the Origin is that the “authentic historicity of  thought” (IOG 153) is the consciousness 
within thought of  thought’s own deferral. Reason is possible at all only because it is still on 
its way, as the simultaneous attending its telos and “advancing on [en avancant sur]” (IOG 
153) its origin of  reason that is formalised in the transcendental. History itself  is also on its 
way yet. That is the paradox of  history, and ultimately the paradox of  reason. This ‘rooting’ 
in the ground of  the past that is also a sort of  rootedness in the sky of  telos is the certainty 
of  thought formalised by the transcendental, and according to Derrida “Such a certainty 
never had to learn that Thought would always be to come.” (IOG 153)68 
                                                
68 Transcendentale serait la certitude pure d’une Pensée qui, ne pouvant attendre vers le Telos qui 
s’annonce déjà qu’en avançant sur l’Origine qui indéfiniment se réserve, n’a jamais dû apprendre 
qu’elle serait toujours à venir.” (L’Origine 171) 
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What is the meaning and what are the implications of  a thinking of  consciousness 
as historical in an always deferred sense? Is such a history capable of  doing anything like 
grounding sense and remedying the crisis? Is the need for historicity, and temporality, 
Derrida so adroitly identifies as irreducibly belonging to consciousness satisfied by the 
deferred form thereof  that he just as ably demonstrates it must take? 
 
In this chapter I will discuss and explain Derrida’s reading of  Husserl’s historical 
enquiry and pursuit of  origins as infinite history in which, to paraphrase Derrida, ‘delay is 
the absolute’ (see IOG 152). I will show how this reading of  the infinite within 
transcendental phenomenology exposes the incompleteness of  its search for origin in an 
ontological question that gestures ‘beyond’ the domain of  being and meaning, while 
demonstrating phenomenology’s unimpeachable jurisdiction over not just its own proper 
realm, “the only real world, the one that is actually given through perception” (Crisis 49), 
but also over the opening to that which is neither real nor worldly created by the 
supposedly metaphysical question the sense of  which, Derrida shows, is properly 
phenomenological—“why is there something rather than nothing?” (Leibniz, “Nature and Grace” 
210).  
I’ll pursue this programme in two sections, “The origin to come” and “Delaying 
phenomenology.” The first section explains Derrida’s logic of  delay or deferral; why it is 
the origin and not only the telos that is delayed; and why the origin is delayed rather than 
‘forgotten’ or ‘lost’. The structure of  delay is further explained as a structure of  the basic 
element of  experience—the living present. Derrida argues that the temporal complexity of  
the experience of  the moment as described by Husserl is also the origin of  temporal and 
ontological difference. Difference issues in the same way, at the same moment, and from 
the same source as identity itself. In the meantime, I will also indicate how the thought of  
delay already gestures towards the trademark idea of  differance, in which deferral and 
difference are brought together in a disequilibrious codependence, or rather, explains that 
they both derive from a common origin in the complexity of  the living present. 
In the second section, “Delaying phenomenology,” I will turn my attention to the 
relationship between primordial delay and the search for origins in transcendentalism, 
phenomenology as such, and philosophy at large in order to follow where an infinite 
history leads, and where infinite delay leaves the pursuit of  grounding for science. After 
raising the stakes on the question through an account of  Derrida’s claim that the 
transcendental move, and the search for meaning itself, is a search for origins (or originary 
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principles) that are beyond or other, I announce that for Derrida the origin is not just delayed 
but the origin is delay. Meanwhile, Derrida’s formulation of  the ontological question is laid 
out in terms of  the question of  the origin of  the unity of  fact and sense; after that, I 
explain the priority of  the phenomenological route to what is beyond, even though it is 
beyond, as well as why the ontological does not unseat phenomenology or compromise its 
necessary claim to absolute dominion in being and sense. Finally, the complexity of  the 
living present will be revisited as the origin of  delay, and I will explain why delay is 
grounding enough for phenomenology’s needs. 
 
a. The origin to come 
 
On the face of  it, Derrida’s notion of  ‘delay’ seems to be inappropriate for describing the 
elusiveness of  the origin. The tense seems off—surely if  the origin is lacking it is not due 
to the origin’s ‘delay’, which is not an appropriate way of  speaking about an essentially past 
event. A ‘delay’ of  origin sounds like nonsense in contrast to the plausibility of  something 
like ‘forgottenness’ or ‘disappearance’. Derrida uses the same terms to describe both the 
non-presence of  the origin and that of  the telos/idea, despite the temporal differences they 
imply, rather than reserving ‘delay’ and ‘defer’ for the latter and using a term like ‘forgotten’ 
or ‘elusive’ to refer to non-presence in a way that respects the customary reservation of  the 
relevance of  the discourse of  ‘origin’ for the past and for consciousness and its extensions. 
The forgotten origin is still the origin, while the delayed origin cannot possibly be an origin 
at all—how can it be the origin if  it is delayed, which is to say, ‘still to come’? The origin 
cannot succeed that which it is origin of. This impossibility is precisely Derrida’s point—
the notion of  delay denotes a basic yet easily concealed consequence of  a 
phenomenological rather than merely epistemic historical study. If  the origin is essentially 
inapparent and does not simply fail to appear because of  contingent obstacles, then it is 
not merely forgotten-yet-still-existent. We cannot say with the integrity of  a reduced 
attitude that the origin was, but yet fails to appear. We can, of  course, meaningfully relate to 
phenomena that do not appear except horizonally, as is the case with the origin which is 
not apparent except as a necessity for what is. But when an event is known only by its 
necessity for that which is given in apodeictic evidence, it is crucial to rigorously determine 
the sense of  its necessity, and not to make assumptions of  any kind with regard to it, not 
even as to its temporality. Not all preconditions are in the past. The origin of  geometry is 
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an origin of  an idea, and as an idea it is to come. Because what it is the origin of  is to come, it 
is therefore eminently possible that the origin is on its way as well, the way a caterpillar is to 
come. There is always the possibility of  a new origin, even in the age of  the fully developed 
science. We cannot assume that the origin has already occurred if  that which demonstrates 
its necessity as an origin is still on its way. By saying that the origin is delayed, Derrida 
emphasises that the origin itself, and not just the knowledge of  it, is to come. 
The origin is deferred. The telos is deferred. Deferral, or delay, separates them, from 
each other and from us. A Rückfrage is turned in upon itself, at once leading backwards and 
into its own arrival, a Rückfrage which cannot get started until it is complete. So we beat on, 
seeking the way back into where the ‘going on’ came from. Or is it the other way around? 
“So we beat on, boats against the current, borne back ceaselessly into the past.” (Fitzgerald, 
The Great Gatsby 180) Is there a difference? Is it always both? 
If, as Derrida says, “Teleological sense and the sense of  origin were always mutually 
implicated for him [Husserl]” (IOG 131)—and I am strongly inclined to agree—there is no 
teleology without an origin, certainly, but there is also no origin that is not an origin of  a 
teleology, otherwise it would not be an origin nor would it be capable of  being inscribed 
within any history, since it would be lacking the connection to a sense outside of  itself, 
which is necessary in order to redeem it from the mere isolation of  an absolutely peculiar 
occurrence that is not even an event. Not only is the origin, indeed, delayed, but the 
delayed structure of  the telos is further deferred in that not only its consummation but even 
its inception (which after all are only different aspects of  the same event) is infinitely 
delayed. The problem of  the infinite task and of  the infinite idea is a duplication of  Zeno’s 
paradoxes, because the infinite is not a countable infinite. Achilles must overtake the 
tortoise before he can loose his arrow. The description of  reason as a teleology and infinite 
task is therefore further complicated; it cannot be conceived in the safer way, as a project 
undertaken and not yet completed, for it always remains to be undertaken. It is, perhaps, in 
need of  an undertaker if  we cannot make sense of  its structure or existence. 
This delay matters because it determines the relationship between the origin and 
science, and because the situation is in fact even stranger—not only does the origin wait on 
a telos to come, but there are multiple, or perhaps, as Derrida claims, infinite, ideas with 
multiple origins. I will review what Derrida goes so far as to call a “double reduction” 
(IOG 51), which if  not a double movement is perhaps a double ‘stalling’, a two-fold inertia, 
from both directions. The idea of  pure geometry is delayed insofar as it is predicated upon 
the possibility of  the enquiry into and reactivation of  its origins in order to orient it within 
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the broader ideas of  reason, experience, and philosophy. The telos is not there until the 
origin is. The origin is always delayed, delayed in multiple ways at the same time due to its 
temporal ambiguity; ‘the’ origin is never located, because there is always a deeper and more 
‘extraworldly’ origin preceding it, and because as long as the origin is the origin of  an 
infinite project with a telos that is to come, the origin can always be to come itself. I will 
explain this thought of  Derrida’s in the next paragraph. The origin is delayed in the fullest 
sense of  not yet existing, because the idea is delayed. As long as the idea is not yet ‘here’, 
neither is the origin, which is nothing besides the origin of  ‘it’. The origin is not there until 
the telos is. That is to say, the telos must already present itself  at the origin of  science. Thus, 
the infinite delay is always compounded, whether it is from the direction of  the telos or the 
origin, because before one can get caught up in the delay of  the one, one is already stuck 
with the other. This only means that delay is not simple and cannot be overcome as a static 
structure of  delay, as though it were merely a matter of  ‘waiting it out’. As infinite, it is an 
infinite greater than a countable infinite—it is comparable to an infinite series of  whole 
numbers which we can only get started enumerating once we have counted the infinite 
fractions that come before the first of  them. 
The interdependence of  telos and origin is discussed by Derrida on page 131 of  his 
Introduction in order, first of  all, to explain the relationship between the epochs of  geometry 
as set out by Husserl, and, second, to resolve an apparent discrepancy between the Vienna 
lecture and the Crisis itself  about whether in the mathematics of  antiquity there is, in the 
words of  the Vienna lecture, “the first discovery of  both infinite ideals and infinite tasks” 
(Crisis 293), or whether ancient mathematics and geometry concern “only finite tasks, a 
finitely closed a priori” (Crisis 21), as he writes in the beginning of  part two of  the Crisis. If  
geometry is the infinitisation of  the eide of  all shapes, then, Derrida asks, are not the 
ancient origin of  geometry, which raises the proto-geometrical arts of  shape-study such as 
land-surveying to an infinitely exact ideal, and the modern (Galilean) universalisation of  
geometry, which treats the whole world as pre-existing in those exact mathematical terms, 
both, the one no less than the other, origins? If  the origin of  geometry is nothing more 
than the infinite determination of  spatiotemporal shapes, then, Derrida implies, we cannot 
say that one of  these (say, the factico-chronological one) is the real or true origin, while the 
other is merely a development thereof, an intraworldly development, notwithstanding 
Derrida’s unfortunately-worded claim that “The infinite infinity of  the modern revolution 
can then be announced in the finite infinity of  antiquity’s creation.” (IOG 130) Nor, 
presumably, can we say that the ‘latter’ origin is the origin of  something other than ‘pure’ 
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geometry—simply a different but related discipline. The ‘modern infinitization’ takes 
ancient geometry’s infinite determinability of  the shapes within its system and, by inventing 
the idea of  ‘geometrical space’ (a very different idea from discrete geometrical shapes), 
presupposes in advance that every corporeal thing as well as the world in which they are 
situated is absolutely determinable in geometrical science, although to describe this as a 
progression is already to undermine the modern rebirth’s originality. Both of  these are 
origins of  geometry because both are the origin of  an infinite determination of  shape. 
There can be two such origins because the infinite determinability of  neither the one nor 
the other of  them could be known or anticipated until the event of  its invention. The 
Galilean invention is neither a development of  an already inchoate potentiality nor a ‘taking 
off  in another direction’, and yet it is the origin of  the infinitisation of  the world of  shapes, 
an infinitisation already performed! It is just that the infinitisation that this origin originates 
was not yet invented at the origin of  the prior origin. The origin is therefore doubled. This 
is what makes the origin original! This spurs Derrida to question whether, since there can be 
more than one such origin, geometry might as well have an infinite number of  origins: 
“But if  each new infinitization is a new birth of  geometry in its authentic primordial 
intention (which we notice still remains hidden to a certain extent by the closure of  the 
previous system), we may wonder if  it is still legitimate to speak of  an origin of  geometry.” 
(IOG 130-31) 
This is the logic that leads us to the delay of  the origin: “Must we not say that 
geometry is on the way toward its origin, instead of  proceeding from it?” (IOG 131) It is a 
logic which unsettles the very notion of  ‘origin’. If  the ‘infinitisation’ demanded by reason 
may turn out (as it already seems to have done) not to be a simple (one might say, ‘finite’, 
or at least ‘countable’) infinitude that is invented as a ‘mobile project’ once-and-for-all, then 
the origin is indeed ‘to come’. But what does that mean for ‘origin’, and for a Rückfrage? In 
the logic of  the infinite task, which is of  course the logic of  all rational activity, the origin 
and the telos lose their separateness as fully distinct points and instead “they will be revealed 
fully only through each other at the infinite pole of  history” (IOG 131). The idea of  origin 
as logical as well as genetic principle derives its force from this togetherness. 
 
What is given by a history deferred? If  time is no longer the unveiling ancient of  a 
baroque allegory—an old man exposing the pale bloom of  Truth’s youth in the light of  day 
given to us by Tiepolo (see Tiepolo, Time Unveiling Truth)—, and if  he is no longer the 
141 
father of  Truth, as Francis Bacon said69, is there anything more to it than the disruption of  
certainties and systems? Can we say anything more of  it than, to quote one of  Derrida’s 
favourite phrases, “Time is out of  joint” (Shakespeare, Hamlet Act 1, Scene 5)? Without 
time and history not even the Authority that Bacon refused can give us the beginnings of  
the meaningfulness philosophy and language commit us to. Without the idea of  reduction (in 
the medical sense of  ‘gently’ manipulating back into place what has been dislocated) we 
cannot even say that it is ‘out of  joint’ in the first place—the basis for such normative 
claims of  a member that is in general and in essence articulate is always the idea. If  the 
critique is put, there may yet be hope for time to be reduced, so to speak. Husserl both 
identifies this crisis in its history and proposes a therapy for it through history, specifically a 
history drawn by a therapeutic telos—reactivation. However, it is a telos whose infinite deferral 
may be essential. Is the telos, then, the telos, or is rather the continual and unabated 
disappointment of  its fulfilment the telos? And what is the basis for deciding between these 
possibilities? 
If  the deferral of  the idea is not merely a contingent misfortune of  our epoch, but 
a rule belonging to ideal structures themselves, then is the idea still the idea? Has it not 
been supplanted by the necessity of  its own disappointment? At first glance this question 
seems to recapitulate the dichotomy between equivocity and univocity as the idea of  
language, but the solution to the latter cannot offer any guidance here. The necessity of  
univocity was demonstrated by appeal to its capacity to provide the idea of  language. We 
cannot decide so easily here because the very structure of  the idea and the telos must be 
called into question. The problem, as Derrida addresses it, is that the idea is not given 
phenomenologically; “Husserl never made the Idea itself the theme of  a phenomenological 
description.” (IOG 137) And later on, in Voice and Phenomenon, he examines the 
impossibility of  thinking the infinitude of  the idea. It is there that I will take up this theme 
in the final chapter. 
In the following section I will say more about the relationship of  the notions of  
delay and difference to the mature concept of  différance, though it is worth noting now that 
Derrida adamantly effaced the priority of  this or any other term (here he talks about 
‘primordial Difference’), since the name for what is not a principle or any stable object or 
dynamism undermines itself. For this reason, a few years later, in Differance, Derrida makes 
explicit that what he is talking about is not a term or an idea that can be spoken of  
                                                
69 see Francis Bacon, The New Organon aph. 84: “For, truth is rightly named the daughter of time, 
not of authority.” 
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equivalently through the use of  a number of  different interchangeable terms70; resisting the 
simple idea of  a principle, Derrida claims to derive from the context in which his reading 
occurs a chain of  “nonsynonymic substitutions” (D 142) to which differance lends itself. The 
play of  relationships which differance, difference, delay and others not only signal but are 
caught up in cannot be dominated by a principle to which the others should be compared, 
and so I will resist the dominance by the more well-known names of  the ideas appearing 
only at the end of  the Introduction but orienting the reading before that. 
“Phenomenology is always already late,” Lawlor writes (Lawlor, Derrida and Husserl 
135). Intentionality marks phenomenology with delay. Intentionality marks the movement 
itself, which is built on a foundation inherited from Husserl’s teacher Franz Brentano, in 
this way. As such, it is a science catching up with its discovery—a science lagging behind 
itself. Introduced with the structure of  consciousness as intentionality, the delay, which 
then becomes most conspicuous at the horizons of  temporality, pervades the system; “At 
its greatest depth—i.e., in the pure movement of  phenomenological temporalization as the 
going out from self  to self  of  the Absolute of  the Living Present—intentionality is the 
root of  historicity.” (IOG 150) Historicity, as delay, belongs to the very structure of  
consciousness, even if  it only reveals itself  as such and without concealment at the 
horizon. As Lawlor writes, “The lateness, however, is not ‘a simple and faulty misery’ of  
thought as phenomenology, because phenomenology itself  prescribes historicity for being; 
only phenomenology can give us access to the consciousness of  the Living Present.” 
(Lawlor, Derrida and Husserl  135) 
As Derrida only briefly mentions here, the absolute of  sense is conceived by 
Husserl as always both the constituting and constituted absolute moment—“the unity of  
the noncoincidence and of  the indefinite coimplication of  the constituted and constituting 
moments in the absolute identity of  a Living Present that dialectically projects and maintains 
itself” (IOG 144). Derrida characterises this, against Husserl’s objections, as dialectical in the 
sense that every dialectic is “only the dialectic between the dialectical (the indefinite mutual 
and irreducible implication of  protentions and retentions) and the nondialectical (the 
absolute and concrete identity of  the Living Present, the universal form of  all 
consciousness)” (IOG 143). As the locus of  intentionality, the living present “takes mental 
processes as they offer themselves as unitary temporal processes in reflection on what is 
immanent” (Id I 203). But it has the other aspect that in scientific reflection the 
constitution which creates that unity can be examined only through the complexity that can 
                                                
70 “Differance is neither a word nor a concept. (D 130) 
143 
be experienced in it (and not through a psychological abstraction). The living present is 
constituting because it is the origin of  any sense, constituted since it is not simple in itself; 
it is nondialectical in that it is the single origin of  experience, dialectical in that it has a 
temporal complexity from which it itself  derives. How can we make sense of  these dual 
aspects of  the living present? 
It is this ambiguity of  the present as the absolute origin of  the world that is 
responsible for the sustained paradox of  the constitution of  sameness on the foundation 
of  alterity. The structure of  consciousness, though grounded in the present, is still an 
original historicity. Though absolute (the absolute basis for any experience and thus for the 
phenomenological move), intentionality is never simple—its own absolute basis is the living 
present which is itself  never a simple now-point but what John Drummond describes as a 
“compound intentionality that comprises primal impression, retention, and protention” 
(Drummond, Historical Dictionary of  Husserl’s Philosophy 123)71. The living present, likewise, is 
absolute; “the Living Present is the phenomenological absolute out of  which I cannot go 
because it is that in which, toward which, and starting from which every going out is 
effected.” (IOG 136) Derrida puts this in the most concise, as well as in somewhat more 
conclusive, terms in “Violence and Metaphysics”; “The absolute impossibility of  living 
other than in the present, this eternal impossibility, defines the unthinkable as the limit of  
reason.” (VM 132) It has, he writes, (once more in Introduction) “the irreducible originality 
of  a Now” (IOG 136). At the same time, the present is ‘living’, though if  the logic of  the 
distinction between Leib  and Körper—body and flesh—was to be transposed (see UG 161 
and IOG 97), then the sense of  the present as constituted would have to be something 
more like ‘fleshly present’ or, to take advantage of  a colloquial phrase, ‘fleshed-out present’. 
The living present means that intentionality is not something that occurs outside of  time in 
a simple ‘now’, which is to say that the structure of  temporality is not the intention by 
consciousness of  an object which exists in its own same moment, but is temporal to the 
core (the core that it will not, therefore, have). This temporality accordingly has both noetic 
and noematic aspects; on the one hand, the object of  consciousness is in flux, streaming 
without interruption, while on the other the consciousness of  it is a complex of  retentions 
and protentions which are inseparable from one another and from urimpressions. In 
Derrida’s words, in the noematic aspect of  temporality as described in the Phenomenology of  
                                                
71 see Husserl, Time Consciousness §11. The phrase ‘primal impression’ renders the original 
‘Urimpression’. Lawlor translates Derrida’s rendering ‘L’impression originaire’ (see Voix 73) with the 
close and preferable ‘originary impression’ (see VP 56). However in English, as with ‘urevidenz’ the 
language can well abide the neologism, which actually seems quite at home—‘urimpression’. 
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Internal Time-Consciousness, “the present appears neither as the rupture nor the effect of  a 
past, but as the retention of  a present past” (IOG 57) That is to say, the present is not in a 
relation with its past—it is a past retained. This is why Derrida describes the living present as 
a “going out from self  to self ” (IOG 150), since its temporalisation indicates a difference 
in the subject, at least in the time of  the subject, preceding the constitution of  the most 
basic element of  his coherent experience and subjectivity. In the irreducible temporal 
complexity of  intentionality, the temporal characteristic of  deferral, and even the spatio-
ontological characteristic of  difference—anticipating the move from time to space and 
from deferral to difference and differance in Voice and Phenomenon in the difference of  the 
self  in pure temporalisation (that ‘going out from self  to self ’ which is intentionality’s core 
in the living present)—appear, ahead of  Derrida’s meditation on their mutual coevality, as 
irreducible originary conditions of  phenomenological existence. 
Intentionality is only possible on the basis of  a difference and deferral within its 
atomic structure—an interplay between presence and absence from which presence derives. 
Presence originates from this difference, or to be more overtly Derridean, what is already a 
differance, since it is the difference between difference and identity and “the dialectic 
between the dialectical… and the nondialectical” (IOG 143), an idea (or not an idea, as 
Derrida would have it) that I will explain in the last chapter. This is the reason that Derrida 
can elucidate, without contradiction, the way that, in Cartesian Meditations, the grounds for 
the possibility of  experiencing other subjects are already laid in the basis of  the possibility 
of  experiencing temporal alterity72 as a function of  the dialectical living present: “By its 
very dialecticalness, the absolute primordiality of  the Living Present permits the reduction, 
without negation, of  all alterity.” (IOG 86) Derrida goes beyond the analogy Husserl draws 
between recollections and the experience of  the other (Fremderfahrung)—“Somewhat as my 
memorial past, as a modification of  my living present, ‘transcends’ my present, the 
appresented other being ‘transcends’ my own being (in the pure and most fundamental 
sense: what is included in my primordial ownness)” (CM 115)—to show that the basis for 
both of  these appresentations already belongs to the least part of  experience. Because the 
origin of  the phenomenological is not itself  but the interplay between itself  and what is 
not itself  or what is not yet itself, the constitution of  another time or another person is not 
a leap beyond what is always being performed of  necessity in intention, and what is the 
very meaning of  transcendental. That is the meaning of  this phrase, which announces the 
145 
whole thought of  deconstruction in one of  his most puzzling and most beautiful phrases 
in the book, which ends part six: “The living present constitutes the other as other in itself  
and the same as the same in the other.” (IOG 86) There is always already within the same a 
difference which anticipates the constitution of  the different time and the different subject, 
not on the basis of  a wholly self-identical subject to which the alterity of  the other would 
have to be reduced in order for it to be constituted within the same, but as an extension of  
an alterity which is already constitutive of  any so-called ‘same’. From his interpretation of  
Husserl’s ‘living present’ Derrida takes the cutting from which he will grow his hybrid.  
By determining, incisively and accurately, the temporality of  intrasubjective 
experience as essentially a difference within the same, Derrida anticipates in an already 
fairly mature form the argument he makes in Voice that the temporal deferral is always also 
spatial and therefore ontological; “In a certain way, therefore, intersubjectivity is first the 
nonempirical relation of  Ego to Ego, of  my present presents to other presents as such; i.e., 
as others and as presents (as past presents).” (IOG 86) This means that before there is the 
empirical relation of  intersubjectivity, intersubjectivity already exists as the relation of  my 
self  to my self—what is both completely ‘me’ but also, since it belongs as urimpression to a 
completely ‘other’ present, ‘other’. The absolute beginning of  the self  involves an 
irreducible ‘retention’ which belonged already to an other self  as urimpression but now 
belongs to the present as the retention. But because this present is not a composite, the 
whole language of  ‘other’ and ‘self ’, and ‘past and present’ as well, is brought into 
question—the present is the past retained means that the same is the other. 
While Derrida argues for the necessity of  this interpretation, he also mentions in a 
footnote on page 86 that in unpublished material from around the time of  the Cartesian 
Meditations Husserl “seems to go much further” than the analogy presented in the main 
text; 
‘Urhyle,’ i.e., temporal hyle, is defined there as the ‘core of  the other than the 
Ego’s own’ (Ichfremde Kern). Cf. Group C 6 (August 1930), p. 6. On the sense of  
this notion of  ‘alien to my Ego,’ ’the intrinsically first other,’ or of  ‘the first “non-
Ego”’ in the constitution of  the alter ego 
(IOG 86–87fn). 
This shows a different approach to an originary alterity—the hyle or ‘sensuous stuffs’ (see 
Id I 205), which is the sensuous content of  such an object as has it—is the alterity which is 
                                                                                                                                          
72 see CM §52, and for further analysis of the relation between intersubjectivity, temporality and 
history see Carr, Problem 94 and Staehler, “What is the Question to Which Husserl’s Fifth Cartesian 
Meditation is the Answer?” 114f 
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the common ground of  the other and the same, not in a natural or psychological sense, as 
it might seem, but because the basic element of  my or an other’s ego is always the 
conscious intention of  an object. 
That other time is irreducible to my present subjective experience (as for instance 
‘its’ past), since it is another ‘origin’, another absolute source of  experience, and this is why 
the temporality of  experience and the relation to others have a relationship that is more 
than analogical—a common direct ancestor in the “auto-temporalization of  the Living 
Present” (IOG 152). As Lawlor explains, Derrida picks this thread up again in “Violence 
and Metaphysics” by way of  refuting Levinas’ criticism that for Husserl in Cartesian 
Meditations, the other is ignored, neutralised, ‘reduced to the same’: “according to Levinas, 
by making the other, notably in the Cartesian Meditations, the ego’s phenomenon, 
constituted by analogical appresentation on the basis of  belonging to the ego’s own 
sphere, Husserl allegedly missed the infinite alterity of  the other, reducing it to the 
same.” (VM 123) By Derrida’s reasoning, this criticism ignores the already constitutive role 
of  the other, without which there is no same, no ego to begin with. As Lawlor writes, 
“Derrida argues that the intentionality aiming at the other is ‘irreducibly mediate’ (ED 
182/123).” (Lawlor, Derrida and Husserl 162) It is exactly this that Derrida means in the 
Introduction when he claims: “By its very dialecticalness, the absolute primordiality of  the 
Living Present permits the reduction, without negation, of  all alterity.” (IOG 86) The 
ambiguous temporality of  the living present leaves the other potent and not neutralised in 
the way Levinas had warned, while the same is constituted in alterity, but as itself. 
 
b. Delaying phenomenology 
 
In the penultimate paragraph of  his Introduction Derrida brings together the thought of  
deferral and the thought of  difference in nearly as important a place as it will hold when he 
comes to give it a name (that, he pleads, is not a name) in ‘differance’ (différance) and to 
thematise it in the eponymous paper (that, he would have to plead, is not an eponymous 
paper). This occurs when he supposes that “what has always been said under the concept 
of  ‘transcendental,’ through the enigmatic history of  its displacements [déplacements]” (IOG 
153, my interpolation of  the original French) is nothing other than “The primordial 
Difference of  the absolute Origin” (IOG 153). This last and most enigmatic thought, 
147 
which culminates the thinking of  delay in phenomenology, gestures towards the ‘mature’ 
and expansive concept (which will not then be a concept) by opening up the meaning of  
Husserl’s term ‘transcendental’ to look back on its own history—not only the similar 
Kantian use of  it, but even its Medieval sense having to do with qualities predicable on any 
and all existing things, and finally its original sense in the Aristotelian view of  God—and 
recognise the suprahistorical common denominator in its essential meaning as the location 
of  a principle or origin of  things in otherwise than they are; a quest which Levinas, in 
“Humanism and An-archy” will say is the goal and function of  reason as such; “All 
rationality then amounts to the discovery of  the origin, the principle. Reason is an 
archaeology…” (Levinas, “Humanism is an An-archy” 131). The later development of  
Derrida’s philosophy beyond commentary on Husserl is anticipated in its expansion and its 
consistency in this reflection on the meaning of  ‘transcendental’. 
Derrida gestures beyond the specific applicability of  his thinking of  
deferral/difference to phenomenology, and towards its priority in any philosophy as such, 
that is, any enquiry into “the beyond or the this-side [l’au-delà ou l’en-deçà] which gives sense 
to all empirical genius and all factual profusion” (IOG 15373). In the conclusion of  his 
interpretation of  phenomenology, Derrida begins to suggest something like a 
‘deconstruction’ which will have a trajectory of  its own, which will be concerned not only 
with the explication of  phenomenology’s peculiar transcendental structure, but the 
transcendental (writ large) structure of  various other philosophies, and in its most 
ambitious formulations of  philosophy itself. Nevertheless, this birth of  deconstruction both 
has the unimpeachable novelty of  a birth and is thoroughly within phenomenology, in a 
sense that I would aver is somewhat more than genealogical—it is phenomenology alone 
which discloses the structural ‘differance’ at work in every transcendental, in every 
philosophy. Thus, while we the readers are present at a birth, it is the kind of  birth Derrida 
describes in the advent of  the modern (Galilean) mathematico-scientific project: “this self-
rebirth [renaissance à soi] will be at the same time only a new obliteration of  the first birth 
(certificate)” (IOG 130). In a metaphor I used already, it is somewhat more like a graft, 
                                                
73 In Voice and Phenomenon Derrida returns to this transcendental core of philosophicality as a 
characteristic of phenomenology, but without any longer emphasising the delay involved in the 
transcendental; "phenomenological transcendental idealism responds to the necessity to describe 
the objectivity of the object (Gegenstand) and the presence of the present (Gegenwart)—and the 
objectivity in presence—on the basis of an ‘interiority,’ or rather on the basis of a self-proximity, of 
an ownness (Eigenheit), which is not a simple inside, but the intimate possibility of the relation to an 
over-there and to an outside in general.” (VP 19) The delay which Derrida had previously read into 
Husserl he now raises as a criticism, characterising the transcendental move as a ‘possibility’, rather 
than an idea (in the Kantian sense),  against which the necessity of delay would deal a heavy blow. 
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which derives its character primarily from the tree the cutting is taken from, but which gets 
its sustenance from its root-stock. It is a clone, standing on roots of  another tree. That is to 
say, because this rebirth is an ‘authentic rebirth’ and a kind of  culmination of  the idea of  
phenomenology as the pursuit of  origins, it is itself  a critique of  what is both its source 
and its self, which confronts the latter with the fact that it had not itself  been born yet—it 
shows that as long as phenomenology did not fully recognise the infinite delay of  any 
origin it was still on its way to its birth. 
Because the transcendental both within and outside of  phenomenology’s 
rendezvous with it is broadly the origin of  all that is—the variety of  originating principles 
which every philosophy after its own fashion identifies as the principle and source of  all 
things and thus is the way to make sense of  them, which is in each case the transcendental 
for its own philosophical system—it is always deferred/delayed. As Derrida puts it; the 
‘Absolute origin’ “can and indefinitely must both retain and announce its pure concrete 
form with a priori security” (IOG 153)—this means nothing more than that the structure 
of  an origin, principle, or transcendental involves its simultaneous concealment and 
disclosure. The origin is ‘announced’ as that whereby a thing is given (exists)—the ‘why’ of  
it (see IOG 150)—which leads the philosophical consideration on to a metaphysics and 
ontology.74 But the pursuit of  it is always and indefinitely deferred; for every origin that can 
be indicated an origin of  its own remains hidden; for every ‘why’ which speaks its name a 
prior ‘why’, as though it were the irritating persistence of  the child’s question, is also 
voiced. At least, such is the case for every origin that is an existent—Heideggerean ontology 
escapes this infinite regress, and that escape is very important for Derrida’s reading of  
Husserl, as we will see in the following chapter. The meaning of  the key phrase indicating 
the primordiality of  delay, which I have already cited twice in part, is just this inextricability 
of  delay from the origin; “Here delay is the philosophical absolute, because the beginning 
of  methodic reflection can only consist in the consciousness of  the implication of  another 
previous, possible, and absolute origin in general.” (IOG 152) The reason is simple—
origins are objects of  thought and as such they are things and must have origins of  their 
own. But Derrida’s ingenious trick here is to acknowledge the necessity of  this and rather 
than throwing up his hands at the destruction of  all origins and principles, to realise that 
                                                
74 Derrida argues, in Voice and Phenomenon and in “Phenomenology and the Closure of Metaphysics”, 
that Husserl’s relationship to metaphysics was critical rather than condemnatory, that as with 
rationality his criticisms were aimed a certain crisis in metaphysics with the intent of saving 
metaphysics as such; “Husserl, by constantly criticizing metaphysical speculation, was truly aiming 
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this makes delay itself  the absolute, the origin of  origination and transcendence as such. 
Like Kant with his copernican turn, Derrida notices that what had forbidden the 
excavation of  certain depths sought by enquiry is just what liberates enquiry from the 
necessity of  starting there. Deferral and difference are not merely the unfortunate 
characteristics of  any transcendental—they are themselves transcendental. It is not just that 
the origin is delayed; delay is the origin. And this brings us back to the origin of  the same 
in alterity. 
 
When Derrida calls factuality back into the room, at the end of  his Introduction, it is 
not as an empiricist critique of  or rebuke to philosophy (and thus, to phenomenology); and 
when at the same time he goes outside of  phenomenology to the philosophical question of  
ontology, it is only as governed and raised by a phenomenology. The distinction Derrida 
makes between the sense of  history and the being, which he explicitly distinguishes as 
being in the ‘non-Husserlian sense’, of  history, he claims himself, does not ’stem from’ 
phenomenology nor does it “simply precede transcendental phenomenology as its 
presupposition or latent ground” (IOG 150). What this means is that it is only possible 
after phenomenology, because it will require Derrida to remain faithful to, and not to 
confuse and upset, the work done in reduction to both rigorously distinguish being from 
the non-sense of  metaphysical hypostatisation and separate it from the supposed need to 
be grounded in the latter or in anything else, anything besides the grounding it establishes in 
itself. I will return shortly to his explanation for a new, phenomenological but ‘non-
Husserlian’ question of  being, but first I will explain how the question rears its head. 
When in the preceding section I examined the roots of  history in delay, as the 
retention of  the past in the living present and the constitution of  the same on the basis of  
the other in intentionality, I showed that, on the level of  its constituted immanence, 
temporal horizons are not a break from a self-identical homogeneous ‘present’. There is no 
clearly definable limit in which the past ceases to be present and becomes other. Retention, 
memory and history are not all part of  the present in the instant of  its constitution, 
retention alone possesses this privilege, but they are all made possible in the same moment 
by the same movement which brings the present into being. Derrida indicates this in Voice 
and Phenomenon when against the clarity of  a limit defined by Husserl in Internal Time 
Consciousness in opposition to Brentano as “a radical discontinuity between retention and 
                                                                                                                                          
his critique only at the perversion or the degeneration of what he continues to think and to want to 
restore as authentic metaphysics or philosophia prōtē.” (VP 5) 
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reproduction, between perception and imagination, etc., and not between perception and 
retention” (SP 64)75 Derrida raises other evidence from Internal Time Consciousness; “in the 
preceding section, was not the question of  a continuous mediation posed in a really explicit 
way?” (VP 55) Following his long quotations of  this evidence, Derrida writes; 
As soon as we admit this continuity of  the now and the non-now, of  
perception and non-perception in the zone of  originarity that is common to 
originary impression and to retention, we welcome the other into the self-
identity of  the Augenblick, non-presence and non-evidentness into the blink of  
an eye of  the instant. 
(VP 56) 
The question that seems to guide Husserl’s enquiry—what is the sense of  
histor(icit)y—is already answered in itself, or it is an over-complication of  the question. To 
ask after the sense of  historicity is to ask how history is meaningful, but as Derrida says; 
“In all the significations of  this term, historicity is sense.” (IOG 150) This statement is a 
challenge because it takes the question to presuppose a difference between history and 
sense; a temporal difference. The meaning of  the question is predicated on the assumption 
that sense is present and the present is not history, and therefore what is being asked is 
how history belongs to the present; is presented to the present. To ask what is the sense of  
history would be to ask how history belongs to sense, which is to say what is the possibility 
of  sublimating history to the present. This is why it is the wrong question; by presupposing 
the existential priority of  the present as present, history can only be conceived on the basis 
of  a relation belonging to the present, and therefore as secondary and perpetually subject to 
the temporality of  the same. Yet Derrida has brought to light the meaning of  intentionality 
as the constitution of  the present on the basis of  the retention of  the past. There is no 
‘starting point’ in a present which is not already also its past, and therefore sense is not 
independent of  historicity in the way that the question suggests. Because historicity is 
contiguous with the sense-making of  intention in the living present in the only way they 
could be contiguous (outside of  a presentism that would be just the negation of  time as 
such), through their common feature of  deferral, the question does not arise. 
Historicity is sense—Derrida says that this holds for all significations of  historicity, 
and it is so because both historicity and sense are essentially delay—the infinitely deferred 
horizon of  the origin/telos. Husserl is explicit in the Origin, through the interdependent 
matrix of  ideality, that all sense is historical; as I explained in chapter three, the possibility 
                                                
75 I have switched to David B. Allison’s translation here, as I will from time to time, for the purpose 
of the syntax into which the quotation is to be incorporated. 
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of  intention depends on the pure possibility of  history. The transcendental is “the beyond 
or the this-side which gives sense to all empirical genius and all factual profusion” (IOG 
153) which just means that meaning grounds itself  by way of  this going beyond itself  of  
meaning to a something beyond as its origin (and thus principle or archē) that 
transcendentalism is. 
Because he determines the essence of  meaning as the passage beyond to an origin 
or principle, and shows the necessity of  this structure as perpetually in delay (see IOG 
152f), Derrida permits us to explain that the interdependence of  idealities is inalienable and 
not due to the particular meanings of  the ideal terms. Any ideal structure which presents 
itself  as the principle of  an ideal capacity is itself  possible on the basis of  all of  the other 
principles which form the coherence (‘Zusammenhang’) of  ideality. The ideal structure is 
called on to account for the existence of  phenomena, to give them meaning, however 
because of  the ineluctability of  delay and the multiplicity of  origins, the ideas themselves 
will always evoke and open up onto still more ideas, bringing the entire coherence into 
account at every turn. The meaningful is meaningful because it calls up other meanings as 
prior in order to ground it, but because those prior meanings are ‘delayed’, they depend on 
their own prior meanings for their grounding. A circularity belongs to the system of  
meaning due to the structure of  delay, but if  it is not necessarily a virtuous circle it certainly 
is not a vicious one so long as meaning is not expected to be any more solid than what it 
rests on. 
 
The equivalency of  historicity and sense within the fundamental transcendental 
structure (of  delay) accounts for the possibility of  history, in the Husserlian sense; what 
Derrida calls history’s ‘how’—history is possible because it is not an addition or a realm that 
sense ventures into; sense is always historical from the ‘beginning’—, but it is here that 
what he calls the question of  history’s ‘why’ crops up, the need to acknowledge the possibility, 
in a non-Husserlian sense, of  history—“Is there, and why is there, any historical factuality?” (IOG 
150)—dragging along with it the ontological question and, he claims, the question of  fact, 
understandable only in the footsteps of  the rigorously reduced study of  the sense of  
history and according to the primordiality of  delay. Historical factuality, not to be confused 
with a ‘factual history’, which as I explained in chapter two is nothing but a pseudo-history 
without any rigorously determined eidetic sense—viz., a nonsense—which must be 
reduced, eidetically, in order for its meaning to be restored (as Derrida acknowledges on 
IOG 44. From 47–51 another, historical reduction is elaborated). Historical factuality, then, 
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would be what exists as fact when it has been reduced, or in other words; the historical fact 
to which belongs an ideal sense as fact76, and yet which is also irreducibly historical.77 
Rather than being external to ideal history, the most essential (emphasising both aspects of  
the word) history and the basis for any possibility of  factual history itself, Derrida 
acknowledges that fact is itself  the essence of  history; “History as institutive would be the 
profound area where sense is indissociable from being” (IOG 46)—and the kind of  ‘being’ 
he means here is explicitly factual being—being which is essentially the singularity and ‘here 
and now-ness’ of  an event; “Is this experience, unique of  its kind, not a singular fact—one 
for which we should not be able to substitute another fact as an example in order to 
decipher its essence.” (IOG 47) 
Without the fact, everything would happen at once and all ideas and tasks would 
already be available and indifferent to their initial creation. Of  course, even though the fact, 
the historical factuality, is not reducible to the idea which it ‘contains’, for which it is the 
context, indispensable and non-substitutable, it itself  has an essence, an “essence-of-the-first-
time” (IOG 48), which unites the fact from the beginning with its own sense; 
a unique fact already has its essence as unique fact which, by being nothing 
other than the fact itself  (this is the thesis of  the non-fictive irreality of  the 
essence), is not the factuality of  fact but the sense of  fact—that without which 
the fact could not appear and give rise to any determination or discourse. 
(IOG 48) 
The sense of  the fact is the reproducibility of  its very singularity, the universal 
applicability of  its non-substitutability, without which it would not have any meaning let 
alone be determinable within a phenomenology. Without the reproducibility of  sense in its 
unity with fact we would have “to say that this inseparability of  fact and sense in the 
oneness of  an instituting act precludes access for phenomenology to all history and to the 
pure eidos of  a forever submerged origin” (IOG 47). It is the unity of  sense and fact that 
allows Derrida to say that “Provided we respect its phenomenological value, such an assertion 
[that historicity is sense] does not transgress sense itself, i.e., history’s appearing and the 
possibility of  its appearing.” (IOG 150) Without what Derrida alludes to as an anti-
philosophical hypostatisation of  the fact beyond all sense—the absolutely non-rationalised 
fact—the priority of  phenomenology remains and sense is not transgressed. 
                                                
76 See IOG 48: “For a unique fact already has its essence as unique fact which, by being nothing 
other than the fact itself (this is the thesis of the non-fictive irreality of the essence), is not the 
factuality of fact but the sense of fact—that without which the fact could not appear and give rise 
to any determination or discourse.” 
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The ‘irreducible historicity’ which Derrida refers to, however, is not just a figure of  
speech—he means that historicity is not eidetically reducible, just as factual being is 
distinguished from the meaning of  a fact, which thus is ontologically ideal. It seems not to 
be enough for factual being that it is the idea of  factuality—that the historical factuality of  
the origin exist within an “essence-of-the-first-time” (IOG 48)—this would not be factually 
being, but like everything else within an eidetic reduction which is global, ideal being with an 
essential factuality, which is to say factuality as a meaning bound up in its essence. 
Eidetically reduced factuality would be eidetic, of  course, the same way that the psychic 
was shown to be in chapter three—it would be nothing more than a meaning belonging to 
ideal being. How can we make sense, or rather, what is far more difficult, refrain from 
making sense, of  a different way of  being belonging to factuality, which Derrida insists we 
must? This is the problem posed by a ‘historical reduction’ distinct from the eidetic one 
and which explicitly does not merely take place in the space mapped out by the latter; 
“there is no simple response to the question of  the priority of  one reduction over another” 
(IOG 48). It is not, therefore, a question of  the mere idea of  fact, but being which exists as 
fact. 
It is necessary to descend to these murky depths because of  the serious 
implications of  falling prey to the seductions of  the latter horn of  the dilemma Derrida 
presents—“If  we take for granted the philosophical nonsense of  a purely empirical history 
and the impotence of  an ahistorical rationalism, then we realize the seriousness of  what is 
at stake.” (IOG 51)—, and because in order to perform the reactivation which is Husserl’s 
proposed therapy for the crisis, a history which can get at what never became ideal must be 
employed. For this task, “Instead of  repeating the constituted sense of  an ideal object, one 
will have to reawaken the dependence of  sense with respect to an inaugural and institutive 
act concealed under secondary passivities and infinite sedimentations” (IOG 47–48). This 
act did not exist as eidetic before the historical enquiry, which determines it therefore as a 
fact in its very being. Reactivation goes beyond the resources of  ideal history, in which, for 
all the reasons I detailed in chapter three, and because of  the basic limitation of  the eidetic 
to the objective, eidetic science including eidetic history will always be of  an eidos which is 
“constituted and objective” (IOG 47). Historical reduction, Derrida claims, “will be 
reactivating and noetic” (IOG 47); it will reactivate the inaugural act, rather than just the 
constituted sense of  an ideal object intended by the act. This act, the noetic correlate of  the 
                                                                                                                                          
77 “But an irreducible historicity is announced in that this ‘must’ is announced only after the fact of 
the event.” (IOG 49) 
154 
noema, is the fact. The act is the act of  consciousness in which the ideal object is conceived, 
and the fact of  its invention regards not just the ideal object for which that fact is 
indifferent, but the act of  its inaugural intention which is absolutely non-interchangeable. 
The possibility of  such a reactivation, however, is only as noematic—it is as the content of  
a further act of  reactivation that what was once the noetic counterpart of  a noema (for that 
is the only way we could have evidence of  the necessity of  an act) will be reactivated, and 
not as noetic itself. Certainly, the noetic correlate itself  neither has the potential to persist 
in time and be shared communally the way that its noematic content does, but even more 
basically, the act must be transformed into a content in order to be the object of  a history. 
The reactivation, then, cannot be the reactivation of  activity as activity, it must reactivate it as 
content, making ‘reactivation’ somewhat of  a misnomer. It is as eidetic, therefore, that the 
historical factuality of  the engendering act is given to evidence. Thus, the fact is not 
without meaning, but it is what is historical and yet had not been meaningful before. The 
notion of  factual being then has some ambiguity—it exists in idea as a factual existence. 
  
The ontological question, then, is not a change of  topic from the 
phenomenological one, not a complete shift to the absolute irrationality of  a pure fact; it 
arises within the inquiry into the sense of  history as it bends towards the sense of  the fact, 
of  history’s fact. The question that orients the Origin; “how is there history?” opens up the 
dual ontological question; “is there, and why is there, history rather than nothing?” As the 
sense of  factuality and facts, phenomenology could keep such questions at bay, but what 
delay has shown as the common foundation of  history and sense, is that as the sense of  
facts sense does not absolutely precede the fact (sense is not a self-identical whole), but 
their primordial unity derives from the transcendental delay of  an origin in which each is 
bound, as Derrida rephrases his ontological question; “What is the primordial unity of  sense and 
fact, a unity for which, by themselves alone, neither can account?” (IOG 151) The mutually 
dependent unity of  sense and fact (and the unity of  all the other ideal structures discussed 
in the second chapter of  this thesis) opens up a question that is ontological for the reason 
that it gestures to something (which will not be a thing, since it precedes both sense and 
fact) that precedes sense. But because it also precedes fact it is not an anti-philosophical 
empiricism. It is an ontological question in the Heideggerean mould since it asks after what 
makes all being possible; “why is there history rather than nothing?” The answer will not 
be a thing, neither a factual nor a sensible thing (which are always the same), it is delay. 
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The engagement Derrida orchestrates between phenomenology and ontology 
obviously draws heavily on Heidegger’s ontological difference, and especially its 
groundbreaking (in the most literal sense) recognition that the answer to the ontological 
question (‘why is there something rather than nothing?’) will not itself  be something. It 
cannot be an entity or the question would remain unanswered. Like the ontological 
difference, Derrida’s ontological question brings ontology into phenomenology, beyond the 
shallowness of  a metaphysics that would be unable to answer its own most basic question 
because, as in for example an empiricism, it is unwilling to recognise that the origin of  the 
positivity it concerns itself  with will not itself  be anything positive, will, indeed, resist the 
entire structure of  language which forcefully inserts copulae and a whole grammar of  
positivity into the discourse on ‘it’.78 In an empiricism, or any other kind of  metaphysical 
realism, the ontological question (shallow as it is) would be what Derrida insists it is not in 
the way he reveals it as opened up by phenomenology; phenomenology’s “presupposition 
or latent ground” (IOG 150). Ontology of  that kind would restore phenomenology to 
subjugation as a ‘mere appearing’ made possible by a reality. 
The question ‘why’—why is there factuality, or to put it another way, since there is 
no factuality outside of  its unity with sense—why is there “the primordial unit of  sense and 
fact” (IOG 151)—is beyond phenomenology79 because what it inquires of  is essentially 
prior to the factual and the meaningful which is the condition for all experience. However, 
this reason is always deferred precisely because it is prior to sense (and fact)—in a sense it 
remains under phenomenology’s wing, because it is only its annunciation within the 
phenomenology of  historical factuality that appears (as “eternally the apeiron” (IOG 151fn 
quoting from PRS 116). As Derrida writes; “Phenomenology alone can make infinite 
historicity appear: i.e., infinite discourse and infinite dialecticalness as the pure possibility 
                                                
78 Derrida himself, in an interview published in Lettres Françaises no. 1211 6–12 December 1967 and 
translated into English in the collection of interviews titled Positions, acknowledged a sort of 
‘provisional’ ‘naming’ of Heidegger’s ontological difference in the discourse of differance, while 
also insisting that an ‘openness’ to differance would no longer be determined by the metaphysical 
or onto-theological attachment that despite Heidegger’s intent continued to belong to “the 
difference between Being and beings” (Derrida, Positions 8). He claims that differance “would not 
have been possible without the attention to what Heidegger calls the difference between Being and 
beings, the ontico-ontological difference such as, in a way, it remains unthought by philosophy” 
(Derrida, Positions 8). Derrida thus describes his own neologism (that is not a neologism) as doing 
the work that Heidegger’s ontological thinking could not do because of its limitations to “the 
language of the West” (Derrida, Positions 8) and to a certain still ‘positive’ thinking that permeated 
Heidegger’s discourse of ‘Being’. 
79 “Thus, knowing what the sense of an event is on the basis of a factual [événementielle] example, and 
what the sense of sense in general is on the basis of exemplariness in general, we can then ask 
ourselves a question which no longer proceeds from phenomenology as such.” (IOG 151) 
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and the very essence of  Being in manifestation.” (IOG 152). Moreover, because of  that 
infinity—the essential delay of  the ontological—phenomenology is never surpassed and 
certainly never sees closure, even though it announces a ‘beyond’; 
Since this propaedeutic [phenomenology, understood as the quasi-propaedeutic 
for every philosophical ‘decision’] is always announced as infinite, that moment is 
not a factuality but an ideal sense, a right which will always remain under 
phenomenological jurisdiction, a right that phenomenology alone can exercise 
by explicitly anticipating the end of  its itinerary. 
(IOG 150) 
What is delayed in this ontological question is itself  nothing more than delay, or, to 
be more precise, it is, as I explained above, not something, some character or other, that is 
delayed—it cannot be because as long as the existence of  all things were explained on the 
basis of  a thing, the existence of  that thing would remain unexplained—80and therefore 
delay is infinite, and no ‘thing’ is delayed but delay itself. The delay of  delay sounds like the 
kind of  obscurantist obfuscations that has attracted so much ridicule to Derrida, both 
deserved and totally unwarranted, however it has a rigorously determined sense. The 
delayed ‘answer’ of  the ontological question cannot be anything but delay, and this is 
determined in at least two ways; first, the ontological question, like the transcendental 
question and perhaps any philosophical question that really is a question, is the question of  
an origin and, as I have already shown, Derrida demonstrates that the absolute origin is 
nothing but delayed; second, the infinite delay within phenomenology of  the 
“philosophical decision” (IOG 150) for which it is a propaedeutic, because it is infinite, 
reveals that the ‘decision’ (the ontology) is itself  delay, otherwise its infinity would abolish 
its sense and it would no longer be a delay but simple absence of  the kind that 
phenomenology does not, as a rule, announce. Phenomenology, as Derrida indicates, opens 
up the question of  the origins of  sense and being, and because this asks after the origin of  
being, what it asks after will not be positive. However, neither can it be mere lack or 
                                                
80 Of course, theological philosophy has wrestled with this problem since Aristotle, whose notion 
of an ‘unmoved mover’ was an attempt to subvert the ontological question by accounting for being 
by way of a being whose existence was spontaneous. Natural science has shown itself less 
metaphysically adept in seeking an explanation of the universe by the ‘big bang’. The only reason 
this has satisfied a search for origins is because a sleight of hand has replaced the question of the 
origin of being with the far more mundane question of the origin of what is now. By changing the 
meaning of ‘universe’, natural science has forgotten the question of origins. Heidegger’s ontological 
difference, however, shows that even Aristotle’s conception of the problem as one of cause avoided 
the incisiveness of ontology’s ‘why’. To look for a cause is to look for a ‘thing’, and therefore this 
way of inquiring into origins is doomed to failure. 
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absence, since the merely null is not indicated in a question. Delay, then is what we call the 
not-yet-appearing from which appearing bursts forth. 
Paradoxically, the infinite nature of  delay is what allows us to carry on, both in 
phenomenological study and in deconstruction. When Derrida writes that “delay is the 
philosophical absolute” (IOG 152) it is not a cry of  resignation, but a recognition that the 
infinite task and its infinite history open onto an infinite beyond themselves at every turn. 
 
An ontology which exceeds the phenomenological is announced within 
transcendental phenomenology, but although the evidence of  what is not 
phenomenologically reduced has the potential to overcome phenomenology by confronting 
phenomenology with the limits of  reduction, thus bringing about a closure to the adequacy 
of  phenomenological enquiry, the delay of  this ontology maintains the indefinite openness 
of  phenomenology’s domain. Does this closure restore phenomenology to the place 
relegated to it in Kantianism—beholden to an unknowable but prior and more real 
noumenon? Such a demotion would effectively destroy phenomenology, which in Husserl’s 
copernican turn wrests authority over the entire realm of  existence by legitimately taking 
existence itself  to be appearance (rather than what appearance indicates) and criticising the 
supposition of  a ground-beyond-all-possible-experience as a philosophically sophisticated 
scepticism introduced without evidence. None of  this is the upshot of  Derrida’s 
‘commentary’, as he will call part of  what he does in Voice. To understand it in this way, as a 
devastating critique of  transcendental phenomenology, would be to misunderstand the 
profundity of  delay in Derrida’s thought. Delay is of  course not merely an epistemic 
obstacle, delay does not keep some real and present answer to the ontological question 
from coming to philosophy; rather, delay is the answer (or, quasi-answer) to the question; it 
is an ontology of  delay. Moreover, delay, just like the differance to come and Heidegger’s 
Being, is not the name of  some thing. There is not, in delay, anything which is a more 
profound reality than the phenomenological, and yet delay is the answer to the question 
why in the unity of  fact and sense, things appear. Nevertheless, because there is not some 
noumenal realm concealed by the delay, phenomenology can never be relegated to a merely 
epistemic status. What is more, it is only in phenomenology that the infinite history and 
delay, and therefore the ontology which “owes its seriousness to a phenomenological 
certainty” (IOG 151), appear and can be accounted for. 
Derrida does not get bogged down with the questions of  whether an idea which is 
deferred in the ways I have explicated is yet an idea—the idea of  delay of  the idea is only 
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really proposed on the last two pages of  his Introduction—but he offers a solution to these 
problems nonetheless, or rather, a solution can be found there. It arises by way of  his 
wrestling with a problem I spent a great deal of  time on in this thesis; the intra-historical 
supratemporality of  ideas. 
The rehabilitation of  the idea is not to be found in situating it within a solid 
foundation, of  finding some stable resting place from out of  which the infinitely deferred 
telos and infinitely deferred origin can emerge as stable (as it were) ‘countable’ infinities 
proceeding in a linear if  still boundless trajectory.  Rather, it is precisely the pursuit of  a 
stable point of  departure, a starting place though one in medias res, that gets us into so much 
trouble here. The problem with a telos or an origin that is infinitely deferred, or with the 
codependent (decon–)struction of  telos and origin in which the infinite deferral of  each 
defers the other, is that it robs us of  that minimal and perhaps adequate stability which a 
more straightforward model of  an infinite task or an always preceded origin afforded—a 
place to start. It is after all for the sake of  a present science and structure of  meaning that 
the historical phenomenology and the entire enquiry into crisis was begun, and it is that 
more than the existence of  an absolute origin itself  which ideal history and reactivation 
most urgently hope to obtain. We do not require the presence of  the idea fully realised and 
brought to act, but the idea as a goal which orients our seeking. The recognition of  deferral 
and delay in the stability of  an infinite idea is disruptive not because it precludes the 
obtainment of  a simple origin or an end that is in reach—it disrupts the now, the 
possibility of  a stable point of  origin for any enquiry and the source of  apodeictic certainty 
in experience. Derrida understands the complex self-reflexivity of  Husserl’s ‘living present’ 
as an answer to this conundrum. Delay calls for the careful phenomenological 
determination of  what is necessary as the source of  experience, and not the reactionary 
sceptical dismissal of  the possibility as such at the first signs of  trouble. 
On the basis of  a deferred idea and a delayed origin an absolute present cannot be 
constituted, but such a simple and monolithic ‘now’ is not what gives itself  as the time of  
experience. The question, then, is not whether the present as such, the idea of  a present, is 
disrupted by the deferral of  the idea (just as the question is also not whether a telos or 
origin ‘exists’ as such), but whether a present which both emerges from and launches 
origins and ideas can be sufficiently accounted for, which is to say, adequately described, if  
its origin and its telos are infinitely deferred. In the structure of  delay, there will certainly 
never be a stable and absolutely present point, but such presence is never what has been 
given in experience. Investigation will show that such a complex present can indeed be 
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described—that if  the living present is itself  as complex and deferred as Derrida claims it 
is (and I believe this is consistent with Husserl’s elucidation of  the living present), then the 
deferral of  its temporal horizons should not be surprising or discomfiting. This is the 
meaning of  the enigmatic claim made by Derrida in the third-to-last paragraph of  his 
Introduction; “Since this alterity of  the absolute origin structurally appears in my Living Present 
and since it can appear to be recognized only in the primordiality of  something like my 
Living Present, this very fact signifies the authenticity of  phenomenological delay and 
limitation.” (IOG 152–53) 
The delayed origin, which is to say, the origin which does not (yet) appear, is 
phenomenologically ‘authentic’ because it nevertheless appears, in its deferral (viz., in the 
irreducible “unity of  appearing and disappearing” [IOG 152] which comprises any absolute 
present), in the primordial living present, and because the structure of  delay needed to 
account for its paradoxical disclosure as concealed is already the structure of  the present, 
and therefore it does not need to be accounted for by a kind of  ‘break’ or ad hoc 
multiplication of  divisions. It avoids the irreducibility of  a pluralism. The 
phenomenological ‘authenticity’ of  delay discloses the simultaneous simplicity and 
complexity of  the living present. Derrida is adamant that the living present constitutes a 
dialectic of  protentions and retentions, despite Husserl’s insistence (see IOG 58) and 
Cavaillè’s distinction (see IOG 143)81; 
(as every authentic dialecticity wants) this movement was only the dialectic 
between the dialectical (the indefinite mutual and irreducible implication of  
protentions and retentions) and the nondialectical (the absolute and concrete 
identity of  the Living Present, the universal form of  all consciousness) 
(IOG 143) 
As absolute identity and the primordial present, the living present is the necessary 
starting point for the appearance of  deferral, while as a (dialectical) complex of  
constituting parts, the present consists of  a structure which is itself  deferred (from itself), 
which is not in simple self-identity. Thus there is not the need to posit a present which is of  
a different temporal structure from its own horizons and to therefore invoke the need of  a 
hypostatised fracturing of  presence. Most crucially, the evidence for the delayed origin (and 
idea as well) does not consist of  a self-identity which that origin could never account for; it 
consists of  ‘passage’ which is of  a form not unlike its own. 
                                                
81 The strand of Derrida’s use of the metaphor of interweaving is traced by Lawlor in Derrida and 
Husserl 176f, while the play on the French homographs ‘fils’ (son) and the plural of ‘fil’ (thread) ties 
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On this account, delay is not, as one might think, a misfortune and an accident 
which by always stealing the origin and telos away keeps experience confined to its own little 
island of  presence. On the contrary, deferral begins in the present and therefore it is 
primarily the relentless ecstatic movement of  temporality—the fugitive ‘now’; “the inability 
to live enclosed in the innocent undividedness [indivision] of  the primordial Absolute” (IOG 
153). Delay is not the obstruction of  temporal horizons, it is their condition of  possibility. 
As Derrida says in his description of  intentionality; “The latter is also nothing but the 
Absolute of  a living Movement without which neither its end nor its origin would have any 
chance of  appearing.” (IOG 150) As such, it is the condition of  possibility for 
phenomenology itself, but this claim itself can only come from phenomenology, as Derrida 
notes; “that delay is the destiny of  Thought itself  as Discourse—only a phenomenology 
can say this and make philosophy equal to it” (IOG 152), because phenomenology alone 
starts from delay in the basic structure of  the same—the living present. 
 
Derrida writes; 
[Phenomenology] alone can make infinite historicity appear: i.e., infinite 
discourse and infinite dialecticalness as the pure possibility and the very essence 
of  Being in manifestation. It alone can open the absolute subjectivity of  Sense 
to Being-History by making absolute transcendental subjectivity appear (at the 
end of  the most radical reduction) as pure passive-active temporality, as pure 
auto-temporalization of  the Living Present—i.e., as we already saw, as 
intersubjectivity. 
(IOG 152) 
What Derrida means here is that only in phenomenology can the transcendental 
beyondness of  history (which he rightly identifies with being, recognising that to say the 
other)82 be presented within an a priori. Only phenomenology can begin with its absolute 
starting point in subjectivity, the only absolute starting point, and make the transcendental 
of  historical being appear within it. A system without the delicate negotiations of  Husserl’s 
would have to present historical being, other people, infinite history, and primordial delay 
each as something outside of  and radically other than the subject; things which the subject 
could only comprehend by dominating and thus denaturing. But because the transcendental 
subject, in Derrida’s interpretation, is the “pure auto-temporalization of  the Living 
Present” which is to say is pure delay, and therefore is neither a self-identical one, nor in its 
                                                                                                                                          
together themes of parricide and text in “Plato’s Pharmacy” and “The Double Session”. See PP 71 
& 84 and “The Double Session” 224. 
82 Being is, Derrida writes just above this, “History through and through” (IOG 152) and 
“historicity is prescribed for Being” (IOG 152) 
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very existence without the temporalisation of  history at its (deferred) ‘core’, the illusion of  
separateness ceases to interfere. Being, which is historical being and hence delayed, appears 
to the transcendental subject, because it is native to the subject. This is only the case in a 
rigorous and critical phenomenology such as Husserl’s, which is why “It is in this respect 
that all philosophical discourse must derive its authority from phenomenology.” (IOG 150) 
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5 – The Meaning of  Destruction and Irrecusability of  
Presence (Heidegger: La Question de l’Être et de l’Histoire) 
 
a. Destruction as Confirmation 
 
The meaning of  Derrida’s deconstruction of  the metaphysics of  presence, of  what is, to 
paraphrase from Rogues, ‘more and less serious than critique’, appears in the 1964/65 
seminar maybe more clearly than anywhere else, but in his description of  what Heidegger 
is doing with his destruction of  metaphysics. In this chapter I want to show why 
destruction of  metaphysics is not a refutation; why it is not even an overcoming; why it 
must confirm the priority of  the present; and why it is necessary even though it may seem 
after all not to be doing anything. 
It is in the relationship of  destruction to the metaphysics of  presence that is its 
target that the need for something other than critique (and refutation), and something 
other than crisis, appears most clearly as a consequence of  the absolute privilege of  
presence. It is because of  the present’s absolute irrecusability (see HQ 210) that a method 
other than critique is necessary, and that refutation will prove impossible. This irrecusability 
is why the relationship goes beyond mere ambiguity—“Au moment même où Heidegger 
détruit la métaphysique, il doit la confirmer” (227: “At the same moment when Heidegger 
destructs metaphysics, he must confirm it”). It isn’t merely a toleration of  metaphysics—
the dependence upon metaphysics is invariant and must be confirmed. 
Derrida shows how novel Heidegger’s destructive gesture is by comparing it with 
Hegel’s. Hegel’s refutation avoids the rejection of  what it refutes by regionalising the 
refuted position—by becoming incorporated into the position that refutes it the refutatum 
is retained. Only its validity claim—its claim to the generality of  its validity—is denied. 
Destruction goes even further than this—it is of  what cannot be rejected and can’t even be 
sublated in the Hegelian sense, because it, together with its truth, validity and generality, are 
undeniable. Even the scope and validity of  the consideration of  being as presence that 
Heidegger wants to destroy is confirmed. How is this possible? Derrida goes so far as to 
claim that it is not even an overcoming of  metaphysics (see HQ 213). Not a refutation, nor an 
overcoming. How is this, an intervention that takes nothing away, possible and what is its 
motivation? 
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Following Husserl, Derrida recognizes the absolute privilege of  presence: “The 
living present is, he says, the absolute form… of  experience” (HQ 210) because “it is 
evident, it is evidence itself, that no experience is ever lived except in the present” (HQ 
210). This closely resembles what he writes in Voice: "within philosophy there is no possible 
objection concerning this privilege of  the present-now; it defines the very element of  
philosophical thought, it is evidence itself, conscious thought itself, it governs every 
possible concept of  truth and sense.” (SP 62) No argument is given to back up this claim, 
nor is any necessary—when Derrida writes that it is evidence itself  that the present is the 
fundamental form of  experience he is appealing to the necessity of  having any experience 
in the present, and to the absolute impossibility of  imagining an experience that is not 
present. The basic and non-derivable necessity of  it confirms Sylvia Plath’s claim; “Nothing 
is real except the present” (Plath, Journals 10). 
Indeed, it is Husserl’s recognition of  the present as the irrecusable venue of  all 
experience that allows him to account for historicity in the most rigorous way possible—
within the epoch of  metaphysics—as a confirmed and unapologetic modification of  
experience, of  present experience. Derrida writes: “For Husserl, as for Hegel moreover, 
there is no historicity but in so far as the past or the origin can be made present, can be 
transmitted” (HQ 211). By acknowledging what is due the priority of  the present, the 
meaning of  the past, the only possible meaning of  the past, can be investigated. 
When Foucault disparages “the surreptitious practice of  historians, their pretension 
to examine things furthest from themselves, the groveling manner in which they approach 
this promising distance (like the metaphysicians who proclaim the existence of  an afterlife, 
situated at a distance from this world, as a promise of  their reward)” (Foucault, “Nietzsche, 
Genealogy, History” 89) what he is bemoaning is the historians’ concealment of  their own 
present, their failure to recognize “knowledge as perspective” (Foucault, “Nietzsche” 90). 
With an ambition that Foucault would still reject as surreptitious in its own right, this is 
precisely what a transcendental phenomenology of  history aims at. It is the reason 
Husserl’s notion of  a Rückfrage has the recognition of  the position from which the 
questioning is performed at its centre. 
As I explained earlier, Rückfrage is a “regressive inquiry” or “inquiry back into” (UG 
158), which describes the essentially backwards-looking attitude of  the Origin and the Crisis. 
For history to be critical, self-reflexive, and to adequately ground itself  in the determination 
of  the conditions and structures of  historicity itself, awkwardly enough, it cannot confine 
itself  to the lone dimension of  the past—it requires the retrospective of  a present from 
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which to launch any regressing inquiry (Rückfrage). Husserl suggests that historical inquiry 
would be circular, or a “zigzag pattern” (Crisis 58): “The understanding of  the beginnings 
is to be gained fully only by starting with science as given in its present-day form, looking 
back at its development.”  (Crisis 58) In his introduction to the Origin, Derrida commends 
this program in strong terms: he calls this “only the pure form of  every historical 
experience” (IOG 51) 
The “being all at once temporal and intemporal and omnitemporal” (212) of  the 
present, is no different for history: Derrida notes that for Husserl “the condition of  history 
is a certain ahistoricity of  history” (HQ 212). This ‘certain ahistoricity’ (which is not 
absolute ahistoricity) is the necessity of  the persistence of  ideal objects that are 
‘omnitemporal’ in that they can be “transmitted as the same” (HQ 212) through time. 
Without the persistence of  such omnitemporal ideas, there could be no historicity, no time 
except the present (which wouldn’t even be a present), and no possibility of  the 
genealogical—no sense of  having come from something. In the Introduction, Derrida praises 
Husserl’s phenomenology of  history for disclosing the conditions of  existence of  “a pure 
historicity” (IOG 66): “they are nothing but the pure possibilities of the appearance of 
history as such, outside which there is nothing” (IOG 66). In terms of  the explanation of  
the possibility of  the appearance of  historicity, Derrida comes down hard on the side of  
the irremissibility of  the a priori of  history; the connection through invariant transmission 
to history as that which makes it possible, conceding that it does not become any less 
historical for all that. Historical objects “refer to concrete acts lived in a unique system of  
instituting implications” (IOG 65). That is to say, they are not mere examples or 
possibilities—what is determined through ideal investigation is the historical certainty of  
what must have occurred. What is this but true historicity, as Derrida says: “These then are 
the interconnections-of what is, in the fullest sense of  the word, history itself.” (IOG 65) 
Derrida was still committed to his analysis of  Husserlean transcendental 
phenomenology of  history a few years later in the 1964/65 seminar, which is why he 
concedes that “the philosophies of  the Present, philosophy itself, can very well and with 
good, strong reasons demand for itself  access to historicity” (215) and that “There would 
not be history without present, without the chain of  transmissibility assured by the formal 
identity of  the presence of  the present.” (216) Indeed, he confirms his attachment to the 
phenomenology of  history in somewhat stronger language than he ever used in his 
Introduction. 
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Of  course, if  a fully adequate philosophy of  history was to have been achieved by 
Husserl (and Hegel), Derrida would not have said that in Heidegger for the first time being 
is thought historically (see HQ 50), nor would he have ever had occasion to have taught 
this seminar. Moreover, it is clear from the start, in the discussion of  the difference 
between destruction and refutation in the first session, that a history the appearance of  
which is secured in the ahistoricity of  ideal objectivity, that history in this sense is nothing 
like what is at issue in the ‘question’. This is all more or less obvious. Thus, given that 
Derrida from the start rejected refutation because “If  one can refute, it is because the truth 
can be established once and for all as an object and that nothing but conceptions of  truth 
belong to history, more or less valid approximations of  this ahistoric truth” (HQ 24-25) it 
is obvious that when he then starts to commend, in his strongest language yet, Husserl’s 
phenomenology of  history for determining the conditions of  possibility of  history in the 
omnitemporal persistence of  ideal objects, that there must be a limit to the success of  this 
account of  history. The claim that for refutation to mean anything an ‘anti-historical 
metaphysics’ must be in place implies that the history at question must be history which 
disrupts, rather than supports, truth. If  not ‘ahistorical’ truth must at least be 
‘omnitemporal’ in the sense of  persisting through history. 
And yet, Derrida told his students that “The living Present is, [Husserl] says, the 
absolute form, absolutely universal and unconditioned, of  experience” (HQ 210). It is clear 
that this is not a curio or artefact that should be relegated to the history of  philosophy—
Derrida has signed on to this absolute claim absolutely. It is even formally essential to 
understanding the question at hand, as he makes clear (“And this Husserlean affirmation 
must first be understood in its philosophical invulnerability to properly grasp the audacity 
of  the Heideggerian gesture.” [HQ 210]). This is worth repeating because it emphasizes 
that what Husserl has established about the necessity of  a certain priority of  the present as 
the condition for the experience of  historicity, and of  a continuity of  ideal objectivity as 
the condition for history of  any kind is not a mere possibility, not a way that we could, if  
we chose, account for history. It is the way that experience of  history is possible—it is 
impossible to imagine historical experience that did not occur in the present. And therefore 
historicity as a modification of  the present is its essential and only form. 
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b. Ek-Static Temporality and Experience 
 
The motivation for destroying the present’s priority in the account of  history is nearly as 
compelling, however. Historicity disappears as soon as the present is called in as a 
condition of  history. As a modification it is reduced to presence, to a kind of  presence, no 
matter what priorities it can then exert for itself  as the condition for the appearance of  
things. Derrida writes: “At the same moment where one pretends to render it possible or 
respect it, as for Hegel and Husserl, by showing the absolute present as a condition of  the 
historical linking and of  traditionality, one reduces history.” (HQ 213) The judgment that 
follows is severe—the attempt by Husserl (and Hegel) to take into account what makes 
historical appearance possible, motivated as it is by the resistance to a dogmatic and naïve 
presupposition and simultaneous concealment of  present perspective, nevertheless fails to 
let history appear. All that appears is presence, various modifications of  presence. The 
reason that this is insufficient if  the historicity of  being is to be disclosed, is simply that as 
long as it is understood as a modification of  presence, history is reduced, and in reduction 
made something it is not. It is a denaturing reduction. This dissimulation (and this is the 
condemning judgment) is “not the act of  a philosopher” (HQ 213). Not the act of  a 
philosopher! Because it calls something (presence) what it is not (history). The judgment 
may be too severe—Derrida in that very session repeats that the reduction to the present is 
irrecusable. 
And yet, it is not mere provocation—if  history is merely the name for a kind of  
presentation, so to speak, a present appearance with a certain flavor of  ‘pastyness’, then 
what is missed is nothing less than the difference between present and past. Whatever history 
owes to the present to allow it to appear, it cannot mean anything if  it is not of  a past that 
is different from the present in at least this: that it is not the present. And this not-
presentness is exactly what is taken away from it in its reduction to appearance. What is 
nearly as incontrovertible as presence as the time of  appearance is the necessity of  history 
to be of  a temporality that is not present. It is only nearly as incontrovertible because it is 
not absolutely certain that any such thing as a past that is other than present exists or is 
meaningful in a phenomenological sense (therefore, meaningful at all). 
What is certain, though, is that being appears as historical. Indeed, even Plath’s line 
that was so definitive in its exclusive bestowal of  existence upon the present undermines 
itself  as it continues: “Nothing is real except the present, and already, I feel the weight of  
centuries smothering me.” (Plath, Journals 10)  To put it even more strongly, I mentioned 
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already that Derrida acknowledges, giving credit to Husserl’s living present, that the present 
is ‘the absolute form of  experience itself ’; cannot just the same claim be made on behalf  
of  historicity? True, that “no experience is lived except in the present” (HQ 210) has an 
immediacy which is not matched by what can be said of  historicity—that “no experience is 
ever lived except as having a historical density, so to speak”—there is the necessary 
inclusion of  an ‘as’ that at least doesn’t seem to be a necessary inclusion of  the 
ineluctability of  the present (no doubt, Derrida could ferret it out). And yet historical 
depth is just as resistant to elimination in an imagining—we can no more imagine an 
experience in which everything intended comes into being all at once and at that instant 
than we can an experience that is not lived in the present. 
 
Derrida asks us to join him in wondering “if  the evidence of  the Presence of  the 
Present does not return [renvoie] to a meaning of  experience of  which the historicity, that is 
to say the character as past, would be the very same which, determining meaning in the 
presence of  the present, would radically and definitively escape the form of  the present 
itself.” (HQ 213–14) This would not be, then, an experience of  history, but the historicity 
of  experience. It would be the historical being of  experience itself, which would upset the 
possibility endemic to the experience of  history, of  a stable and in a sense atemporal 
perspective to which the historical might appear, a sterilized object. Rather, what “would 
itself  escape radically and definitively the form of  the present” (HQ 214) is not the 
experience, or even its meaning. Both experience and meaning are rooted in a present that 
they can never escape, let alone radically and definitively so. Rather, that which is historical 
is the meaning of  the experience! The difference here is subtle but profound; it is not an 
experience of  historicity that is returned to in the ‘presence of  the present’, but a historicity 
of  experience, to be precise, a historicity of  the meaning of  experience. A priority that is 
not the priority of  presence, which is itself  only confirmed in the experience of  the 
historical, is announced in the historicity of  experience. What Derrida is suggesting is a 
certain historicity of  the meaning of  experience itself  to which “the evidence of  the 
presence of  the present” (HQ 213) returns. 
The experience of  the historical, as for instance an experience of  the geometrical 
object given in terms of  its reference to its origin, only confirms the priority of  the living 
present in which that experience is constituted. On the other hand, the historicity of  
experience—any banal experience will do as an example, so take the familiar one of  
Husserl’s desk—introduces a priority other than that of  the present, a historical priority 
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upon which the experience itself, and not only its (historical) object, is conditional. The 
historicity of  experience, as opposed to the experience of  historicity, if  such a thing is 
disclosed in evidence, would disclose a historicity other than that which affirms “infinity 
and eternity as the foundation of  sense and possibly of  the historicity of  sense” (HQ 214). 
The experience of  history as a modification of  presence is the only source of  access to the 
essential historicity of  objects of  experience. Whether the object of  experience is the 
perfect sphere or Husserl’s ‘life and blood’ desk, the irrecusable certainty of  the presence 
of  any time in which it appears, that any time in which it ever appeared or will appear will 
be or will have been present, ensures a certain historicity of  the object of  experience, 
which is to say; that it persists in time and had an origin in time, a time which was, it is 
absolutely certain, present at the time. This certainty of  the presence of  the present—of  
“the a priori necessity of  the living Present is the possibility of  a temporalisation without 
me” (HQ 214)—is the condition of  possibility for the experience of  history. 
The historicity of  experience, on the other hand, is the ineluctable historicity in 
which experience itself  derives its meaning—the historicity, that is, that gives experience 
meaning. While the experience of  historicity is the experience of  a pre-existence and 
origin-ality of  objects of  sense, the historicity of  experience is the finite, ek-static 
temporality that gives experience meaning. That is to say, the irreducible historicity of  the 
meaning of  experience is the being in relation to birth and death without which no 
experience as such could ever exist. The experience of  a historical object—Husserl’s 
writing desk—which is only ever given as present, Derrida asks us to consider (but it is not 
us he asks, he never seemed to mean for us, in 2015, to read these words, neither in 1965 
nor at any point thereafter), refers to a historicity which gives the experience, and in a sense 
its content, meaning, yet cannot be reduced to the (present) structure of  experience itself. 
The meaning of  experience is historical in that it derives from the finite temporality of  the 
experiencing being—Dasein, namely its being-towards-death and “a certain relation to 
birth” (HQ 214). 
If  I have set this up in such a way as to make what I am calling the experience of  
history and the historicity of  experience appear to be opposite sides of  the same coin—
even counterparts to one another that could be enfolded within the same noetic-noematic 
analysis, it should be clear that this would be a denial of  the contradiction between 
Heidegger and phenomenology that Derrida is drawing out. Derrida points out that for 
Heidegger “There is no history if  temporality is not finite. Hegel and Husserl were, in a 
certain way, saying the opposite.” (HQ 215) Whereas the phenomenologist showed that the 
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ahistoricity and eternity of  the present was the condition for the experience of  history, 
Heidegger argued that only the possibility of  impossibility—which is to say the anticipation 
of  death as the limit of  presence—gives experience meaning. 
If  the experience of  history is the availability of  history to a present which is the 
infinite structure of  experience—the absolute and invariable ‘now’ in which everything that 
happens happens—then far from being able to be the way of  appearing of  historicity and 
the counterpart of  historical and temporal being, the historicity of  experience is the denial 
of  historicity’s finitude. Certainty in the present as the eternal structure of  being, as what 
must belong to any time or being would deny the historicity of  experience. The present is 
the denial of  death in the sense that it is what death cannot conquer, because while I can 
admit that I may die, which is to say that presence will no longer belong to me, I can also 
be certain that existence will survive my own in the form of  the present—the present in 
which what exists exists. This is why Derrida writes in the margins: “Living Present more 
fundamental than the I.” (HQ 210) Before that, he explains: “And we know a priori… as far 
as one anticipates a future, we know, a priori, that in millions and millions of  years, if  there 
is an experience, a thought in general (human or not, divine or not, animal or not), it will be 
in the present, as we are in the present now.” (HQ 210) 
The living present, then, is exactly the denial of  the significance of  death for the 
structure of  being—it makes of  death a mere ‘feature’ of  the atemporal and immortal 
present. Death, for the structure of  experience, could only be an anticipated present. It 
would have to be a present that has not yet arrived, but will be present when it comes, if  it 
is anything at all. The present, in its living-ness (and it is here that the ‘life’ of  the ‘living 
present’ takes on renewed significance), dominates the existence of  death in the sense that 
it is only as living that death exists, can be experienced or thought. Is death merely a form 
of  life, a moment in life? If  the present exists, with the certainty and atemporality with 
which it must, then death does not. 
Death is not disclosed in an experience of  temporality. Experience, and the living 
present that is its only and invariant form, cannot be the ‘other side of  the coin’ of  the 
historicity or temporality of  experience insomuch as the temporality of  experience is 
determined by its being-towards-death. Nor is death mere ‘non-actuality’, as Heidegger 
explains in §72 of  Being and Time: “Factical Dasein exists as born; and, as born, it is already 
dying, in the sense of  Being-towards-death. As long as Dasein factically exists, both the 
‘ends’ and their ‘between’ are” (BT H 374). Death is not something that is not now but is 
‘in the offing’. 
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Ek-static temporality, as being-towards-death, is not at all the knowledge that in 
some present that is not yet actual the moment of  my death will come. Among other 
things, this thinking of  temporality on the basis of  the priority of  the present, the actual, 
and the instant is a kind of  denial of  finitude, since it makes awareness of  my death 
dependent upon the possibility of  ‘outstripping’ death in imagination. This act of  
imagination rests in the certainty of  the invariability of  the present; the invariable necessity 
that even in my death the structure of  being is preserved. The possibility of  death is not 
disclosed, cannot be disclosed, on the basis of  the present or a temporality of  the present, 
since there is no present in which death is. To put it in my terms—the historicity of  
experience as being-towards-death is not disclosed by the experience of  history. 
Historicity, according to Heidegger, is “just a more concrete working out of  
temporality” (BT H 382), and temporality is Dasein’s finitude—that Dasein is being-
towards-death, not as an actuality to come, but as a possibility that it is as long as it is, 
because of  the way its whole existence is taken up in ‘care’, Dasein’s concernfulness for its 
being: “As care, Dasein is the ‘between’” (BT H 374), a between which does not exclude the 
‘ends’. Being is temporal because of  Care as the “ontological meaning of  Dasein’s Being” 
(BT H 323). This is to say nothing less than that meaning itself  is in care and the 
temporality that belongs to it. In other words, anything meaningful is meaningful because it 
is ‘given’ meaning by care in care’s temporal structure. 
Heidegger explains that things are meaningful when “they have become accessible in 
their Being” (BT H 324). Indeed, that which makes meaning is what being is for Heidegger; 
this is perhaps the most robust way of  reading the definition put in the introduction to 
Being and Time: “Being—that which determines entities as entities” (BT H 6). Because of  
the Daseinsanalytik, the inquiry into being through the interrogation of  Dasein, that shapes 
Being and Time; the ‘accessibility’ of  things that makes them meaningful; their ‘givenness’; 
and the way in which they are ‘given’, is essential to their meaningfulness. This ‘givenness’ 
and ‘accessibility’ must not be understood, as it often is, as a parasitical phenomenality, a 
‘mere’ appearance that introduces distortion or the possibility of  distortion. Heidegger’s 
analysis here is profoundly phenomenological—it is the being of  entities itself  which is 
accessible, which is revealed in the interrogation of  Dasein. This is why Heidegger 
emphasizes that not only have things become accessible, “they have become accessible in 
their Being” (BT H 324).  
Accessibility not being a mere aftereffect, but the way of  being of  beings, the 
question of  being must attend to the way in which being is made accessible, and this is 
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through care. Care might be described in a non-Heideggerean fashion as what makes being 
a ‘self ’ possible, but because there is no self  without being-in-the-world, this can’t be 
understood in a monadic or Cartesian sense. We might more accurately say that ‘self ’ is the 
ontic thing made sense of  existentially by care. In more Heideggerean terms, care is the 
“potentiality-for-being-a-whole” (BT H 303) of  Dasein—the possibility of  projecting 
“existential phenomena upon the existentiell possibilities which have been delineated in 
them, and ‘think these possibilities through to the end’ in an existential manner” (BT H 
302–03). In care, Dasein can be the whole that it is without its reduction to an object 
present-at-hand: Dasien “cannot be pieced together into something present-at-hand out of  
pieces which are present-at-hand.” (BT H 302) 
Heidegger notes that historicity is what determines the concrete character of  
finitude. Being-towards-death determines only finitude itself  as a sort of  empty generality: 
“One’s anticipatory projection of  oneself  on that possibility of  existence which is not to be 
outstripped—on death—guarantees only the totality and authenticity of  one’s 
resoluteness.” (BT H 383) In Being-towards-death and Dasein’s authentic being-a-whole, 
“temporality gets experienced in a phenomenally primordial way” (BT H 304) in which death and the 
future are not mere moments to come, less actual than the present moment. In care, a 
certain priority of  the future determines the primordial temporal experience. Heidegger 
writes: “Being-towards-death is possible only as something futural.” (BT H 325) Care 
involves the being “thought through to the end” (BT H 305) because care concerns the 
being-whole of  Dasein. It is in terms of  its futurity that Dasein is its past or ‘having-been’, 
and yet its ‘having-been’ is essential to its futurity: “Only in so far as Dasein is as an ‘I-am-
as-having-been’, can Dasein come towards itself  futurally in such a way that it comes back.” 
(BT H 325-26) 
Thus, temporality, specifically the Ek-static temporality of  care in which death is as a 
possibility, is the structure of  existence. Historicity is what works out the actual character 
of  existence, and the possibilities that make it what it is. Because existence is finite its 
possibilities are finite, and what they are and what they are not—that is to say, the being-
towards-death of  Dasein—is what history is. The general form of  futurity belongs to 
Dasein because of  its being-towards-death, while the particular character of  Dasein in each 
case is given in its history. Death and history make Dasein finite in this way, and meaning is 
in the care that takes in the whole of  Dasein’s finite being. 
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But what is this ‘meaning’? In phenomenological fashion, one is tempted to 
respond that it is the meaning of  experience, since only what is in principle capable of  
being experienced can be meaningful. If  this were the case, then indeed it would be as 
though the experience of  history and the historicity of  experience were complementary, 
two sides of  the same coin, —as though experience is historical in its structure and that 
historical structure is given in experience. There would be no need for the destruction of  
the metaphysics of  presence in that case; but merely a working out of  presence’s meaning. 
The irremissibility of  presence for experience—that presence is experience itself—
would pervert the meaning of  historicity, however. In historicity, existence is in structures 
that are not nor could ever become, present. Death is not a state of  affairs that will or 
could become actual, and yet it belongs to existence. The historicity of  experience, then, 
means that historicity is not the correlative of  experience, but its limit and destruction. 
Historicity does not explain and undergird experience—rather, it shatters its certainty in the 
eventual presence of  all existence. 
Does that mean that experience does not exist? Of  course not. This is why the 
destruction of  metaphysics is not a refutation. Although historicity and experience are not 
simply counterparts, the historicity which will destroy the infinite certainty of  the living 
present still owes a priority to the present. If  it did not, Heidegger would merely have 
performed, would have been able to perform, a refutation. It would merely have been a 
matter of  displacing the metaphysics of  presence and asserting ek-static temporality as the 
only authentic structure of  existence. On that basis, present experience could be subsumed 
within the ek-static being-towards-the-end without any caveats. However, temporality is after 
all phenomenologically given, which is to say it is experienced.83 There is a 
phenomenologicality that is never given over by Heidegger, and the necessity of  experience 
reasserts the priority of  the present as the ineluctable modality of  the experience. 
Rather than correlates, the historicity of  experience and the experience of  history 
belong to each other in a way that anticipates Derrida’s signature relation—the condition 
of  impossibility—they rely on each other and yet each of  them resists the priority claimed 
by the other for itself. While it is interesting to note this, the clearest sense of  the 
relationship between historicity and experience can be made with a model Derrida had 
already used to describe history and its relationship to ideality in Husserl in the 
Introduction—a wechselspiel, or interplay, between counterposed reductions. 
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Insofar as experience is historical it is dominated by ek-static temporality and being-
towards-death, which is to say, the present possesses no priority but is made possible and 
meaningful because of  its own being-towards-an-end. The absolute priority of  presence 
demanded by experience, which involves the certainty in the infinite presence of  the 
present—that whenever there is an experience, which is to say anything at all, it will be in 
the present, is reduced to the finitude of  being-towards-death and the constitution of  
existence in the possibility of  death. Heidegger writes; “temporality gets experienced in a 
phenomenally primordial way” (BT H 304) But the primordial way that temporality gets 
experienced reduces experience itself. Put another way: as temporality is experienced, 
experience itself  gives over its primordiality to temporality. 
On the other hand, as history and temporality are structures which are experienced, 
their ek-static-ness is reduced to present appearance. As an experience, history and even 
temporality as being-towards-death are structures which belong to the present.  They are 
structures which are given to experience—the finitude of  existence belongs to the present, 
as does the very absence that constitutes it. In this way, temporality is inevitably reduced to 
experience and its domination by the present. This contradicts the intent if  not always the 
expression of  Heidegger. But experience as the way in which temporality is disclosed 
seems to be acknowledged, at the very least by the extensive discussion of  experience. 
Experience has its priority, as Derrida asserts; 
Sein und Zeit, in this sense, announces the end of  this epoch, but still belongs to 
it in that the historicity it describes, it describes, without a doubt, in the 
horizon, at this time explicit, of  being—and that is the progress: the question 
of  being is put as such from the first pages of  Sein und Zeit. But—and this is in 
which it still remains in the epoch of  metaphysics—, the description of  
historicity in Sein und Zeit still concerns the historicity of  a form of  being; being 
as Dasein. This is still in a certain sense history as experience (in a sense that 
after all still holds to phenomenology—that of  Hegel or that of  Husserl). 
(HQ 217) 
 There is a sense in which the present is, as Derrida said in the eighth session 
constituted “as the past of  a future, which is to say living the present not as origin and 
absolute form of  experience (of  ek-sistence), but as the product, the constituted, the derived, 
the constituted in turn starting from the horizon of  the future and the ek-sistence of  the 
future…” (HQ 276), but the constituted present presupposes a constituting present in 
turn. 
                                                                                                                                          
83 “temporality gets experienced in a phenomenally primordial way” (BT H 304) 
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Destruction in Heidegger is described by Derrida as a confirmation of  
metaphysics—the necessity of  the phenomenological and the structure of  experience is 
something that must be acknowledged. And yet, for Heidegger, especially in his 
formulations after the Kehre, there is often a suggestion of  leaving the metaphysics of  
presence behind. 
As confirming the irrecusability of  presence, the destruction of  metaphysics of  
presence sets up a dynamic for which there can be no consistent and stable overview 
between experience and history. The recognition of  each of  them requires, in its way, the 
reduction of  the other. And for each of  these it is a reduction which is not benign— 
reduction which dissimulates what is essential to history or to experience (namely, in the 
case of  which, its incompatibility with being reduced by the other), as the case may be. And 
yet the necessity of  both history and experience, and their dependence upon each other, is 
obvious. 
Again, this interplay is recognisable as a condition of  impossibility. But it is more 
richly accounted for in the terms Derrida used to explain the relationship between the 
eidetic reduction and history in. In the Introduction Derrida describes this as an interplay 
between reductions. In this case, we could call the reductions the phenomenological and 
the historical. The ‘interplay’ does not occur on the level of  experience or history, because 
each reduces the other and thereby inoculates itself  from the influence of  it. However, 
there is interplay for the philosopher attempting to account for them. It is this interplay 
that is the interplay between destruction and confirmation, that distinguishes fundamental 
ontology from another system, come to refute what stood before it. 
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6 – History and Infinite Difference 
(Voice and Phenomenon 
 
Commencing the ultimate chapter of  Voice and Phenomenon, Derrida describes his reading of  
Husserl as “a reading that can be simply neither that of  commentary nor that of  
interpretation” (VP 75), as Lawlor renders “une lecture qui ne peut être simplement ni celle 
du commentaire ni celle de l’interprétation” (Voix 98). David B. Allison’s translation 
renders the phrase using the same vocabulary of  ‘commentary’ and ‘interpretation’ (see SP 
88). These translations respect the cognates and demands that we allow the English word 
‘commentary’ to have the sense that the French ‘commentaire’ accommodates somewhat 
more readily and that the context of  contrast from ‘interprétation’ implies—a commentary 
which consists not merely of  a neutral explication, but critical-evaluative analysis. Derrida 
reiterates again and again that his aim is not simple—that his discourse is at every step 
dependent on phenomenology and at exactly the same time puts in doubt the deriving of  
the infinite and the absent from the fullness of  evidence that ground the transcendental 
approach (the latter being Derrida’s famous deconstruction of  the metaphysics of  
presence). problematises the whole approach. This double gesture is familiar from 
Derrida’s work and attitude. In the recently published 1964–65 ENS seminar Heidegger: La 
question de l'Être et de l’Histoire, this ambivalence appears as a theme—it describes 
Heideggerean destruction of  the history of  metaphysics: “La destruction n'est ni une 
réfutation ni une annihilation” (HQEH 226: “destruction is neither a refutation nor an 
annihilation”). The publication of  Derrida’s explicit and straightforward discussion of  the 
conflict between a philosophical ‘irreducibility’ of  the present as the locus of  evidence, 
epitomised by Husserlian phenomenology, and Heidegger’s thought of  “L'historicité elle-
même” (213: “historicity itself ”), which is to say a historicity which is not reduced to the 
present, makes new insights into his engagements with both philosophers possible, one 
which sheds light on those in his published work of  the same period, especially Voice. The 
ambivalence Derrida expresses here with respect to the fruitfulness and phenomenological 
resources of  a Heideggerean essential link between history and being resembles the 
ambivalence he expressed with respect to Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology in 
Voice. The impossibility of  a straightforward refutation or even overcoming of  philosophy 
as metaphysics, even in its closure, preoccupies Derrida throughout this period of  his 
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scholarship. The ambivalence that compels the gestures of  deconstruction is more evident 
than ever in these seminars, in which it is clearly drawing from both a Heideggerean 
thinking and from a Heideggerean attitude, at once polemical and all-encompassing, to and 
of  the history of  metaphysics.  
The tension appears most starkly in a single paragraph on page 82 when Derrida 
announces that in view of  the critique which I will go on to examine “no pure 
transcendental reduction is possible” (VP 71), but although this condemnation ought to 
doom the entire phenomenological enterprise, he claims, with the same assurance and 
gravity, that “it is necessary to pass through the reduction” (VP 71, “il faut passer par elle” 
[Voix 92]) in order for the critique and what makes reduction impossible to reveal itself. 
There is no doubt but that the confutation (commentaire) of  phenomenology is only possible 
within the discourse of  phenomenology, that is, only if  it is a faithful ‘interprétation’. This is 
why the reading can be neither simply one nor the other. Despite Derrida’s spatial 
metaphor, there is in a very important sense no leaving the reduction behind, in the sense 
of  emerging from it with meaning and truth intact—discourse, as discourse, which must to 
some extent dominate Derrida’s reading, remains attached to phenomenology and the 
reduction in what Derrida determines as its ‘closure’, in much the same way as it did in the 
end of  the Introduction. 
But what is the meaning of  this attachment, and of  this ‘passing through’? What is 
the relation of  phenomenology, and particularly of  its claim to dominate philosophy, to 
destruction, deconstruction, and the outside? Derrida’s text aims at something beyond mere 
critique, something at once more radical and more faithful. Is it Derrida’s decision, or a 
consequence of  engaging with the father of  phenomenology? The paradox, perhaps, 
derives from the impossibility of  a straightforward fidelity to Husserl and to his critique. A 
simple avowal of  critique, one that would be uncritical of  it, is impossible, of  course, but 
so is a simple rejection of  it (a rejection which if  it had any basis at all would only affirm 
critique itself). This is what Derrida will thematise later, in “Plato’s Pharmacy” as the 
“necessity and inevitability of  parricide” (PP 162) as it arises in Parmenidean philosophy 
and Plato’s Sophist. It is the impossibility of  acceding to the father’s discriminations without 
catching him, or at least some potent part of  him, on the point of  that scalpel. 
We must ask ourselves, after Maupassant, “what would we do with this parricide?” 
(de Maupassant, Original Short Stories, 271)84 On the other hand, perhaps the manoeuvre is 
                                                
84 Or, ‘what would we make of this parricide’—“Que ferions-nous de ce parricide?” (Maupassant, 
Contes et Nouvelles 559) 
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freer than that, perhaps it derives from the desire expressed in Rogues at the other end of  
Derrida’s career to bring into question the hegemony of  critique; “Perhaps we might try to 
think, on the contrary, something other than a crisis.” (Rogues 124) Something other than 
crisis, “a tremor at once more and less serious” (Rogues 124), and something that calls for a 
reading that is other than critique.  
 
This chapter consisting of  two sections presents and explains Derrida’s hallmark 
idea of  differance as it both relates to and is anticipated in Husserlian phenomenology, and 
how the logical difficulties of  a thinking of  infinite difference indicates a certain closure of  
history and phenomenology that pushes us into the open question of  an origin history 
cannot unearth, in the ontological question as to the ‘why’ of  it. And yet phenomenology 
remains relevant—remains the relevant philosophical enquiry. 
The first section—“Deconstruction of  phenomenology, or deconstructive 
phenomenology?”—returns to the hints in the last chapter that delay was not only delay 
but involved an equiprimordial spacing and difference. As I showed in the last chapter this 
is already hinted at, but of  course it becomes a much more fully worked-out hypothesis in 
Voice and Phenomenon and in other texts of  that period, especially the text which takes its 
name for what this observation leads to; “Differance”85. Even though its chief  claims with 
regard to Husserl were already put in the Introduction as indications of  the capacity of  
transcendental phenomenology to account for difference, when it reemerges in Voice it is in 
a much more critical mode in which the originality of  differance is put as an objection to 
the ‘pre-expressive core of  sense’ which Derrida claims Husserl relies upon. I will raise 
objections to this critique by adhering to the reading of  the ideal core of  sense as coherent 
possibilities of  ideality, according to which the idea of  a pre-expressive core is neither 
necessary nor plausible. 
In the second section, “Death and the infinite”, I will return to the question of  the 
act, subjectivity, and the living present, which likewise revisits themes already raised in the 
Introduction and in my chapter on it. Here again my method is to return to the radical 
interpretation of  Husserl given by Derrida in the Introduction, and my own interpretation of  
Husserl on the basis of, I think, shared priorities in terms of  grounding phenomenology 
                                                
85 Not being a word, as Derrida attests, ‘différance’ is frequently left untranslated by Derrida’s 
translators—Alan Bass makes this choice in his translation of the lecture “Différance” in Margins of 
Philosophy and Leonard Lawlor also leaves it in the French in Voice and Phenomenon. In my discussion 
I’ve opted to translate it following David B. Allison as “differance” and to distinguish it from 
“difference” either by italicisation or commentary where potential for confusion exists. 
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without deriving “difference from the fullness of  a parousia” (VP 87), but maintaining an 
infinite difference as the many-chambered heart of  transcendentalism. In Voice, Derrida 
describes an opposing tendency to that which I have emphasised and tried to establish in 
self-sufficiency (ironically) in Husserl’s thought, which aims at an original starting place of  
positivity and fullness at the core of  the subjective act, the living present, and infinity itself. 
Ultimately, the reason fullness is necessary is because the infinite as such is not thinkable 
without betraying its own logic. It is only a positive infinite—the absolute—the idea of  
which is not logically inconceivable—yet such an infinity is only possible given fulness of  a 
positive, which the primordial difference our interpretation of  transcendentalism reflects 
cannot derive from, at least not directly. The way to the thinkability of  infinite difference is 
through the death of  the positive infinite, and that in turn indicates the closure of  science. 
 
Although it may seem odd to discuss Voice and Phenomenon in this context without 
elaborating the structure of  Derrida’s deconstruction of  experience in transcendental 
phenomenology on the basis of  its presupposition of  a pre-expressive core of  sense, that 
is what I mean to do. This argument is not only the core of  the text, it is widely considered 
crucial to the development of  Derrida’s philosophy and of  his relationship to Husserl, and 
in a sense it is profoundly germane to my discussion of  the possibility of  truth coming to 
be in history, because it brings into question the self-identity of  sense that would be the 
basis for the possibility of  truth. On what grounds then, do I exclude or even merely gloss 
over this important topic? The deconstruction/destruction of  presence that is at issue here 
has already been conceded—it is the status of  this deconstruction and the status of  
presence in the light of  it that is now in question. While it is important to look at Derrida’s 
problematisation of  sense here, this has already been done extensively. Key scholarship in 
this area includes Claude J. Evans’ Strategies of  Deconstruction; and Bernard Dauenhauer’s "On 
Speech and Temporality: Derrida and Husserl." Derrida himself  also revisits the theme of  
auto-affection in Husserl in chapter eight of  On Touching—Jean-Luc Nancy. As it is I have 
attempted to look at history as what concerns both Derrida and Husserl, and not to go into 
the important and difficult questions raised by voice and auto-affection. I hope I have 
succeeded in proving the feasibility of  this project, partial though it may be, by showing the 
importance of  history in Derrida’s work on Husserl and the development of  his own ideas. 
I will give a brief  précis of  this topic by way of  introducing Voice, but what I will avoid 
doing for the sake of  the integrity of  this thesis is going into a sustained argument about 
the way it obtains with regards to Husserl and its meaning for his philosophy. 
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a. Deconstruction of  Phenomenology, or Deconstructive 
Phenomenology? 
 
If  delay/deferral was in Introduction, the book without a name about a book without a 
name, a radical interpretation of  Husserl’s philosophy of  history which ‘merely’ explicated 
the necessarily infinite nature of  that history, in Voice and Phenomenon, Derrida pulls at the 
individual strands or filaments (‘fils’, as he points out, again in Pharmacy) interwoven in the 
phenomenology of  history some more until the way infinite history and deferral calls for 
an equally radical intervention in spatiality, and therefore identity is revealed as a more 
disturbing development than it appeared in the gestures toward it in the Introduction. Here 
the impossibility of  the confinement of  the constituted complexity of  the living present to 
a temporality of  deferral and its creation of  difference in the temporo-spatiality and 
disruption of  identity of  fundamental differance is explained thematically, rather than merely 
alluded to. Along with the claim that the temporal delay could be more readily 
accommodated by phenomenology comes the criticism that the spatiality of  a difference at 
the constitution of  the present is problematic for Husserl’s system. 
Nevertheless, even in light of  the further disruption wrought by bringing deferral 
together with difference in differance, the consequence of  Derrida’s more original 
intercession is overwhelmingly consistent with the ambiguous significance of  the 
Introduction—phenomenology is not free from self-destruction, but neither can it be simply 
dismissed. Deconstruction, which with the outlining of  the movements of  differance and 
trace is by the writing of  Voice and Phenomenon in 1968 almost completely anticipated, does 
not replace or subvert phenomenology or introduce some new science or realm of  being 
which phenomenology falls short of. We have to say, in some sense, that when we are being 
deconstructive we are doing phenomenology, even though when we are being 
deconstructive we are problematising phenomenology, only because when we are being 
deconstructive we must problematise deconstruction and because to do phenomenology is 
to bring into question the possibility of  doing phenomenology. The understanding of  what 
Derrida insists is not a technique but which can also never give rise to a movement, 
depends on this. 
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The question which orients Voice and Phenomenon is the same as that which orients 
the Introduction and the Origin itself, and which Derrida claims comprises transcendental 
enquiry as such (see IOG 153)—the question of  origin in the temporal sense and at the 
same time in the sense of  fundamental and instituting principles, senses which, in the 
aftermath of  Husserl’s claim that “The ruling dogma of  the separation in principle 
between epistemological elucidation and historical, even humanistic-psychological 
explanation, between epistemological and genetic origin, is fundamentally mistaken” (IOG 
172), are one and indivisible. Nevertheless, Voice is entirely original. In Voice, the origin 
under investigation is conceived as the origin of  meaning and sense (which is again not 
outside the realm in which it is conceived in the Origin). Since the introduction of  the 
concept in The Phenomenology of  Internal Time Consciousness, Husserl had used ‘the living 
present’ to describe the irreducible temporal complexity and constitutedness of  the 
absolutely constituting moment of  experience—the origin of  being (see Husserl, Time 
Consciousness §11). At the end of  his Introduction, Derrida explains how the constituted 
complexity of  the constituting moment of  intuition incorporates already at the source of  
self  and sameness and the very atomic core of  experience the phenomena of  alterity, as 
they will later take form in his own discourses on other people (in the fifth meditation) and on 
other epochs (in the Crisis and especially in the Origin itself), within the basic self-identity of  
the transcendental ego (though Husserl never explicitly thematises the derivation of  alterity 
on the basis of  primordial alterity, as Derrida points out). The temporality of  the 
fundamentally temporal root of  intentionality is revealed in this analysis to not itself  derive 
from a still more fundamental core of  presence but from infinite passage and deferral, that 
is from what also makes history possible. Far from history being rooted in the present a 
primordial deferral is the ‘origin’ of  both. It is perhaps closer to the truth (though not 
precise) to say that the present is rooted in history, though not in a material sense but in its 
essence as a present that is the past retained.86 Even in the Introduction, Derrida, however 
briefly indicates the impossibility of  isolating temporal extension from spatial extension, 
and of  distinguishing difference in time from difference in the subject whose time it is, 
which is why he characterises intentionality itself  as “the going out from self  to self  of  the 
Absolute of  the Living Present” (IOG 150). 
This was ‘merely’ a radical interpretation of  what was already implied in the 
irreducible extension of  the ‘now’—it is deferral of  itself, prior to any constituted self-
                                                
86 “The present appears neither as the rupture nor the effect of a past, but as the retention of a 
present past” (IOG 57) 
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presence. Having embarked patiently and painstakingly on an itinerary in the Introduction, 
Derrida proceeds much further, much faster, in Voice. It is not merely that Derrida 
continues on in the same direction—it is a re-embarkation in the same direction from the 
same starting position.  
 Thus, deferral is tantamount to difference, and where there is time there is always 
space, but, according to Derrida in Voice, this constitutes a major discovery whereas the 
‘delay’ interpretation was ‘merely’ a radical interpretation. On this basis (among others) 
Derrida launches his idea of  differance, a ‘concept’ (that is not a concept) much more 
disruptive for Husserlian phenomenology than the delay the latter had already anticipated. 
Here, the philosophical/anti-philosophical movement deconstruction is under way. 
 
Because it retraces familiar ground, the argument as to the spatiality of  delay is not 
difficult to follow. Time—the temporality which in the living present and in Derrida’s 
earlier treatment of  it described the self-relation which constitutes the transcendental ego 
as the source of  experience—Derrida here describes as a metaphor for what he calls very 
provisionally “this ‘movement’” and “trace”87 (VP 73). But time is a problematic metaphor, 
because it talks about movement “in the very terms that movement makes possible” (SP 85 
[see VP 73]). There is thus great risk of  conflation. Metaphor is necessary, however, 
because what makes temporality possible essentially has no ‘determinate being88’ and thus 
can only be spoken of  metaphorically. It is a habitual but problematic tendency to use the 
metaphor closest at hand—the first thing ‘it’ produces; what is only possible because of  it. 
The ‘movement’ that constitutes temporality is not itself  temporal—it is of  course ‘prior’ 
to time. While it may not be possible to ascribe to what is in some sense a purity of  
movement itself  a determinate character, it is at least potentially misleading to speak of  it 
in terms of  something it makes possible, and particularly to exclude from it what else it 
makes possible. The substitution of  time for the origin of  time would not be so misleading 
in itself  did it not efface the coexistence of  time with what time as “non-space” (VP 73), 
for Husserl, suppresses. The auto-affection by which a ‘now’ is affected by “another now” 
(VP 73) is a ‘trace’ (of  the retained ‘now’) which Husserl considered as purely temporal and 
therefore capable of  being united in a ‘living present’ as that which while temporally 
                                                
87 See VP 58: “the trace in the most universal sense, is a possibility that not only must inhabit the 
pure actuality of the now, but also must constitute it by means of the very movement of the 
différance that the possibility inserts into the pure actuality of the now.” 
88 “As soon as we insert a determinate being into the description of this ‘movement,’ we are 
speaking by metaphor.” (VP 73) 
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extended could in its own way be considered self-identical and self-present.89 Husserl’s 
embrace of  time as primordially and fundamentally extended in a way that Derrida will 
have been able to characterise in perfect harmony90 with the former as ‘delay’ and ‘deferral’ 
because it did not prioritise an absolute present91 is here shown to rely on an idea of  self-
presence in space, and therefore in identity. This in itself  would not be so worrying, except 
that it is, as Derrida demonstrates, unwarranted—the same ‘movement’ which makes time 
(and anything at all) possible by ‘retaining’ the now-become-’non-now’ is the movement 
which makes space and differance possible and in fact introduces space and time 
ineluctably. The Introduction, as I said, alluded to difference bringing space into the 
constitution of  the living present, but read this as an interpretation of  the meaning of  the 
living present as the self ’s “going out from self  to self ” (IOG 150). Here, in Voice, Derrida 
expands on the same logic, but no longer seems to think that Husserl’s transcendental 
subject can accommodate the difference. 
Derrida explains the retentional structure of  the living present as the way that a 
‘now’ simultaneously becomes itself  and becomes retained, which is to say ceases to be 
itself, or rather becomes not-itself, to “become a non-now as a past now” (VP 73). The 
complexity of  the living present as the basic unit of  experience means that the ‘now’ must 
at the same time become and then cease to be as such and yet be retained. The retention 
which makes existence possible Derrida calls auto-affection; “The process by means of  
which the living now, producing itself  by spontaneous generation, must, in order to be a 
now, be retained in another now, must affect itself, without empirical recourse, with a new 
originary actuality in which it will become a non-now as a past now, etc.” (VP 72–73). In 
the same moment (or rather, ‘movement’, since it is not determined in the temporality of  a 
‘moment’) in which the identical occurs—in which the now becomes itself—the ‘other’ is 
there as a constitutive part of  the identity, and yet what it is affected by is nothing other 
                                                
89 Derrida sometimes renders the concept most familiarly called “lebendige Gegenwart” as “le présent 
vivant” [Voix 95], but he also uses “Le maintenant vivant” (Voix 94). Even though the term had no 
priority for Husserl over terms such as ‘now’ (see ITC 34) or even the lovely term ‘Augenblick’ I will 
stick with the familiarity of the ‘living present’, in part because it lays bare the implied ‘presence’ 
with which Derrida confronts Husserl, raising the question whether the present is really ‘there’. 
90 I am deliberately oversimplifying the issue of whether the living present is a prioritisation of the 
present. Derrida himself, however, will have to concede his doubts as to the temporal purity of the 
present of the living present at the bottom of page 72 and the top of page 73 of Voice in order to 
explain the structure of retention as forming a ‘now’. 
91 And which, as Derrida notes, Heidegger also praised as being the first to depart from the 
Aristotelian priority of presence; “Heidegger says in Sein und Zeit that [the analyses of The 
Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness] are the first, in the history of philosophy, to break with a 
concept of time inherited from Aristotle's Physics and determined on the basis of the notions of 
‘now,’ of ‘point,’ of 'limit,’ and of ‘circle.’” (VP 52) 
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than itself. Being retained in another now, the now becomes both now and not-now, all 
before it has become now. It becomes its own other and in so doing constitutes itself. As 
Derrida describes it; “such a process is indeed a pure auto-affection in which the same is 
the same only by affecting itself  with an other” (VP 73).  And again: “The living present 
arises on the basis of  its non-self-identity, and on the basis of  the retentional trace.” (VP 
73) Obviously, this movement must be prior to the difference between same and other. 
Characterised as such, the primordial extension that constitutes the living present is thus 
not merely (what Derrida characterises here as) the safe, sterile temporal extension which 
could be understood as confined within a single and self-identical individual; it is also the 
spatial relation that distances the self  from itself  in its requisite traversal of  distance 
between the self  and the other. Between the ‘now’ and its simultaneous retention as a no-
longer-now there is a relation of  difference which demands the traversal of  space implied 
in the possibility of  relation as auto-affection; relation of  a self  to its other, or ‘outside’; 
“Since the trace is the relation of  intimacy of  the living present to its outside, the openness 
to exteriority in general, to the non-proper, etc., the temporalization of  sense is from the very 
beginning ‘spacing.’” (VP 73) 
It is because the self-proximity of  auto-affection is essential to the maintenance of  
sense in expression yet impossible within a supposed pre-expressive ‘core’ of  sense, that 
the interruption by the space of  differance is meant to be so destabilising. The pure auto-
affection of  expression is necessary, Derrida’s interpretation would have it, in order for the 
pre-expressive core of  sense to be possible and to be indicated (without the purity of  an 
expression which sustains the non-limitation of  the signifier by the signified in language, 
the object itself  of  language would not present itself  to us), and such a core is in turn 
necessary for expression as well. There is indeed no expression without an object to be 
expressed, just as there is no object without the pure possibility of  its expression. The 
movement of  the trace which is prior to time and space and which constitutes both, 
introduces difference and the spatiality of  an irreducible outside into the initial moment of  
the constitution of  the expression. If  expression is possible only in a self-presence from 
which anything external, anything which would interfere with its universality, has been 
excluded, then the ‘essential difference’ (see VP 70f) of  the auto-affection which comprises 
the movement of  that necessary self-presence must also and at the same time make the 
absolute self-presence on which it (expression) relies impossible. The dream of  the purity 
of  an expression in which the exterior of  the sign, the signifier, remains absolutely 
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mastered by a signified ‘core’ which reduplicates its object is dashed by Derrida’s 
observation that this dream is only the concealment of  its own conditions of  possibility. 
As a result, the auto-affective expression cannot by itself  furnish language’s essence, 
and indication—the indicative function which, according to Derrida, Husserl’s thinking must 
still relegate to a secondary, non-essential function of  language long after the distinction 
between the two is actually made in Logical Investigations because of  the demand of  auto-
affection for the “unproductive redoubling” (VP 27) of  expression—must be understood to 
fulfil the essential function of  language that is communication. The essential difference of  auto-
affection demands indication at the origin of  expression, in the constitution of  the self, 
which because it is constituted by auto-affection is not constituted by an entirely 
homogeneous same. A function of  indication is essential to the constitution of  the object, 
but indication, Derrida claims, is a duplication which because it is not strictly auto-affective 
is not pure. Without the purity of  unproductive expression as a complete attainment, the 
object it expresses is not determinable with absolute certainty. But that is still to treat 
language as a latecomer to consciousness. The situation would be even more serious, 
because the object itself  is not, by necessity, experienced outside of  the possibility of  
expression. To put it another way—there is no possible object of  experience except that 
the possibility of  expression in language belongs to it. 
 
But is there really supposed to be an objective core or stratum prior to expression? 
And if  so, in what sense? How and in what way is the ‘pre-expressive’ ‘pre-‘? The object 
exists as idea, and as such depends on its coexistence with a whole field of  companion 
idealities, among which are not only language (which we could explain away as being 
confined to the interiority of  expressive language, as per Derrida’s—after Husserl’s—
distinction) but community and history. The possibility of  an object is therefore dependent 
from the start on what is outside of  the object and the conscious apprehension thereof  by 
a solitary subject—the world and others. Any supposed priority of  the object is nothing 
but a manner of  speaking, perhaps invoked by way of  explaining the articulation of  
ideality’s distinct yet interdependent ‘parts’. There is no possible object prior to the 
possibility of  language, and therefore it is impossible to speak of  “the existence of  a pre-
expressive and pre-linguistic stratum of  sense” (VP 26). The only ‘before’ that is 
meaningful with regard to ideality is an essential ‘before’—the ‘before’ which would denote 
the essential independence that is a consequence of  being possible ‘before’ the possibility 
of  the other. Any non-essential priority, such as for example a factual one, at least 
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according to Husserl, is of  no consequence. This is the case not only for ‘factuality’ in the 
non-phenomenological sense—the essence of  factual priority is inconsequential. The 
‘outside’ which Derrida claims Husserl’s account of  sense and phenomenological being 
excludes, thereby confirming “the classical metaphysics of  presence” and indicating “that 
phenomenology belongs to classical ontology” (VP 22)92, will always have already been 
there at the outset in the only way that it ever needs to be ‘there’; as possibility. Derrida 
emphasises the necessity of  the ideal structure of  repeatability as a possibility prior to any 
factual repetition himself  on page 58: “The ideality of  the form (Form) of  presence itself  
implies consequently that it can be repeated to infinity, that its return, as the return of  the 
same, is to infinity necessary and inscribed in presence as such” (VP 58), and again on page 
64: “An ideal object is an object whose monstration can be indefinitely repeated” (VP 64). 
What Derrida’s indication of  this ‘core’ of  meaning relied upon by Husserl, and 
indeed, his entire deconstruction of  the metaphysics of  presence, is concerned with is 
maintained, rather than challenged, by the structure of  possibility. It is a structure that 
Derrida had the strongest instincts for, as he indicates in his response to John Searle in 
Limited inc.: “I repeat, therefore, since it can never be repeated too often: if  one admits that 
writing (and the mark in general) must be able to function in the absence of  the sender, the 
receiver, the context of  production, etc., that implies that this power, this being able, this 
possibility is always inscribed, hence necessarily inscribed as possibility in the functioning 
or the functional structure of  the mark.” (LI 48) Derrida, as I have shown throughout this 
thesis, is keenly aware of  the resistance to simple priorities throughout Husserl’s thinking; 
indeed, this is what draws him to Husserl. It is perhaps this careful attention to 
phenomenology’s resistance to the collapsing of  differences which trained Derrida’s ear to 
a priority never relinquished by Husserl. In that sense, Derrida’s deconstruction is a faithful 
attention to Husserl’s most radical tendencies and at the same time a profoundly unsettling 
intervention. 
 
 
b. Death and the Infinite 
 
                                                
92 In fact, Derrida will claim, any account of sense and meaning whatsoever will be bound to this 
invalid exclusion. 
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If  the incursion of  space, world, alterity and the other into sense is problematic, it is 
because, according to Derrida, sense requires that these externalities must be constituted 
on the basis of  an irreducible subjectivity, that is, the pure auto-affective act of  a 
transcendental subject—that without the act the sense loses its grounding in the 
apodeicticity of  experience, which must have the structure of  the transcendental act. The 
necessity of  the factual is not on the side of  the object, but on the side of  the irreducible 
subjectivity—without which all of  the ideal coherence is meaningless. Without the 
transcendental ego and its act, all of  phenomenology would fall prey to the same 
objectivism for which Husserl criticises modern science—forgetting the intention that 
makes it what it is. But the question remains as to how the act must be reclaimed by 
phenomenological science. Without doubt, the act must be treated and not eliminated as a 
merely epistemically necessary and imperfect instrument, but does that mean that it must 
not be reduced to its essence? Indeed, is it possible for science to treat subjectivity without 
reducing it to an object of  study? And is this not adequate for the avoidance of  
objectivism, that the act is brought into consideration as an object of  thought? Is it not an 
object with the content ‘act’ which is necessary in order to prevent the forgetting of  origins 
and meanings? Does phenomenological certainty require (and, can it attain) the act as act, or 
is it enough for it to turn the act into a content; the subjective into an object? 
I explained in the section on the coherence of  ideality (in chapter three) that the 
coherent components of  ideality are fundamentally interdependent and that none of  them 
can exist without the other. Their interdependence, because they are idealities, is not 
factual. It is not a dependence on the factual existence of  other idealities, but a dependence 
on their possibility; they each depend on the pure possibility of  the others. What about the 
subject and the subjective act, however? Is the subjective act different from the coherence 
of  ideality, as the activity in which every ideal capacity must begin to occur, or is it itself  an 
essential possibility of  ideality—as it no doubt seems to be in the case of  the object’s 
dependence on the possible subjective act in which the object can be intended, for 
instance, or a possible speaker by whom language can be spoken. Put another way, in order 
to bring the dichotomy into relief—is the factuality of  the subjective act irreducible, as 
Derrida maintains, or is it itself  an ideal possibility—the possibility of  being intended 
which belongs essentially to the object. 
The transcendental function of  writing described by Husserl in the Origin, by 
making communication ‘virtual’ and demonstrating the necessity of  the ideal possibility not 
of  a subject but the ‘subjectless transcendental field’, shows that transcendental subjectivity 
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as constitutive of  the object is (nothing more than) an ideal possibility—it is the liberation 
of  sense from all factual subjects that writing accomplishes in order to constitute the 
object, particularly in terms of  the essential “persisting existence” which belongs to objects; 
“[writing] makes communications possible without immediate or mediate personal address; 
it is, so to speak, communication become virtual” (UG 164). Writing performs, as I have 
explained already in the chapter describing the coherence of  possibilities, a transcendental 
function in separating the possibility of  the act of  a transcendental subject, on which the 
possibility of  objectivity still depends, from the existence of  the factual subject. This 
independence from the factual is opaque in spoken language alone, wherein the necessity 
of  speech’s evanescence keeps the two (the factual and the possible) always coincident. By 
preserving the sign, writing separates the possibility of  its apprehension from the instant 
of  its authorship; unlike speech, writing remains ‘potent’ after the moment of  inscription, 
and this allows the reading subject to remain anonymous, and therefore to not be any 
particular subject at all. Borrowing a brilliant phrase coined by Hyppolite to describe the 
epochē (“subjectless transcendental field”), Derrida describes the role of  writing in 
Husserl’s coherence of  ideal possibilities; “By absolutely virtualizing dialogue, writing creates 
a kind of  autonomous transcendental field from which every actual subject can be absent” 
(IOG 88). 
Derrida’s description is as potentially misleading as it is beautiful and profound, 
however, especially with regard to his use of  the term ‘create’—in a sense, the autonomy 
and freedom from dependence on actual subjects is indeed created by writing, but only 
insofar as writing makes it possible to perceive an independence that already belonged to 
language, indeed to everything else constituting the coherence of  ideality. What language 
does is make the distinction between the essential possibility of  a subject’s act, without 
which the meaningfulness of  the object would be lacking, and the actual subject, which 
Derrida says “left to itself, is totally without signification [insignifiante]” (IOG 88), 
perceivable, thinkable. The distinction remains hidden in the case of  spoken language in 
which the necessity of  the actual presence of  a listening subject due to the merely 
contingent properties of  speech as ephemeral, as a medium without durability, interferes 
with the power to imagine a circumstance in which the language and its expression 
maintained its meaningfulness in the absence of  any actual subject. Writing furnishes the 
material for a thought experiment which would adequately demonstrate this independence. 
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This just means that the possibility of  writing is always already there, in the possibility of  
language, as a sort of  ‘archē-writing’.93  
As essential for the possibility of  objectivity, the possibility of  the subject can be 
included among the parts of  Husserl’s coherence of  ideality, as a transcendental possibility. 
Leonard Lawlor’s description of  the interdependence between subjectivity and writing 
supports this interpretation of  it as an interdependence of  possibilities; 
“By being able to do without every actual or factual subject, every actual reader or 
writer, writing opens up the possibility of  transcendental subjectivity. Therefore 
transcendental subjectivity depends on the possibility of  writing” (DH 117). The possibility 
of  subjectivity depends on the possibility of  writing—the factual is never at issue, is “totally 
without signification” (IOG 88). 
 
The ambiguities of  phenomenology are ambiguities of  the sense of  history, and the 
history of  sense, or to be slightly less abstruse, the question of  the truth of  the identity 
noted at the end of  the Introduction that brings together historicity and sense (see IOG 150-
51) in an indissoluble unity. Everything concerning genesis and the search for origins that is 
at stake in the project of  phenomenology, and in that of  philosophy itself, rests on the 
question of  whether history is up to the task. “In all the significations of  this term 
historicity is sense.” (IOG 150)—history and sense map to the totality of  each other’s 
possibilities, but is history a movement beyond its own closure, beyond the limits of  sense? 
This ambiguity concludes both the Introduction and Voice and Phenomenon, in which it is more 
strictly delineated and its tensions aggravated. Is genesis the history of  the presentation of  
being the closure of  which is defined, or is it the ontological question just opened up that 
brings us beyond both presence and sense94? If  it is both, how is that to be understood? If  
genesis is the history of  the presentation of  being, confined to sense, and the ontology that 
Derrida shows the opening onto, then are the two absolutely distinct and is the separation 
between them both according to sense determinable as fundamental to the sense of  history 
in all its possible significations, as Derrida claims in the Introduction (see IOG 150). If  so, 
then is the thinkability of  ontology secure? 
                                                
93 A neologism Derrida adopts to write about just the kind of necessary possibility of writing for 
language of any kind in Of Grammatology (see DG 60) 
94 Of course, if history leads beyond sense, then so does sense, since the former’s identification with 
the latter goes both ways. 
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The way to begin addressing these questions is shown at the conclusion of  Voice, in 
the opening of  ontology on the one hand and the closure of  history on the other. I will 
finish my enquiry there, bringing in parallel movements from the Introduction as necessary.  
 
Derrida identifies the ‘closure’ (or, ‘death’) of  the history of  being, that is of  both 
metaphysics and phenomenology as well as the history itself  which characterises every 
possible form of  them, as “self-presence in absolute knowledge” (VP 87). The closure of  
the metaphysics of  presence and the pursuit of  absolute knowledge is their achievement; 
the self-presence of  absolute knowledge. It is also the end of  science, its closure and death, 
since science is nothing but the pursuit of  knowledge, love of  wisdom in the sense in which it 
is characterised in Diotima’s fable of  Gifted (Πόρος) and Poverty in Plato’s Symposium (see 
Plato, Symposium 81f).95 Science is not, for Husserl or for any other thinker, perfect 
wisdom—it is the infinite task of  reason. Closure is the end of  science, which science 
perpetually forestalls. The closure is thus associated with death—it is the end of  history 
and the end of  science. Closure is also a consequence of  the same infinitude which 
maintains the opening. In Derrida’s metaphor which is never just a metaphor, life and death 
are brought together in the striving for life in meaning through voice, which Derrida says 
is; “at once absolutely alive and absolutely dead.” (VP 88) 
Differance, according to Derrida, is the implied ambiguity that sustains the 
unequivocal structures of  phenomenology. Between the infinite difference of  
phenomenological historicity, which as the ‘diacritical’ structure of  phenomenological 
temporality extends the theme of  history beyond the Kantian limitation of  it to 
‘intraworldly’ investigation; and the infinite presence of  the instant, which is the irreducible 
origin of  any evidence, there is a differance which is ‘prior to’, in the sense of  not 
subsumable under one or the other of, both deferral and difference and both finitude and 
infinity. Being is neither simply the infinite self-presence of  the intentional object with the 
constituting ego in the living present, nor simply the infinite difference which is constituted 
as ideal object, but always both, owing its existence to the difference between them. This 
differance is the region in which phenomenology is at work, and the marking of  a 
differance ‘prior to’ or ‘beyond’ the finitude of  phenomenological being as diacrisis of  
sense in infinite difference is what, finally, motivates the ontological move and the closure 
of  the metaphysics of  presence and the history of  presence. 
                                                
95 see Plato, Symposium 81f 
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This means, counter-intuitively, that the closure comes about through the limitation 
not of  presence but its contrary, or to be more precise—the closure comes about from 
differance as the deferral/difference between presence and difference. The differance 
between infinite presence and infinite difference, which is indicated in the finitude of  
infinite difference in a way I will shortly outline, may demand the closure of  infinite 
presence. This is because presence is neither simply the absolute other of  difference, 
preserved in its infinitude by an absolute lack of  interrelation with its ‘outside’ and 
contrary, nor simply difference deferred, a product and consequence of  originary 
difference. Differance is the difference between difference and presence. Or to put it the 
other way, it is the presence of  each as the deferral of  the other. Presence is exposed to an 
other which is not simply external to any relation, nor capable of  being subsumed under it 
as a derivation, and therefore its closure is indicated in the instance in which the ontological 
question is opened up. The closure of  the search for origins in history is not the 
abandonment of  that project altogether; it just means that for the first time the search for 
origin beyond sense, beyond “the system of  wanting-to-say” (VP 88 “vouloir-dire” [Voix 
116]) has become urgent. The question of  the origin of  meaning presents itself  as if  for 
the first time in differance, because the outside of  meaning is not absolutely without 
relation. Nevertheless, this relationality does not make of  the sensible a ‘region’, for reasons 
I will go into shortly. 
In order to understand the other side of  history brought into play by differance, of  
course, it is necessary to explain the way the discourse of  differance is demanded ‘in the 
first place’ by the finitude that emerges from the concept of  infinity in Husserl as infinite 
difference or “indefiniteness of  différance” (VP 87) not derived from presence. At the 
same time, the infinite deferral of  the infinite present is a limit to the present’s ideal infinity, 
so the infinite as an infinite fullness is also terminated. This is why, as Derrida mentions, 
Husserl is consistently cognisant of  the limitation of  the “schema of  a metaphysics of  
presence” (VP 87) which, Derrida argues, his philosophy is nevertheless subject to. The 
finitude of  infinite presence makes phenomenology’s fate, that it “relentlessly exhausts 
itself  trying to make difference derivative” (VP 87), tragic; doomed to failure and 
disappointment. But what is the sense of  this failure? Notwithstanding phenomenology’s 
sometimes stubborn pursuit of  its tragic fate, however, is a grounding (so to speak—one 
that would in fact be a pseudo-grounding at best) in infinite difference similarly doomed? Is 
the infinite deferral of  the idea (which Derrida has shown to also be the infinite difference 
of  the idea) not just the idea which is capable of  sustaining the infinite work of  
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phenomenological enquiry? In order to account for phenomenology in this way, the 
appearance of  the idea of  infinite difference must be accounted for; the question ‘how is 
infinite difference that is not derivative of  fundamental presence thinkable?’ must be raised. 
And it is with this question that the problem of  infinity gets serious. How serious? 
The death sentence is imposed; “Only a relationship to my-death could make the 
infinite différance of  presence appear.” (VP 87) Derrida’s explanation for why death is 
necessary to the appearance of  infinite difference, to what would seem to have so little to 
do with it and perhaps, as infinite, resist it, is dizzyingly condensed. Derrida starts with 
Hegel’s depiction of  Kant’s conception of  the infinite idea as a sort of  apeiron; a mere lack 
of  limit, or, in Hegel’s own pejorative term—the ‘poor infinite’ (schlechte Unendlichkeit). The 
infinite as in-finite and a-peiron, which is merely the negation of  the finite, undermines its 
own concept because it is conceived on the basis of  its counterpart, in excluding the finite 
from the infinite, the infinite is made finite. The definition of  infinity annihilates infinity. 
Supposing that Hegel’s critique would hold just as well against Husserl’s conception of  
infinity as it does against Kant’s, Derrida, implies that infinite difference as the apeiron or 
indefinite is another name for the ‘poor infinity’ by referring to it here in his own terms as 
“the indefiniteness of  différance” (VP 87), the indefiniteness of  difference which is not 
derived from a prior full term (or presence). It is not only Husserl’s infinite, as in the 
infinite idea, then, that stands upon the paradox of  the apeiron (which has been held to be 
problematic since at least Pythagoras), but Derrida’s also. If  Husserl does not derive 
“difference from the fullness of  a parousia” (VP 87) that is in acknowledgement of  the 
impossibility of  doing so—of  the infinite delay which separates fullness from the 
discursivity of  the ideal object—it is an acknowledgement that Derrida will enthusiastically 
accede to. In his radical interpretation of  Husserl’s disruptions of  presence the 
distinguishing traits of  his philosophy are emerging fully developed—the notion of  the 
absolute as passage, the notion of  trace and of  fundamental differance—all of  which 
derive from the refusal to derive “difference from the fullness of  a parousia” (VP 87). The 
challenge then is not to eliminate the thought of  the in-finite, but to explain its thinkability. 
Derrida states, again in a Hegelian moment, that infinite difference can be thought only by 
thinking the ‘positive infinite’96. For differance to appear, its counterpart must be 
thought—the positive infinite. Given the appearance of  the positive infinite, infinite 
                                                
96 “the positive infinite must be thought (which is possible only if it thinks itself) in order that the 
indefiniteness of différance may appear as such.” (VP 87) “l’infini positif doit être pensé (ce qui n’est 
possible que s’il se pense lui-même) pour que l’indéfinité de la différance apparaisse comme telle.” 
(Voix 114). 
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difference can be thought, but only through death; only because the positive infinite must 
think its own death. 
What Derrida calls, after Hegel, ‘positive infinity’ can be nothing other than the 
absolute, the totality of  being, or else its ‘positivity’ would not be infinite.97 The difference 
which distinguishes entities from one another is exactly what is meant by a difference 
derived from presence, because it operates within the infinite presence of  the absolute. 
This is difference that can be thought, since it is within presence and does not demand the 
self-defeating logic of  the ‘poor infinity’. This difference will not, however, be infinite in 
the Kantian sense, since the absolute limits and makes it definite. Now, mathematically it is 
possible for the absolute to encompass subsidiary infinities, the way mathematical infinites 
can contain infinites, and indeed even equal infinites (the set of  all natural numbers starting 
from two is infinite and even though the set of  all natural numbers starting from one 
contains it, the latter is no greater or smaller than the former; they are both infinitely large). 
There is no reason why a difference within the absolute could not be an infinite difference, 
since infinity can always contain a plurality of  infinites. But logical infinity shows itself  to 
be different from mathematical infinity in this regard. Mathematical infinity is not logically 
infinite. To be infinite must mean to be without determination and limitation—whether 
because as the apeiron it is conceptually defined as such absence of  limits or whether because 
as the absolute it is conceived as all that belongs to being. Mathematical infinity is not 
infinite in this way—for starters it is already defined as belonging only to the realm of  
mathematics. A mathematical infinity is not without limits, but a set which is not limited in 
at least one dimension. It can be limited on its other sides, and in terms of  its character—
even the set of  all numbers is defined by the idea of  number. The mathematical infinite is, 
as such, always derived from the full presence of  an idea. The analogy therefore breaks 
down, because although a certain kind of  infinity or at least openness could belong to a 
difference that operated within the safe confines of  the absolute, it would not have the 
absolute and unconditioned infinitude of  logical infinity—it would already be determined. 
Infinite difference cannot be derived “from the fullness of  a parousia” (VP 87), because it 
would not then be infinite but derived from a presence which would be to it as a limit, and 
the infinite difference which constitutes is without a simple and definite origin in fullness. 
And yet, despite these difficulties, the conceptual self-contradictions of  ‘negative infinity’ 
preclude the thinking of  the idea and its infinitude on that basis (which would never have 
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been a basis). If  the infinite difference of  the ideal cannot be thought as the negation of  
limits or yet on the basis of  an abiding presence, then we are one step closer to death. The 
stakes are at their highest here, where death in the form of  the impossibility of  thinking 
the infinite which is not positive threatens the opening (and life) of  reason that the infinite 
promised. 
The difference between (and relation between) difference and presence is 
differance. There is a difference from even an infinite positivity, an absolute, which appears 
in death. Derrida indicates quite slyly that the thinking or appearance of  positive infinite 
must include the possibility of  death. This is necessary because the infinite must be self  
reflexive, or as he puts it; the thinking of  the positive infinite “is possible only if  it thinks 
itself” (VP 87). Otherwise, the infinitely present object would be limited by a subject over 
against it, and would not be infinite after all. Let us recall what this means—the living 
present which is the infinite origin of  being must be turned on itself  if  being is to be 
comprehended in its infinitude, a self-reflection which will bring into focus death, the death 
which limits the infinite. 
 
Alluding to the Hegelian notion of  the absolute as self-reflexive, the invocation of  
the relation to death as condition of  possibility for the appearance of  infinite difference 
hearkens back to Derrida’s earlier argument, in the chapter “Meaning and Representation”, 
that absence, which is to say specifically the possibility of  my absence—death—, lurks in 
presence, is in fact constitutive of  presence. In that argument, Derrida explains that the ‘I 
am’, far from having meaning only in the factual event of  the speaker’s own existence, in 
fact means something only because of  the possibility of  death or ‘absolute disappearance’; 
“The appearing of  the I to itself  in the I am is therefore originarily the relation to its own 
possible disappearance.” (VP 46) The reasoning is that because presence is, it has always 
been and will always be; “To think presence as the universal form of  transcendental life is 
to open me to the knowledge that in my absence, beyond my empirical existence, prior to 
my birth and after my death, the present is.” (VP 46) To say that “I am” is to make an 
association of  myself  with being (“The I am, being experientially lived only as an I am 
present, presupposes in itself  the relationship to presence in general, to being as presence.” 
[VP 46]) indicates the possibility of  my death in the necessity that being will always be. The 
relationship with presence as a relationship with the possibility of  absence, is constitutive 
                                                                                                                                          
97 As it is, it is not simply infinite, but, as Lawlor explains (see Lawlor, Derrida and Husserl 138), finite 
and infinite, due to the problematic logic of totality, which must both be finite, as it establishes the 
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of  the I—to be able to say ‘I am’, which is to say, to have a relationship with presence in 
general, I must have a relationship with my possible absence. To say ‘I am’ is to be able to 
think that the presence which now makes this ‘I’ possible somehow must with absolute 
certainty go on without me, that the present is and that this is is invulnerable to the possible 
disappearances to which I myself  am, and therefore to say ‘I am’ is to say ‘I will die’. The 
allusion to Heideggerean being-towards-death could scarcely be more obvious, especially 
when Derrida writes; “we can no longer say that the experience of  the possibility of  my 
absolute disappearance (of  my death) comes to affect me, supervenes over an I am and 
modifies a subject.” (VP 46) The implicit point is that we cannot take authentic being-
towards-death as a character of  a subject in any way, since it is rather that something like 
being-towards-death is constitutive of  the possibility of  subjectivity. 
Here Derrida would show that as the metaphysics of  presence metaphysics 
conceals absence and absence’s constitution of  presence. It treats being as though it need 
not be in relationship with its death, which is to say with non-being. The reduction of  the 
sign as, according to the logic of  representation, derivative of  original being is the same 
concealment of  non-being. The sign as the system of  derivation of  reproductions from an 
original presence isolates the relationship to death. This relationship to death animates the 
sign as relation between presence and absence, wherein reproduction in a sign produces 
relationship with absent being, as a system which all in all comes along afterwards, after 
simple presence. Although Husserl’s eidetic science is fundamentally the possibility of  
repetition, as well as the other ideal possibilities, it requires, according to Derrida, such a 
dissimulation of  the sign and the relationship with death—it requires the infinite presence 
of  the living present; “alone a temporality, determined on the basis of  the living present as 
its source, determined on the basis of  the now as ‘source-point,’ can secure the purity of  
ideality, that is, the openness of  the repetition of  the same to infinity” (VP 46)—without 
the originality of  a present there is no such thing as repetition. If  being is determined as 
presence, Derrida is arguing, then that determination must be rethought in a radical way so 
as to cease its dissimulation of  the absence which makes it possible, and at the same time 
impossible. The difference between being and non-being must be thought together with 
being’s deferral of  non-being, which is to say the relationship between them that is not 
difference, but dependence and concealment. This is indicated in ‘differance’, with the 
considerable wrinkle that being beyond being it is also beyond meaning. While I would 
counter that the necessity goes both ways—the same is only thus on the basis of  the 
                                                                                                                                          
limit of being, and at the same time infinite, as it is open to all being. 
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possibility of  its repetition to infinity—Hegel’s refutation of  the apeiron demonstrates a 
logical priority. 
To think the ‘I’ on the one hand, or to think the positive infinite on the other, is in 
any case to think death. This is why Derrida announces that “Only a relationship to my-
death could make the infinite différance of  presence appear.” (VP 87). The logic of  this 
has been laid out through the discussion in “Meaning and Representation” and it comes 
together in the presentation of  Hegel’s argument for infinity as the absolute which is self-
reflexive. Since the appearance of  the infinite must involve the appearance to self  of  the 
subject of  experience, and since death as the possibility of  absolute disappearance of  the 
subject is constitutive of  the subject, it follows that death, which is to say finitude and the 
possibility of  absence is constitutive of  positive infinity. In its constituting relation to 
death, the infinite is dependent on the finitude that death presents. In its constituting 
relation to death, the positive is dependent on the absence that death presents. These 
conditions of  possibility, which are also conditions of  impossibility, which is to say 
conditions which make the phenomenon and concept impossible at its origin, are perfect 
examples of  the form of  critique, or rather of  what is “at once more and less serious” 
(Rogues 124) than critique, that will remain with deconstruction; the quasi-transcendental 
condition of  impossibility. They represent the differance which precedes the difference 
between finite and infinite, presence and absence, etcetera; “The infinite différance is finite. We 
are no longer able to think it within the opposition of  the finite and the infinite, absence 
and presence, negation and affirmation.” (VP 87) 
The infinite difference and infinite delay which constitutes the origin of  meaning, 
which phenomenology is up to the task of  tracing, betrays its own thought—the 
impossibility of  thinking the infinite as the apeiron. On the other hand, infinite presence 
requires the thought of  its other in the necessity of  thinking its own death or absence. The 
origin sought, therefore, can only be thought on the basis of  differance—of  what does not 
divide itself  in the distinction between the finite and the infinite, between absence and 
presence, or between difference as delay and difference as difference. The paradoxes of  
infinity and finitude finally demand that phenomenology probe beyond meaning into the 
question of  origin which is not a ‘what’, but a ‘why’. 
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7 – Iterability and the meaning of  origin 
(“Signature, Event, Context”) 
 
In “Signature, Event, Context” the necessity of  iterability for signs and the sign is 
articulated in such a way that it is brought into tension with the necessity of  unity of  self-
identity which is also constitutive of  the sign. This poses a challenge to Husserl’s historical 
grounding of  science in originary meaning that the short essay only begins to touch upon. 
Meaning depends on iterability, on the possibility of  being infinitely repeated with its full 
meaning. However, if  meaning is always iterable then the unique instance of  it is incapable 
of  containing it. Derrida writes: “the very iterability which constitutes their identity never 
permits them to be a unity of  self-identity” (MP 318) Meaning never exists in an instant, 
because its meaningfulness is dependent upon the possibility of  infinite repetitions of  it in 
infinite other instants. Because an instant cannot contain what is necessary in order for 
meaning to exist, Derrida’s challenging thought runs, there cannot have been an origin of  
the meaning of  geometry. There cannot have been an instant in which the meaning of  
geometry was brought into being. There is no ‘essence of  the first time’, since the essence 
of  the first time already depends on the essence of  the subsequent iterations. Also, as we 
have seen before, the aporia cannot be quickly resolved by drawing a distinction at the 
iterability’s ‘mere’ possibility. Although it may appear that a conflation of  possibility and 
essential fact is the source of  confusion, and that the deconstruction merely aggravates this 
confusion, it is impossible to rigorously distinguish between the possibility of  iteration and 
the fact of  the first time, because, as I showed with respect to the coherence of  ideality, all 
of  the essential ideal structures of  meaning are possibilities. Though a fact, the origin of  a 
sense is a possibility contingent on the possible existence of  iterations thereof. Because the 
whole structure is eidetic, there is nothing which is actual in the sense that it has a priority 
over all possibility. 
 
 
a. Grounded in the Event 
 
If  an origin, that quintessential event, that event par-excellence, is not singular but essentially 
caught up in determining relationships to later iterations of  it, of  what it is as self-identical 
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unit of  meaning, then that ‘essence of  the first time’ which in the Origin was the basis of  
ideal history is not a simple ‘time’ that had been ‘first’. The necessity that the ideal 
objectivity must have had an origin in time which grounded the certainty of  historical 
necessity is destroyed when the just as necessary involvement of  identical iterations of  the 
origin is demonstrated. How can there have been a single ‘first time’ if  the first time is 
meaningless and unthinkable without the constituting possibility of  its absolute identity 
with the second time; indeed, with infinite other ‘times’; times which are necessarily not 
times of  an iteration of  something other and therefore are not other than first. Is it 
necessary to rethink the entire structure of  ideal history in the face of  this—to think a 
history which is not dependent upon the uniqueness of  the event of  the origin? Is such a 
history even possible or meaningful? Where would such a rethought history leave the 
reactivatory project with originary truth-meaning? Is originary meaning coherent if  the 
origin is proliferated?  
What is essential first of  all in history is the ‘essence-of  the-first-time’, the 
Erstmaligkeit that, as I explained earlier, Derrida borrowed from Fink and sought to marry 
to Husserl’s phenomenology of  history. In a footnote on page 48, Derrida insists that 
Fink’s concept “gives a thematic value to a signification aimed at by a profound intention 
of  Husserl.” (IOG 48fn) This ‘first time’ is what distinguishes history from an ahistorical, 
atemporal articulation of  essential characters and qualities in which priority would denote 
purely and simply a kind of  necessity. Within such a purely atemporal articulation of  ideal 
necessities, the absolutely apodeictic historical necessity of  the event, the ‘that it happened’ 
of  the origin, is not brought out. The essence-of-the-first-time indicates the foundation of  
historical certainty—that what is must have come to be. All the same, this may seem like a 
nice philosophical distinction and a trivial contribution to philosophy of  history if  one 
were to forget what is made possible by the determination of  historical necessity, of  a 
necessity that is not simply logical in the sense of  the logical interrelationships of  
concepts—the step beyond what is already logically contained in the science itself. This is 
the step that makes the enquiry into the subjective origin of  geometry—extraworldly 
history—possible. While the ideal meaning of  the objective science of  geometry is entirely 
internal to the logical meanings and interconnections of  its terms, the originating meaning 
of  geometry’s very own necessity is outside the logical structure of  the science. Because 
geometry’s meaning, its original meaningfulness, can only be in experience, that total region 
from which it wants to declare its independence, any certainty with respect to it is in the 
necessity of  the event of  its origin. To put it plainly—it is because geometry must have 
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come into being that its meaning can be associated with certainty with experience, the 
subject and its lifeworld. The meaning cannot be ascertained in pure atemporal logical 
necessity of  its own objective sphere itself. But geometry must have been invented, and 
thus it must have had meaning for a subject which is to say have had relevance to their 
lifeworld. And from that certainty essentially general characteristics of  the lifeworld, such 
as its being a world of  things with bodily character, can be descried. But the necessity of  an 
origin is the cornerstone of  this enquiry, this historical enquiry or Rückfrage. No ideal 
deduction is possible without it. 
 
 
The thrust of  Derrida’s deconstruction of  the event in “Signature, Event, Context” 
is the severing of  the sign’s meaningfulness, and of  meaningfulness in general, from its 
domination by its origin. By pointing out that the meaning of  the sign, its unity, is 
constituted by the iterability that transcends that very same self-identity, Derrida 
complicates the localisation of  the unity of  meaning in self-identity. Consequently, the self-
identical core as the basic element and origin of  meaning is destroyed. Meaning is not 
derived from a simple origin or ‘transcendental signified’ which would anchor the signifier 
thereof  in its indirect but sovereign presence. Derrida writes: “This structural possibility of  
being severed from its referent or signified (and therefore from communication and its 
context) seems to me to make of  every mark, even if  oral, a grapheme in general, that is, as 
we have seen, the nonpresent remaining of  a differential mark cut off  from its alleged 
‘production’ or origin.” (MP 318) The constituting possibility of  exact reproduction opens 
the same self-identity that had guaranteed the presence, or self-presence as presence to 
itself, of  meaning to alterity and difference. There is thus no longer an origin… at least not 
a simple one. 
 Here, in a different context and having become more sophisticated in 
philosophy of  language and structuralism, Derrida takes on the same target he took on 
four years earlier in Voice and Phenomenon—a self-identity of  meaning capable of  deriving all 
of  language and significations’ sorties and excursions. It is the same target as Voice’s pre-
expressive core of  sense. Instead of  a core, instead of  a unity that would be prior to the 
relation to an outside that constitutes expressivity and iterability, meaning can only be 
constituted by difference and by deferral of   that idea of  self-presence. In this 
deconstruction of  the origin three key Derridean ideas: the deconstruction of  presence, 
arche-writing, and differance are all articulated as what the enquiry into meaning brings up. 
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It is clear from Derrida’s deconstructions that the idea of  a united and fully self-
identical and present origin of  meaning is in no case tenable. Of  course, the chief  target in 
this context is J.L. Austin and the distinction that Derrida finds completely untenable; the 
possibility of  a rigorous distinction between the appropriate context of  an utterance and its 
being ‘taken out of  context’, as for instance by being cited. Derrida points out that Austin’s 
effort to keep citation and other ‘non-serious’ uses of  language separate and distinct—
“abnormal, parasitical” (MP 324)—ignores the necessity of  the possibility of  citation—it is 
impossible to imagine an utterance that is entirely sincere and original and to which the 
possibility of  iteration in “infinitely new contexts in an absolutely non-saturable fashion” 
(MP 320) did not already belong. Derrida writes ‘non-saturable’ because it is impossible for 
the original intention of  the utterance to saturate the infinite possible contexts in which it 
could find meaning, and thus for the possible meaning of  the utterance to be saturated and 
limited by the intention. Saturation would require the presence of  a conscious intention 
without which the sign could not function: “For a context to be exhaustively determinable, 
in the sense demanded by Austin, it at least would be necessary for the conscious intention 
to be totally present and actually transparent for itself  and others, since it is a determining 
focal point of  the context.” (MP 327) But if  this were the case, if  meaning was so limited 
by originating intention, it would be because it was without the iterability and self-identity 
that makes ‘taking out of  context’ possible. Meaning would not exist if  it were without this 
self-identity. He asks: “What would a mark be that one could not cite? And whose origin 
could not be lost on the way?” (MP 321) Thus, “one will no longer be able to exclude, as 
Austin wishes, the ‘non-serious,’ the oratio obliqua, from ‘ordinary’ language.” (MP 327)98 
It is also clear that Derrida wants his deconstruction to take hold not only in the 
peculiar aggravation of  the significance of  context that Austin’s theory of  performative 
utterances employs—the deconstruction of  the presence of  originating intention is meant 
to solicit a whole epoch of  metaphysical thinking. And Husserl epitomises this epoch. The 
reasons that Husserl exemplifies the metaphysics of  presence have been well explored—it 
is Husserl’s careful attention to what in his 1964/65 seminar Husserl called the 
                                                
98 In his “Reiterating the Differences: A Reply to Derrida” John Searle insists on the distinction 
between standard and parasitical forms of speech acts, as Derrida quotes him “there could not, for 
example, be promises made by actors in a play if there were not the possibility of promises made in 
real life.” (LI 89) In Limited Inc, Derrida himself reasserts what is explained in “Signature…”; that 
what is being distinguished from the standard here is the possibility of reproduction and repetition, 
and that this exclusion is by no means possible without the denial of the structure of language that 
is so-called standard (see LI 89). 
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‘irrecusability of  the present’ as the only possible form or position for experience as such 
that both brings to attention the constant and invariably assumed structure of  presence as 
the condition for experience, and thus also in bringing it to light primes it for and exposes 
it to scrutiny that would look into what it itself  presupposes. 
 Derrida is indeed entirely explicit that the same ethical and teleological 
determination that makes the distinction between language which  is ‘serious’ on the one 
hand and ‘abnormal’ and ‘parasitic’ language on the other possible is deeply engrained not 
only in Husserl’s theory of  language, but in the entire edifice of  transcendentalism. The 
possibility of  citation and other ‘abnormal’ or ‘parasitic’ forms of  language demonstrate 
the possibility of  the absence of  a signified that Husserl ethically determines as the crisis, 
which is to say the crisis of  the forgetting of  meaning. The crisis of  sciences is nothing 
besides this—the absence of  their signifieds, which is to say the forgetting of  the meaning 
of  their truth which opens up the possibility that it does not exist or is not recuperable. 
Derrida points out that the possibility of  determining this absence as a crisis is dependent 
upon the same teleologico-ethical limitation of  ‘normal’ language to “‘logical’ language” or 
“language of  knowledge” ( MP 319) meaning language which is not Sinnlosigkeit but which 
possesses meaning. What this would mean is that the language’s signified is not absent, but 
present. 
 However, as Derrida has shown in “Signature…”, absence, or to be more precise, 
the constituting possibility of  absence, is essential to meaning as such. If  that is the case, 
the counter-example to crisis is lacking, is in fact a non-sense, and what Husserl calls crisis 
is actually the normal state-of-affairs for meaning. Meaning is what is made possible by the 
possible absence of  the signified. The, as Derrida writes, “possibility of  functioning cut 
off, at a certain point, from its ‘original’ meaning and from its belonging to a saturable and 
constraining context” (MP 320) is what ‘constitutes’ the mark—the self-identical unit of  
meaning which is the basis not only of  the system of  written marks, but oral 
communication, and even meaningful experience itself. As I have fairly exhaustively 
demonstrated in my second chapter, on the eidetic and objective structure of  intentional 
consciousness, the possibility for being meaningful of  experience depends on its 
constitution as an objective, self-identical unity. Therefore iterability belongs to it de jure. As 
Derrida points out, this possibility deconstructs meaning by opening it up to the possibility 
of  the absence of  its own object. The whole possibility of  reactivation of  originary 
meaning and the resolution to the crisis must then be cast into doubt—as long as the 
possibility of  absence of  the signified belongs to the structure of  meaning it is impossible 
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to guarantee with the certainty necessary for the resolution of  crisis that the meaning that 
could ground the truth of  geometry (for example) were ‘present’. Because meaning is 
always constituted by the possibility of  absence, it is impossible to derive rigour from the 
certainty invested in the apodeictically certain determination of  an originary meaning. The 
apparent certainty of  the essential origin dissimulates the necessity of  the possibility of  its 
absence, without which it could never be the origin of  anything.99 Every present meaning, 
as meaning, is essentially absent from its origin. 
 This kind of  logic is what riled John Searle in his enagement with Derrida. In his 
reply to Derrida’s reply to his reply to “Signature”, “Literary Theory and Its Discontents”, 
Searle takes issue with Derrida’s excessive concern for exactitude and conceptual rigour;  
it is not necessarily an objection to a conceptual analysis, or to a distinction, 
that there are no rigorous or precise boundaries to the concept analysed or the 
distinction being drawn. It is not necessarily an objection even to theoretical 
concepts that they admit of  application more or less. 
(Searle, “Literary Theory and Its Discontents” p. 637) 
Searle accuses Derrida of  ignorance of  the history of  the philosophy of  language and of  
commitment to a certain pre-Wittgensteinian conception of  language” (Searle, 
“Discontents” p. 639). It’s tempting to sympathise with Searle’s apparent annoyance with 
the lawyerly-seeming rigidity at the base of  many of  Derrida’s quasi-transcendental 
investigations—if  it is possible to preserve important concepts such as meaning by merely 
being a little more relaxed about their meaning isn’t this the only reasonable approach? 
Should we not be willing to sacrifice exactitude to preserving our understanding of  the 
usual and normal for which such exactitude is, to all appearances, superfluous? Leaving 
aside that Searle seems determined throughout the debate to misinterpret Derrida’s 
deconstructions as mere sceptical rejection of  meaning (see Searle, “Discontents” p. 642), 
is not a more conservative approach possible, even necessary? 
 
 
b. Etho-Teleology of  Crisis 
 
                                                
99 Seemingly exasparated, Derrida explains the difference between a necessary possibility and a 
necessity in his response to Searle: “Sec never said that this absence is necessary, but only that it is 
possible (Sarl agrees) and that this possibility must therefore be taken into account: it [the 
possibility of an absent receiver] pertains, qua possibility, to the structure of the mark as such, i.e., 
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If  the logic of  originary meaning places it inescapably in this bind, it is not obvious what 
the juridical possibility of  the absence of  the signified ‘looks like’. Does it merely mean that 
the crisis of  grounding is inescapable? That there is no possibility of  grounding the ideal 
objectivity of  geometry and the like in experience? This cannot be the case, since as I have 
already shown there is a possibility of  determining the experiential counterparts of  ideal 
science. It seems to be true that the determination that geometry had to have originated in 
a world of  things and that the things, some of  them, had a bodily character. Moreover, it is 
true that this essential bodiliness does not belong to the predicates of  geometry itself. 
Something has been added, then—a meaning has been attached to the science, or else 
made explicit in it, that was missing before. What is at question is the originarity of  it and 
the necessity that attaches to it on that account. The originary grounding is the attachment 
to a given meaning of  a certain necessity—this is the epistemic significance of  the 
historical enquiry. It is not merely possible for geometry to be a way to exactly and univocally 
describe the sensible world. This is not one possible meaning among others, because 
although there may be other meanings for geometry, or especially for specific geometrical 
objects and theorems (a square may come to mean the principle of  limit and boundedness 
as opposed to the apeiron or infinite in the sense of  inexactitude itself  represented by the 
oblong shape, as it did for the Pythagoreans; and the number three may come to be 
attached to great theological significance in Christian mysticism), the meaningful relation to 
a sensible lifeworld was necessary in order for geometry to have been invented. 
 Husserl of  course never states explicitly why we should view the one as a viable 
candidate for originary meaning, and not the others, but it isn’t hard to expand on the 
necessity he does state. The originating meaning of  universal truths such as those of  
geometry could not be found in an arbitrary mystical system of  thought; in order to 
originate truth with the universality and necessity of  geometry, it must have been invested 
with meaning that was equally universal. Such universality is only to be found in the most 
essential and general characters of  the real phenomenally given world. This is not to 
discount the possibility that other extrinsic causes contributed to the purely chance fact of  
geometry’s invention—indeed, I have paid some attention to the importance of  the tax 
laws of  the Egyptian floodplain in occasioning protogeometrical innovations, and these 
laws and the annual flooding, and the Egyptian religion and burial traditions that 
encouraged accumulation of  great wealth and thus necessitated a rigorous taxation system, 
                                                                                                                                          
to the structure precisely of its iterability. And hence must not be excluded from the analysis of this 
structure… this possibility is always inscribed, hence necessarily inscribed as possibility” (LI 48) 
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is certainly nothing but contingent and extrinsic to the essential history of  geometry 
itself—but in order for geometry to have been invented as an eternal and universal truth 
that was also universally meaningful it must have been invested with a core of  meaning that 
was universal as well. 
 However, this originarity and the certainty at work in it is exactly what is called into 
question in the possibility of  the absence of  the signified. The possibility of  absence of  the 
signified and of  the resulting non-saturation of  meaning means that the historical enquiry 
(Rückfrage) that discloses the necessity of  an event of  the origin, and the meaningfulness 
that that in turn necessitates, can never saturate the possible meaningfulness of  the science 
of  geometry. The priority of  the originary truth meaning would no longer be absolute. Not 
even in the case of  a rigorous reactivating Rückfrage that had been exhaustive in the 
determination of  the essential, invariable, and universal meaning of  its truth could it 
saturate the possible originary meanings of  what as meaning and signification is necessarily, 
essentially separable and independent structure of  signification. 
The consequences of  this necessity are neither mysterious nor subtle—it is the 
impossibility of  tying the ideal science of  geometry to a rigorously determined origin with 
absolute certainty. The possibility of  the absence of  the originating intention cannot be 
conclusively overcome. A number of  concrete possibility result from this—there is the 
possibility that the meanings which because they are not sufficiently general and essential 
seem to be able to be dismissed as contingent and belonging to extrinsic history, such as 
the Nile flood-plain land-surveying or the mathemysticism of  the Pythagoreans or a similar 
but earlier sect, cannot be excluded, cannot with absolute certainty be said not to have 
determined the existence and meaning of  geometry, and even to have been the only way 
that geometry could have come to be. The history of  geometry would despite Husserl’s 
intentions still belong to an irreducible contingency, because there would be no possibility 
of  absolutely and finally excluding all merely contingent meaning from geometry, even 
from geometry not only as a historical and cultural artefact, but from its meaning as 
universally true. Without the possibility of  an originary intent saturating the meaning of  
geometry, there is no possibility of  absolutely excluding the significance of  the contingent 
meanings that we could otherwise say have merely attached themselves to geometry from 
having had a role in its apparent universal meaningfulness and truth. If  the success of  
geometry owes has been due to the contingently-associated meanings such as Egyptian 
land-surveying, Pythagorean mysticism, and even the idealised materialism of  Galilean 
science, it is not possible to exclude this as the source of  its meaning because of  a carefully 
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determined originary intention. The upshot would be that the meaningfulness of  geometry 
is not as universal as it appears to be, not only in a circumstance of  crisis but even were a 
reactivating imagination to appear to be successful. There would be no possibility of  ruling 
out with absolute certainty the possibility of  the relativism Husserl sought to avoid at all 
cost. A reactivated originary intention would never be more than a certain possibility of  
meaning—“In this typology, the category of  intention will not disappear; it will have its 
place, but from this place it will no longer be able to govern the entire scene and the entire 
system of  utterances.” (MP 326) This would be an utter tragedy for mathematics, according 
to Husserl.100 
While the deconstruction is written into the logic of  eidetic phenomenology, its 
consequence is a revisiting of  Nietzsche’s scepticism of  the origin—his adaptation of  
Hume’s rule that nothing of  the character of  a cause can be determined from its effect to 
the project of  genealogy—and the possibilities that this scepticism opens up, of  finding 
the origins of  values not in the same value, but in values altogether different, or in disvalue. 
As Foucault puts it, “What is found at the beginning of  things is not the inviolable identity 
of  their origin; it is the dissension of  other things.” (Foucault, “Nietzsche” 79) 
This danger is precisely what Searle’s second defence of  the invulnerability of  
meaning to interpretation and attention to Derrida in “Literary Theory and its 
Discontents” ignores. For Searle’s speech act theory the distinctions between sentence 
meaning and speaker’s meaning, type and token, etc. insulate the source of  truth of  
meanings—sentence meaning—from molestation by the speaker and from being perverted 
by intent which runs counter to the sentence’s own meaning. Searle writes: If  
communication is successful, I will have succeeded in performing a serious, literal, 
nondefective speech act. What follows from the fact that I or somebody else might take a 
different token of  the same sentence type and do completely different with it? To repeat, 
                                                
100 Bernhard Waldenfels, in his article “The Despised Doxa” imagines a more fruitful radicalisation 
of imagination that remains in line with the intentions of phenomenological investigation. By 
increasing the scope of imaginary variation from appearances to the conditions under which things 
appear, variation would be extended to the structures of appearance. This would allow the 
distinctions between the everyday and the extraordinary to be problematised, with a rethinking of 
the extraordinary: “The latter is not to be thought as the exception, but rather as the permanent 
back-side of the ordinary and regulated, whose threads invisibly penetrate the visible fabric.” 
(Waldenfels, “The Despised Doxa” 36) 
It is not to be doubted that imaginary variations must continually broaden and disrupt its own 
parameters in order to prevent itself from settling into a hide-bound and conservative echo-
chamber, it is unclear to me whether the radicalisation of variation from appearances to their 
structures is capable of this or whether it is even any different from what is already involved in a 
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nothing whatever follows. The intentionality of  tht speech act covers exactly and only that 
particular speech act.” (Searle, “Discontents”, p. 660) Searle’s view does not imply the 
laughably improbable position that sentence meanings are invulnerable to tampering, 
change, and distortion; on the contrary, his view of  these is that that meanings depend on a 
background, its context, that can change (see Searle, “Discontents”, p. 640-41). There is 
however, a bizarre consequence of  Searle’s view—it does not offer any way to understand 
the possibility for speakers’ meaning to effect sentence meaning. 
Now, without a doubt Husserl is opposed to relativism. There is no more 
consistent motivation running through his work than the determination of  the absolute 
certainty and universality of  mathematics and the resistance to any relativisation thereof. In 
Logical Investigations he refutes psychologism on the basis of  its reliance upon facts, 
specifically facts about the human psychological makeup, to derive logical principles; “any 
theory is logically absurd which deduces logical principles from any matters of  fact” (LU 
82), the reason being that matters of  fact, even those which are so general that the entire 
human species is characterised by them, “are ‘contingent’: they might very well not have 
been the case, they might have been different” (LU 82). The determination not to confute 
fact and logic continues to motivate Husserl in his critique of  science. The quest to renew 
science by grounding it in essential and universal meaning is motivated by an intolerance 
for contingency in the foundations of  science—it is the quest for the grounding of  science 
in absolute, general conditions of  experience as such. However, in the defence against the 
confusions of  relativism it is just as crucial not to misunderstand its scope, and to weaken 
and corrupt the meaning of  the priority of  logical principles by expecting them to appear 
where they cannot.  
It is crucial to understand the certainty of  the origin, and what is at stake in the 
certainty of  origin. As an origin, it is of  course necessary in the sense that the invention of  
geometry had to have originated with this meaning, but there is nothing to ensure that it 
had originated to begin with, and therefore that the meaning that is universal for it is 
universal tout court. Even this level of  certitude is not supported by the possibility of  the 
absence of  the signified, however. There can be no absolute certainty as to the existence of  
the necessary, the universal and essential, and logical principle. That the logical principle 
cannot be derived from any matters of  fact does not and cannot guarantee the existence of  
any logical principle ‘there’ to begin with. The possibility of  the absence of  the signified 
                                                                                                                                          
rigorous eidetic investigation. It is unclear, above all, whether such a radicalisation can stave off the 
need for a deconstructive approach. 
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indicates the possibility that there is no logical principle grounding meaning and giving it 
the necessity of  universal meaningfulness, but this only reinforces what the structure of  
crisis already demonstrated—that the forgetting of  originary meaning contains the 
possibility that no adequately grounding meaning is there to be found. It is impossible to 
tell the difference between a science in crisis and that which is not and never was a science 
at all, at least for as long as the forgetting of  meaning persists. It is always possible in the 
event that meaning is not available to ground the science that there was no meaning of  the 
kind needed there to begin with; that geometry and the sciences were ungrounded to begin 
with. This danger is precisely what made crisis serious. What is newly thrown into doubt in 
Derrida’s deconstruction of  the event of  the origin is only the possibility of  the absolutely 
certain confirmation of  the grounding of  meaning in the universal structure of  experience. 
It means that essentially the crisis can never be resolved or escaped. 
 Is the diagnosis of  crisis a purely negative exercise, then? Is there nothing that can 
be gained from the reactivating intuition? Is the search for originary meaning at best a 
vanity and at worst a delusion that could only serve to reinforce our own presuppositions 
and give us false licence to propagate them? Not quite—while it is impossible to achieve 
absolute certainty that the meaning of  science is grounded, it is possible to determine with 
certainty what could provide such a grounding and thus what such a grounding must be if  
indeed there is one. It can be made clear that if  there is a grounding of  ideal geometry in 
an essential and general structure of  experience it could not be something like the 
measurement of  farmland on the flood-plains of  the Nile for the purposes of  taxation, nor 
the ethical and mystical determination of  the meanings of  numbers and shapes—it could 
only be something like the exact description of  things in their bodily character. Only 
meanings of  a certain kind can be the origin of  logical principles—these are logical 
principles themselves and not matters of  fact—this is the sole defence against the logical 
confusion and nonsense of  relativism that is left standing after Derrida’s deconstruction of  
the transcendental origin and signified, but perhaps it is enough merely to keep categories 
and realms of  meaning clear. 
 If  Husserl’s aim in opposing relativism is understood in the more modest sense of  
defending the meaning of  logic from the absurdity of  attempting to derive it from facts, 
then there is nothing in the exercise of  an eidetic history which must be rejected. However, 
the destruction of  the sense of  origin, while it confirms the origin in its radical sense does 
have this consequence—it makes the claim to unconditioned universality of  meaning-
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ground contingent on the existence of  the truth it grounds, and prescribes the claim to 
absolute truth. 
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis has aimed to show what is necessary for a philosophical and self-critical history 
and to answer the question how it is possible for the historical to have a place in the pursuit 
of  truth, and to present some problems that arise from that answer. Finally, it has explored 
the question of  the meaning of  the problems—what the state of  knowledge is in light of  
the problems it faces. If  it is possible for truth to be explained in strictly phenomenological 
terms, or in other words—if  it is possible for us to account for the existence of  truth, it 
will be because it is possible to account for how truth comes to be. It is Derrida’s analysis 
that shows that a phenomenological account of  the existence of  truth and meaning 
demands a historical account of  how truth comes to be. In Husserl’s Crisis writings 
themselves, this part of  the motivation for the explanation of  the constitution of  ideal 
objectivity is always only implicit. 
This thesis has explained the interdependence of  history and knowledge in 
Husserl’s development of  a philosophically critical history. It has sought to explain why 
history is necessary, why it must start with the examination of  the backward-looking 
attitude that makes it historical, and why—contrary to the usual opposition of  truth and 
history—objective, universal truth can be made sense of  only through the explanation of  
how it had come to be. While Derrida’s deconstruction of  the prioritisation of  the present 
in Husserl and throughout philosophy—a priority the zenith of  which is philosophical 
history—must confirm this unity of  history and truth even as it indicates its inability to 
come to task with the past itself; his intervention certainly challenges the necessity of  an 
opposition to ungroundedness of  a Husserlean or any other type. The investment in 
groundedness of  meaning and the involvement of  discourse in the teleology of  truth 
maintain a certain hold on any talk that would make a claim to truth and groundedness, but 
talk of  that kind begins to look less motivated in an absolute sense, and to look more like a 
decision, or a leap of  faith. This appearance is deceptive, however—in deconstruction the 
infinite task remains. 
The importance of  this question—whether a combined epistemic and historical 
project is possible—is the double-bind between the necessity Derrida indicates of  having 
enough humility in one’s philosophy to recognise the limits of  certainty and rigour on the 
one hand, and the Husserlean necessity of  accounting for truth. The latter comes back to a 
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kind of  humility too, I believe. What demands truth is not the will to absolute knowledge 
or omniscience, but the demand to avoid dogmatism—the kind of  dogmatism that any 
shortcomings or lapses in our pursuit of  truth, whether of  a skeptical or assertive mood, 
invites. It is just as much a treason to precipitately give up on the quest as it is to announce 
it is over. In a way, the ideas of  destruction or deconstruction are meant to acknowledge 
this double-bind. 
To give up on the science of  history or of  having the possibility of  doing history 
taken away would be to give up on communication and the entire coherence of  ideal 
possibilities which together make up the possibility of  culture and humanity itself. We 
would be left with complete lack of  relation and a “dogmatism in pre-Kantian style” (VM 
130). Not only would the abandonment of  congress be an unfathomable loss on its own 
terms, the notion of  an isolated position could not stand up to any investigation without 
showing itself  to be contaminated, according to Derrida’s logic. Moreover, the exclusion of  
relation is also the rejection of  the idea of  evidence in any form. 
One of  the things phenomenology allows us to do is to recognise that the 
questions at the limit or the outside of  the possibility of  knowledge are neither the biggest 
nor the most interesting nor the most urgent. Most of  the questions with which 
philosophy should concern itself  are within certain limits, certain assumptions. 
Deconstruction allows us to do away with the falsity of  an arbitrary and unsound 
distinction which closes off  these enquiries from the outsides which their presuppositions 
cut them off  from, but without ending the discussion and destroying the question at hand. 
It allows us to recognise the limits, without forcing us to throw up our hands in despair and 
walk away. I have tried in this thesis to strive for an account of  historical meaning which 
takes these concerns to heart and builds itself  an edifice with many doors leading in and 
out. 
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